A defense of Frank Salter’s defense of us

Frank Salter has given us a new understanding of the relationships of individuals to ethnies and ethnies to each other.  But being the pursuit of the freedom of the individual, liberalism must cast down and, in the end, destroy ethnicity.  Salter, therefore, is useful to those who would oppose this outcome; in the hands of our people the notion of ethnic genetic interests (EGI) would go a long way to awaken our ethny to itself and to its circumstance.  Liberalism cannot allow this and must, if it is to complete its purpose of “freeing” Western Man, falsify Salter’s notion or, failing that, render it morally illegitimate.

David B and GNXP have fallen in line with the attempt to falsify EGI.  Therefore, both from the point of view of resisting this attempt and of disseminating the idea of EGI into public life, it is necessary to intrude once again - and at some length - upon the goodwill and intellectual appetite of MR’s readers.

Please note all references to Salter’s work are from his first edition of On Genetic Interests.  Parts I, II, and III of David’s critique of Salter can be found at GNXP, for example here.  I strongly advise you to pull up the appropriate pages and have them to hand on your screen while you peruse the following.

Part I: Philosophy concerns “quasi-philosophical issues” that are addressed in both this previous MR post and in the comments thread to that post.

There is a practical way of translating David’s disinterest in genetic continuity (eg, not caring about the fate of one’s own children).  If someone cares about his children or his ethny (or nation, etc), then this is a value not subject to rational critique - unless the entity of attachment does not exist.  But, as we know, all these categories do have an objective existence.  If David wishes to maintain the nihilistic idea that “life has no interests” that is his right and we will not be able to convince him otherwise.  However, those who believe that life indeed does have interests will find Salter’s arguments more compelling than those of David.

As regards the nonsense that Salter is anti-eugenic, see below (response to Part II, points 3 and 5).  In point of fact, looking at some of the arguments David makes, particularly in Part II (and to some extent, Part III) and looking also at his constant harping about eugenics, I am led to wonder if all of these ideas and arguments really originated with David himself.  Ultimately though, other than in the important consideration of motivation, it matters not - because the arguments put forth by David, whatever their origin, fail to convince.

Part II: Technical Comments is revealing since the main answers to David’s comments are to be found in Salter’s book itself.  My main aim here is to demonstrate that fact to third party readers, who should obtain that work for themselves and carefully compare it to GNXP’s misrepresentations.

Point 1: If it is not clear in Salter’s work, he is referring to distinctive gene frequencies rather than distinctive genes per se.  David’s assertion about the relative non-importance of human genetic variation is an opinion, which mirrors the “we are all the same” arguments of race-deniers.  Salter deals with this in section 4e of his book (pages 89-93).  Given that genetic information is arraigned in a hierarchical fashion, with small changes in control genes and promoter/enhancer regions having significant downstream effects on total gene expression and resultant phenotypes (on which selection operates), the “differences are too small” argument falls flat.  Ironically, many of the non-political posts in GNXP’s own archives underline the importance of human genetic variation and thus contradict David’s assertions of the universalist genetic identity of humanity.  The idea that we are all essentially clones of each other is undermined by new data that shows variation between individuals (the Nature Genetics paper described below concentrates on groups, btw).  The “we are 99.9% the same” commentaries may soon become undermined by reality.  Does David deny that individuals belonging to the same population group have more common/recent ancestors than persons belonging to different groups and thus share more distinctive gene frequencies?

Of interest as well as Salter’s point (page 91) that the politically-correct minimization of human genetic variation is an inversion of scientific reasoning, in that it attempts to obscure rather than “explain and predict facts” such as gene-caused phenotypic differences between population groups.  If human biodiversity results from that genetic variation which David says is so small, then this stresses rather than diminishes the importance of these small differences.  In addition, genetic interests are relative and even siblings - whose genetic differences are small compared to those that characterize population groups - have differences in interests (“sibling rivalry”).  Furthermore, genetic interests are the product of the extent of relative genetic variation multiplied by the numbers of people involved. The genetic interest inherent in ethnies is very large because of population size.

I am gratified to see that David B mentions combinations of genes in his critique, for that is, in my opinion, the only real flaw in Salter’s work - that Dr. Salter does not consider patterns/combinations of gene frequencies as a genetic interest, even though such patterns are in fact a genetic interest.  What this does, of course, is increase the importance of genetic interests, and adds to the refutation of David’s critique.

Point 2: With respect to the broad scope of genetic interests, this section by David is essentially nit-picking as well as a repetition of his previous argument.  Nevertheless, it is worth analyzing in detail to clarify some of Salter’s points.

First, Salter’s comment (page 326) about “...ever more complete genetic maps” suggests he realizes that more genetic data is needed (also see page 54 and page 265).  It may also be noted that (neutral) gene assays are based upon the statistical method of sampling; these assays are used by Salter to provide estimates of the probability of persons sharing the same distinctive functional alleles that Salter is primarily concerned with.  Regardless how genetic variation is assayed, David will ultimately be disappointed that his “we are all the same” mantra is not supported.

For example, Nature Genetics 5, 598-609, 2004 asked, “what proportion of SNPs and haplotypes are shared among groups if alleles are ascertained in an unbiased fashion?” African-Americans and European-Americans were compared.  The conclusion: “...most of the common SNPs in this data set are either private or common in only a single population.” Haplotype analysis gave similar results.  More to the point, even many of those SNPs common to both groups had markedly different frequencies (ie, their frequencies were population distinctive).  And these were derived from functional DNA sequences, relevant because Salter stresses functional genes in his work.  However, the functional/non-functional divide doesn’t really alter anything, since this paper also states that “...ancestry inferences are robust using a modest number of polymorphisms in either coding or non-coding regions.” Also, see here.

Second, since Salter is indeed concerned with functional genes (see point 4), it does make sense to examine gene/allele frequency.  David’s complaint about “function and fitness” is somewhat contradictory since he then suggests that total genomic similarity be considered, which is not really concerned with “function and fitness”.

Third, the main body of point 2 is essentially just a restatement of point 1, and can be answered the same as above for point 1.

Fourth, the argument against the importance of general “genetic similarity” is even more fundamental. Just as natural selection is dependent upon genetic variation and works upon genetic differences, by analogy, so do relative differences in genetic interests depend on distinctive gene frequencies.  Thus, genetic interests are not concerned with absolute levels of genetic similarity.  Mice share ~ 90% of their gene sequences with humans, but this does not mean that two (or more) mice constitute a greater genetic interest for you than does one other single human.

Salter clearly states in his book (page 95) that it is only distinctive genes [frequencies] that are important (not total genetic similarity).  Harpending also makes this point in his onion analogy in the Appendix (page 327).  Genetic variation that is randomly distributed among populations does not constitute ethnic genetic interest because the gene (and gene sequence) frequencies remain the same regardless of the outcome of ethnic competition.  Thus, it is not overall genetic similarity that is the point per se, but distinctive genetic information, in a relative sense.  Salter (page 47) illustrates the relative nature of genetic interests with his “a world made up of cousins” analogy.

The bulk of human genetic variation is within populations, randomly distributed among the groups; in fact, as Sarich and Miele state in their book “Race”, because humans are diploid a significant fraction of human genetic variation is found within each individual person.  Genetic information that does not differ in frequency between groups is not the stuff upon which inter-group competition and genetic interests are built.  For most but not all (!) of the human genome it would not matter if all humans except for Bushmen were killed, because the genetic variation in Bushmen is at least as great as that of any other human population and composes the bulk of total human genetic variation.  However, for those distinctive gene sequences, for which there is considerable inter-group variability, much would indeed be lost if specific populations are diminished or eliminated.  Members of groups thus have interests (ethnic genetic interests) in the frequencies of those distinctive genes/gene sequences, which is what in fact distinguishes one human group from another at the genetic level. Furthermore, those gene frequencies that result in the phenotypic differences between population groups are concentrated in the genetic variation between groups.  Therefore, not only is this lesser level of variation more valuable because of its uniqueness and distinctiveness but also because of its functional information. 

This is why it is not important that an Irishman may theoretically share more similarity in his overall genome to a Nigerian than to another Irishman, for that similarity is based upon randomly distributed genetic variation that, because it is ubiquitous, has no value as a genetic interest.  However, the Irishman in question will in fact share more similarity with another Irishman than with a Nigerian for that genetic information that is not randomly distributed, but distinctive.

This is also why it would be more adaptive for an Irishman to support his fellow Irishman in competition with a Nigerian who may be more similar to the Irishman in the entire genome.  The bulk of the similarity between the Irishman and the Nigerian is based upon gene sequences randomly distributed among all humans and thus this similarity does not constitute meaningful information in distinguishing intra-human genetic interests; eg, between those of Irishmen and Nigerians.

If all Nigerians became extinct, this would not change the worldwide frequencies of this randomly distributed genetic information.  It will still be found in similar proportions in all other populations, and thus the Irishman would lose no genetic interest.  However, if all Irishmen except for our Irish person of interest became extinct, then there would be a diminishment in unique and distinctive genetic information, and therefore a significant loss of genetic interest for our subject.  An incorrect emphasis on absolute numbers of similar gene sequences, rather on the relative nature of distinctive genetic information, would result in the absurd conclusion that a person has a greater genetic interest in a vegetable garden (or any other organic mass containing a large number of similar [potentially] replicating gene sequences) than in their own child.  Selection, competition, and conflicting biological interests are based upon distinctions in genetic information, not upon randomly distributed genetic similarity, genetic information that retains the same representation in the population regardless of outcome. (See also Salter’s book, pages 45-48, 95, and 327-333).

OK, on to points 3 and 5.  Here we observe a serious problem in which Salter’s views are being grossly misrepresented, and clearly written statements in his book are being completely ignored.  Salter’s views are not “anti-eugenic”, and the Huntington’s example is vulgar and absurd.  Salter openly and clearly states (Section 4d, page 89) that it would be adaptive, in a net sense for the entire distinctive genome, for maladaptive alleles to be sacrificed.  A quote:-

Those dysfunctional alleles no longer serve the interests of the majority of the genes compromising the genome and thus the individual’s genetic interests would be preserved or increased by substitution of maladaptive alleles.

After that, for anyone to assert that Salter’s position in any way implies that genes for fatal diseases need to be preserved is the height of mendacity.  Salter also makes a similar point about possible adaptive changes in genetic structure in section 4g, page 109, in which he states that specific positive genetic characteristics could be spread throughout a population via “inter-marriage or reproductive technologies”.  Salter also makes the point in his ethics section (page 319) that genetic competition must be allowed to continue, but within limits - total displacement, or severe diminishment, of ethnies is to be avoided. Salter approvingly discusses Hamilton’s point that “social systems must leave room for adaptive genetic replacement”.  However, Salter stresses, again, that ethnic displacement is wrong, and that adaptive changes in gene frequencies can take place without such displacement.  Indeed, for most of human history, selective pressures have been acting on isolated, relatively homogenous populations.  Eugenics can be practiced within the ethnie, and, yes, without the “intermarriage” that Salter mentions, and it is completely compatible with a strong commitment to ethnic genetic interests, as I discuss here.

Eugenic modulation within the ethnie is best, since it preserves kinship genetic interests while boosting adaptive genetic interests.  Intermarriage between widely separated groups would destroy genetic interest to a far greater extent than any putative increase in a positively valued trait, as my IQ example illustrates.

In summary, I see points 3 and 5 as gross distortions of Salter’s openly stated views. Essentially David lifts from Salter’s book the possible objections, but neglects to give Salter’s answers.  These distortions are a plain warning sign to third parties NOT to depend on GNXP for honest analyses of Salterism.

With regard to point 4 please see my answers to 3 and 5 above.  Also, please bear in mind that this criticism is again a gross distortion of Salter, who makes clear again and again that he is talking about functional genes: eg, he mentions the importance of this on pages 87-88; on page 88 he clearly states that he has relegated non-functional DNA sequences to “non-interest status”.

Actually the distinction between functional and non-functional genes is, I think, going to be worn down over time, given increasing evidence that “non-functional” genes actually do have regulatory functions.  Furthermore, I argue that even some real non-functional genes constitute part of genetic interests, because they can embody distinctive genetic information.  Functional genes may constitute both kinship genetic interests and adaptive genetic interests, while non-functional genes may constitute kinship genetic interests only.  On a per codon basis, the functional genes are of course, a greater interest but the non-functional genes are an interest as well.  While Deutsch, like Salter, stresses the importance of functional genes, he admits (pages 173-174 in “Fabric of Reality”) that this is a matter of degree.  The information of functional genes fills their “niche” better than non-functional genes, since the functional genes actively contribute to their own replication.  But, non-functional genes carry information as well, even if it is of lesser value.  For example, I suggest that DNA sequences relevant to kinship (eg, ancestral markers) are a form of information and if information is fundamental to reality (with genetic information being fundamental to life), then it has value.

My assertion that true non-functional genes can constitute genetic interest does not obviate the points made in response to point 2 regarding Salter’s stress on functional genes in his analysis of genetic interest. The key here is information - distinctive genetic information. Deutsch stresses that genes embody knowledge; eg, he states that life “is about the physical embodiment of knowledge” (page 181 of Fabric of Reality).  Functional genes (including so-called “non-functional” genes that have real regulatory roles) embody knowledge of their niches and contribute to their own replication in a real way.  Certain true non-functional genes embody knowledge of kinship between living organisms, and these distinctive non-functional gene markers can be considered analogous to the gene alleles discussed in point 2.

I cannot ignore the fact that that a portion of the non-functional genome that is distinctive contains information.  I see information as being fundamental.  After all, there is a choice - there can be non-functional sequences “A” or non-functional sequences “B”.  Those that are randomly shared between all groups are not interests between humans, since they give no information.  Those ancestral markers that distinguish ethnies represent information, and thus, I argue, represent interest (since there is competition for which of these distinctive gene sequences will be represented in the next generation).

Do please note that these thoughts on the importance of (true) non-functional genes are my own.  Salter - contrary to David’s implication - focuses on functional genes.  Furthermore, the historical development of the gene frequency differences that Salter is concerned with is not relevant to current consideration of genetic interests.  The main question with respect to genetic interest is “what”, not “why.” Thus, whether selection or drift (or any other mechanism) is responsible for observed gene frequencies does not change the interests in question.

As a side note, I’d suggest that in any future update of “On Genetic Interests” Dr. Salter should not only clarify these points further, but should also add sections on:-

- Genetic patterns/combinations as genetic interests

- Compare and contrast kinship genetic interests and adaptive genetic interests

- Intrinsic value of genetic information; compare and contrast roles of functional and non-functional genes

- Do dominant alleles have greater influence (positive or negative) on genetic interests than do recessive alleles?

- Discussion on how ethnic and meta-ethnic identities can boost adaptive behavior with respect to genetic interests even in light of potential kinship overlap between closely related groups

In Part III: Intermarriage Fallacy David presents a two-group (English-Bantu) population model to demonstrate that the proportions of distinctive genes remain the same after intermarriage.  He also asserts that the loss of kinship on one side of the intermarriage divide is counterbalanced by an equal loss on the other side; given the relative nature of genetic interests, intermarriage would thus result in no loss of genetic interest.  Discuss.

Putting aside for the moment questions about patterns of gene frequencies (below), David’s analysis does not take into proper consideration the following two essential factors:-

1) The fixed carrying capacity of each nation (an integral part of Salter’s thesis discussed, for example, on pages 61-63 of his book), and

2) The effects of unidirectional migration.

So, for #1 we can talk about the number of “English gene equivalents” in an English population at any given time.  However, England has a fixed carrying capacity.  Let us say for example it is 150 million.  Whether those 150 million are of pure English stock or of mixed English-Bantu stock makes an enormous difference to the genetic interests of the current English population and to each individual Englishman.  Population cannot increase infinitely.  If the 150 million people are “pure” English (and of course diploid), then that’s 300 million sets of “English” genes (300M/2 = 150M).  If the 150 million are English-Bantu hybrids, then there are 150M “English” genes and 150M “Bantu” genes.  If we say that the carrying capacity is 300 million, or 1 billion, or any number short of infinity, the same holds.

As regards #2 there is one-way gene flow from non-white nations to England.  So, it is NOT the case that a miscegenating Englishman is boosting his fitness by “preventing” the births of pure Bantus in a reciprocal fashion.  In Africa, pure Bantus are still being born without the threat of immigration and genetic dilution, and these will fill the carrying capacity of their territory in sub-Saharan Africa.  Meanwhile, there is unidirectional migration of Africans to the UK, where they dilute the genetic interests of the native English ethny.  Intermarriage in the UK may prevent the birth of pure Bantus in the UK, but the presence of Bantus in the UK represents an excess of Bantu genetic interests above and beyond the store of undiluted genetic interests in their homeland.  In other words - and this is crucial - intermarriage in the UK represents a positive net expansion of Bantu genes.  They are not being prevented from producing pure Bantus - they have every opportunity to pursue a national ethnic strategy in Africa.  The people who are really being prevented from producing “pure offspring” are the English, for it is their territory that is being invaded.

Since the flow of people (and genes) is not reciprocal, then the effects of intermarriage are not reciprocal. It is the native ethny of the mixed state who are being prevented from maintaining their representation of the world-wide population.  The alien ethny both maintains their representation in their homelands and expands their genes in someone else’s territory.  Ultimately, the Bantu genes are, on a world-wide basis, expanding, while those of the English are declining.  How on earth is there any reciprocity in that?

As regards the interests of an individual Englishman, the same holds.  By intermarriage, he loses parental kinship compared to endogamy, and he also loses relative genetic interest not only compared to endogamous co-ethnics and non-ethnics but also to exogamous non-ethnics, because of the asymmetrical nature of gene flow as described above.

Let us use another simple model of population and immigration to summarize these points. Take two populations A and B who live in their respective nations AX and BX.  Let us assume that AX and BX both have a carrying capacity of “12 genetic-population units”.  We start with the condition that AX has 4 A units and BX has 8 B units.  Two B units migrate from BX to AX; typical unidirectional migration.  Both nations now have 6 population units; BX is “pure” 6 B, while AX is 4A and 2 B.  Let us assume no further immigration, and that in AX both ethnies have ~ equal growth rates (a very conservative assumption).  Both nations then reach carrying capacity.  BX will have 12 B units.  Given proportional growth, AX will have 8 A and 4 B units.

Obviously, this unidirectional migration has harmed A’s interests, in that they have suffered a decline in their population compared to what it would have been (12A) without the migration of B.  The worldwide genetic representation of A has been diminished, while B has benefited by increasing its genetic representation over and beyond the capacity of BX alone, from 12B to 16B.

According to classical Salterism, the damage to A will be the same, in a strictly genetic basis, regardless of whether the two groups in AX had remained endogamous after the B migration event, or whether there was intermarriage.  The same number of individual “genetic units” from each group would be present.  However:-

1) An interest in patterns/combinations of genes and gene frequencies yields a gross decrease in fitness comparing exogamy over endogamy.  On a worldwide basis, A suffers more than B, because B is still present in undiluted form in BX.

2) Even given classical Salterism, exogamy hurts A’s interests by decreasing the organic solidarity of the A group.  Imagine that endogamy was maintained.  Group A could rally around a historical A identity and pursue group interests vs. B.  They could promote repatriation of B, separation, or some other political-social movement to attempt to restore/maximize A’s interests over that of the B newcomers.  They could attempt to out-breed (eg, going against the assumption above), maximizing A gene frequencies.

But once admixture occurs, a heavily hybridized population cannot extricate A interests away from that of B.  Families would be mixed, genomes would be mixed, and whatever pure A’s remain would have a limited potential to recruit sufficient numbers of other pure A’s to their side in the struggle against B interests.  Some pure A’s would have admixed family members, etc.  Given sufficient intermarriage, the interests of the two groups would become so intertwined that it would be impossible for the original interests of group A to be pursued.

Thus, even with classical Salterian theory, endogamy is to be preferred because it allows the native ethny to strategize on a group-centered basis to salvage genetic interests. Group B, secure in their original homeland, can afford to dilute A’s interests and group solidarity via intermarriage.  The effects - genetic and socio-political - of intermarriage are not reciprocal because the migration is not reciprocal.  This holds regardless of whether the migration was voluntary (immigration) or involuntary (slave trade).

David B is also a bit inconsistent about all of this.  Salter considers intermarriage from both the familial and ethnic dimension.  If we focus on the family, it is clear that endogamy is superior, in that it boosts relative parental kinship.  But ah! … we are told by David that we must also consider the effects of mate choice on others.  Very well.  Why stop at the “spare English woman” or the local Bantu immigrant “prevented” from producing pure Bantu offspring?  If we need to consider the effects on others, in the context of ethnic genetic interests, then we need to consider effects on the entire ethnies, no?  And given realities of unidirectional immigration, the effects on others of intermarriage is always to lower the fitness of the net receiving ethny and to boost that of the net “contributing” immigrant ethny.

You can’t have it both ways, indeed!  If you wish to consider “effects on others” you cannot arbitrarily stop the analysis at the point that is convenient for your argument.  You must consider the proportional representation of ethnic genes and gene frequencies both within the entire nation and within the world-wide human population, and you must consider the time dimension as well – “effects on others” include future generations (who will be faced with a maxed-out carrying capacity) as well as the current one.  After all, consideration of the genetic relationship between generations is what the intermarriage/genetic interests idea is all about.

To summarize the classical Salterian view:-

Regardless of intermarriage, the mere presence of alien peoples (eg, immigrants and their descendants) harms the genetic interests of every member of the native ethny.  If some natives out-marry with the aliens, they also suffer a loss of parental kinship with their offspring relative to what they would have obtained with endogamy and they also lose genetic interest relative to those co-ethnics who do not out-marry.  Alien ethnics who out-marry, of course, also lose relative genetic interest compared to their endogamous co-ethnics. However, even the out-marrying alien ethnics gain a genetic advantage over all of the native ethnics, because of the asymmetrical nature of unidirectional immigration flow.  Even though they lose relative genetic interest compared to endogamous alien co-ethnics, they “help” displace native genes and gene frequencies while their own homelands maintain a reservoir of undiluted ethnic interests. 

Thus, for the native ethnics, “diversity” is always a net loss of genetic interests, with exogamous natives losing more than endogamous ones.  For the aliens, it is a net gain as they are expanding their genes and gene frequencies into someone else’s territory (assuming that the flow is not reciprocal, which it never is).  Out-marrying aliens gain less than endogamous aliens, but all gain relative to the natives.

The end result of all of these demographic shifts is a net loss of native genes and gene frequencies and a net gain for the aliens.  Out-marrying also constitutes a dilution of the genetic interests that every member of an ethny has in the other.  This not only decreases co-ethnic genetic interest (one can consider out-marriage as decreasing the genetic interests of other co-ethnics) but it undermines the organic solidarity of the group, making the pursuit of group interests less feasible.  Thus, the ability of the group to compete is decreased relative to other groups.  People who out-marry genetically distant others can be viewed as “free riders” on their group’s continuity.  They benefit from the existence of their group, but “contribute” negatively to it.  All this undermines the group’s position in global competition.

But classical Salterian theory is limited.  Of course, there is a real Salterian “fallacy” - but one that underestimates, not overestimates, the genetic loss via intermarriage and that undercuts the critique analyzed here.  Thus, patterns of gene frequencies is a piece of information destroyed by intermarriage independent of the number of specific alleles in the general population.  As this was not part of Salter’s original theory nor part of David’s critique, I’ll just cite
this MR post.

One can speculate as to the motivations behind GNXP’s overwhelmingly negative reaction to Salter’s work.  As others have noted, it is amazing that not one real positive commentary has come from GNXP about this original bio-political work from a noted political scientist.  Not that they have to agree with all, or even most, of the work.  But, what we observe are gross misrepresentations, logical flaws, nit-picking, self-described vulgar attacks and unrelenting negativism.  Comments about how life has no interests, and the attempt to diminish the importance of human genetic variation are troubling coming from a blog allegedly supportive of, and interested in, concepts related to human biodiversity.  The GNXP response to Salter has been very troubling and disappointing indeed.  But not unexpected.  No, not that.

See also here.

If I see that further clarification of these points is needed, I will, with GW’s indulgence, create a secondary post to deal with it.  But if not, and if David B will now give up the game he has been playing, we can all move on.

Posted by JW Holliday on Thursday, May 19, 2005 at 08:08 PM in Ethnicity and Ethnic Genetic Interests
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