|
|
The Ontology of Mind: The Free Will Theorem“If the atoms never swerve so as to originate some new movement that will snap the bonds of fate, the everlasting sequence of cause and effect—what is the source of the free will possessed by living things throughout the earth?” - Titus Lucretius Carus, Roman philosopher and poet Previously in this series, I went through a mathematically intensive deductive argument that demonstrated (via reductio ad absurdum) that the mind was not mechanistic. In this installment I will be detailing what physics has to say about the prospects for determinism in the physical universe and the notion of free will. [Note: Before proceeding below the fold I highly recommend that the reader revisit the introductory entry to this series, which has almost been completely rewritten since it was first published] The Classical Understanding“We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.” - Pierre-Simon Laplace From a modern perspective, the great success of the Western scientific program of reductionism starts with Newton, who developed a theory of dynamics for explaining the basic interactions of solid objects and gravity. The mathematical machinery behind this theory, which was independently discovered by himself and Leibniz, was deterministic in its workings to such a degree that practically any physical setup that you could imagine under this theory had a unique time evolution. Moreover, Newtonian dynamics and the mathematical machinery behind it was so successful that it was subsequently expanded to include the phenomena of fluids and electromagnetism. The irresistible metaphor that emerged from all this was that of conceptualizing the universe in terms of one grand machine that is governed by a precise collection of rules which are revealed by physics in the form of mathematical equations. It is a metaphor famously articulated by Laplace in the quotation above. The consequences of this metaphor to traditional notions of free will were profound, namely that those notions had to be wrong and that the experiences on which they were based had to be illusory. For if the universe is one big machine, whose workings can be completely determined by a set of mathematical equations, then what room is there for free will? And if our experience of free will is illusory then what are we to make of those things that we believed to have been the source of our will as anything other than falsehoods built on illusions! The Dome “Since 2003, there have been many reactions to the dome. Some are amused to see that indeterminism arises in so simple an example in Newtonian physics. Others are indifferent. The response that surprised me, however, came from those who had a full grasp of the technical issues, but nonetheless experienced a powerful intuition that the dome somehow lies outside what is proper in Newtonian theory. It is not always easy to discern the grounding of such instinctive reactions.” - John Norton Amusingly enough, the long-standing lore of classical dynamics being completely deterministic was always wrong! John Norton, an American philosopher of science, discovered a counterexample just a few years ago that he is now calling “The Dome”.
The dome is a radially symmetric surface with its shape defined by the equation given above; where r is the radial distance coordinate in the surface of the dome, h is the vertical distance below the apex at r=0 and g is the constant acceleration of free unit mass in the vertical gravitational field surrounding the surface. A point-like, unit mass slides frictionlessly over the surface. Initially, at time t=0, it is at rest exactly at the apex. As it turns out, classical mechanics doesn’t distinguish between an infinite family of possible outcomes for the dome; specifically, the unit mass may stay at the top of the dome indefinitely or it may slide down the dome at any given radial direction at any given moment in time (the details of the physics can be found in Norton’s paper here). The situation couldn’t be less deterministic. Modern Developments “It is safe to say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.” - Richard Feynman Although Norton’s Dome was only discovered a few years ago we’ve known that there are problem with this metaphor of the universe as machine for quite a while now. To the surprise of many, classical dynamics wasn’t the end of the story as it was eclipsed in the 20th century by the new physics of relativity and quantum mechanics (abbrev. QM), the latter considered to be the most fundamental theory of physics currently available. However, also to the great surprise of everyone, QM turned out to be an incomplete theory; in other words, one cannot use QM to completely predict the future state of the universe in terms of its elementary particles. Specifically, the mainstream interpretation of QM is that the universe undergoes periods of unitary development, which are completely deterministic, followed by a wave function collapse that is not deterministic. It was presciently observed by the Ancient Greek atomist Titus Lucretius that in order for there to be free will that the atoms that make up the universe must, every so often, exhibit a “slight swerve” in their motions. Perhaps such an indeterministic “slight swerve” can be found in QM with rigid scientific proof and finally put to rest the soulless phantasm of determinism, which William James famously observed as robbing from mankind that most precious hope. The Eternal Return Interestingly enough, we can give a philosophical proof for why such a task is impossible by considering as a thought experiment something similar to Nietzsche’s concept of an eternal recurrence. The thought experiment goes as follows: Suppose God creates a cyclic universe that periodically restarts itself at constant intervals, and that when it restarts itself it does so exactly in the same manner every time. Consequently, regardless of whether the actors in the first running of the universe had free will (or not) the actions of their counterparts in subsequent installments of the universe would be completely determined by what their antecedents did in the first running of the universe. And since the actors of such a cyclic universe have no way of knowing which installment of the universe they inhabit they cannot be able to demonstrate, via a rigid scientific argument, that the evolution of their universe is not completely determined as a function of the past. Of course, however unlikely it is entirely possible that this state of affairs could apply to us and, therefore, we too have no way of demonstrating via such an argument that the universe we inhabit is not a deterministic function of the past. The Free Will Theorem The stage is now set for a very recent and provocative result that comes to us from the famous English mathematician John Conway, inventor of the Game of Life, and his American colleague the logician Simon Kochen in what they are calling The Free Will Theorem (abbrev. FWT), which states roughly that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity. The FWT makes use of three axioms that are given the names SPIN, TWIN, and MIN, which I will give below along with a technical statement of the main theorem (all of which are taken from the linked article).
The axioms SPIN and TWIN are straightforward consequences of QM that can also be operationally verified independent of QM, which is just a fancy of saying that these axioms can be established by performing experiments in a suitably equipped laboratory without needing any knowledge of QM. Indeed these axioms have been verified in this way and are most definitely true. It is the axiom MIN that contains this assumption that an experimenter can make a “free” choice, which is to say a choice that is independent of the past history of the universe, with regards to the directions in which to measure the squared spin component of a particle. Conway points out that this assumption of independence is customary to make in empirical science otherwise it might be possible that Nature conspires against the scientist to only conduct those experiments that might produce misleading results. In other words, the cost of denying MIN is that we don’t have any propositional grounds on which to believe that the results of empirical science are reasonable. Before moving on to the last section of this entry, I would like to point out that there is a six part video lecture series that has been made available to the public here and consists of Conway lecturing on every aspect of the FWT in front of a live audience at Princeton. A purely nontechnical presentation of these ideas and their consequences can be had by watching the first and last lecture in this series of talks. Conclusions We conclude this entry with a series of inductive arguments in support of free will. Moreover, we shouldn’t balk at our use of inductive arguments toward this end for if we have free will then there should be no rigid scientific argument in favor of free will by our considerations of the eternal recurrence thought experiment.
Personally, I find these inductive arguments compelling and feel that they provide more than enough philosophical evidence for embracing some form of free will and rejecting determinism. Posted by Notus Wind on Sunday, September 12, 2010 at 07:39 PM in The Ontology Project Comments:2
Posted by danielj on September 12, 2010, 11:56 PM | # A related article for the Christians in an Edwardsian vein: Free Will Refuted 3
Posted by Guessedworker on September 13, 2010, 08:23 AM | # Notus,
How do you respond to the assertion that the mind is not crudely mechanistic, but that in ordinary waking consciousness, such as you and I are experiencing at this moment, it takes on the characteristic of mechanicity. That is, free will is illusory > the self is illusory > the self’s perception of the external world is illusory. In other words, all theorems as products of mind assume an optimisation of mental processing which does not, in fact, obtain. Indeed, it could be said that this assumption constitutes one giga-scale inductive argument. The premise - permanent, immediate mental optimisation - is the problem. 4
Posted by Notus Wind on September 13, 2010, 10:22 AM | # GW, First a little clarification on a few matters.
What does it mean for something to not be [crudely] mechanistic but still take on the characteristics of mechanism? I tend to think of mechanism as being a binary property that a system either has or does not have.
How so? 5
Posted by Søren Renner on September 13, 2010, 10:55 AM | # This was a good post. Personally I was satisfied on this point (free will vs determinism) by Kant’s “two standpoints” from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, but this was interesting, especially the stuff from Conway. 6
Posted by Notus Wind on September 13, 2010, 11:17 AM | # Søren,
I’m glad you enjoyed it! 7
Posted by Guessedworker on September 13, 2010, 12:05 PM | # Notus, The presumption that agency is necessarily total or absent is a weakness to which, in this particular area of enquiry, deductive logic is prone. It is a structural flaw. Adequate data on the function that passes for self is unavailable to the intellectual system. 8
Posted by Notus Wind on September 13, 2010, 12:31 PM | # GW,
Suppose that we’re considering some large and complicated system whose workings are entirely mechanical except for a single black box (Descartes’ pineal gland!). I would say that this system - taken as a whole - is not mechanical regardless of how small that black box is in relation to everything else, a little yeast works through the whole batch of dough so to speak. Furthermore, I would say that whatever function this system performs that does not depend on this black box is mechanical but whatever function it performs that does depend on this black box is not mechanical. Now, I ask you, where is the flaw in this logic? What I will readily admit is that this perspective has its limitations. If we say that a certain system has a certain property (in the manner of logic) then that assertion may not tell us all that much about that system’s composition and perhaps a great many other properties, but I would identify this as a limitation and not a flaw. 9
Posted by Guessedworker on September 13, 2010, 04:07 PM | # Notus,
But whether it is or not a machine simple is not of interest, because the answer, “Therefore it is a vehicle of free will,” simply does not follow. For example, is there free will or mechanicity in the sleep state? 10
Posted by Gorboduc on September 14, 2010, 08:14 AM | # GW says:
Were this question asked of me - which I know it’s not - I’d answer, quite simply, in the language of the Schools: What is freely asserted is freely denied: PROVE your assertion. There’s a problem in making contact with GW’s mind when he’s in this sort of mood: it’s difficult to get through to Le Penseur when he’s not sure if he actually has a mind, or a self - when he thinks that he can’t think, and might not be there or anywhere else at all. Chesterton a century ago warned that influential English philosophers of his time, while rather arrogantly imposing their views on the academic world and also - by means of a privileged access to the Press granted to some - on the public, was likely to produce a race of men too intellectually humble to accept that 2x2=4. “Let us not decide whether anything is good or bad, but let it be considered good not to decide it.” Danielj’s Jonathan Edwards article seems very thin, I’m afraid: perhaps, not just for Christians, but for other intelligent folk who are interested in the problem, I might bring my favourite old war-horse out of the stable: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06259a.htm The source a century old: it contains a wealth of information of which Edwards and his modern exegete are smply unaware. Notus, you’ll be pleased that it concludes with a quote from William James, admiringly cited by you. There is absolutely NO need, Notus, to have any recourse to “thought experiments”, especially one like yours that begins “Suppose the Deity ...”. That simply doesn’t begin to touch reality at all: and it’s further distanced from common experience (a word etymologically connected with “experiment”) by its association with Nietzsche and his ideas about the eternal return. I think also that your references to mathematical equations could be clarified: first,
is ambiguous, for although we’re talking determinism, isn’t it possible here that “determined” can either mean “ordained” or “worked out by us”?
the universe isn’t “sustained” by equations in the same way as it might be by the will of God, as equations have no sustaining (or creative) powers, but are explanations based on our observations. 11
Posted by danielj on September 14, 2010, 08:47 AM | # Gorb, libertarian free will destroys moral accountability. If at any time you perform an action but were willed to or could have performed a different action, then you cannot be held responsible for your actions. 12
Posted by uh on September 14, 2010, 08:51 AM | # Ever treading Christian waters. Or the mathematician’s. Can ANY behaviour or cultural pattern or reaction or whatever you like to call it be linked to ANY part of DNA? Sure. You’re evidently not reading the right books. 13
Posted by Notus Wind on September 14, 2010, 09:41 AM | # GW,
True, but the entry isn’t arguing for free will on the basis that mind is non-mechanical, if I were to make such an argument I would have done so in the Gödelian thread. The entry is arguing for free will inductively on the basis of its explanatory power; in other words, that some form of free will is more consistent with the facts of nature (as revealed by physics) than its converse, determinism. 14
Posted by Notus Wind on September 14, 2010, 10:22 AM | # Gorboduc,
In this context we’re saying that something is determined if it is forced by the laws of nature as revealed by mathematical physics. Of course, in everyday language our use of the word “determined” is not restricted in this artificial way, which is what I think you’re reacting against.
Anytime it seems that I am needlessly doing something in my writing you should always suspect that my sense of humor is the culprit. 15
Posted by Guessedworker on September 14, 2010, 12:10 PM | # Notus,
This is the point I have made on the Godelian thread ( I think). Some free will is required for adaptiveness to be recognised - or not - in the EEA. But it may only be the level of agency in Man required for any large mammal. This level does not operate above the line, so to speak. We are not unduly conscious of it. It works principally through our sexual instincts and emotions, as it does in other mammals. That leaves the question of the veracity of “the large model” of conscious choice we actually believe ourselves to be exercising at all times, and this is where the real interest lies, and where the question of mechanicity <> consciousness strikes home. This, really, is where the metaphysics and physics of the mind need to be accommodated to one another, which is what I mean when I use the words “of interest” in my comment on September 13, 2010, 08:07 PM. What is your position here? 16
Posted by Notus Wind on September 15, 2010, 12:24 PM | # GW, I can see that we were just getting warmed up, I wonder when PF will join the fun.
I have a number of things to say in response to this. First of all, it’s not clear to me that any kind of free will is necessary for the purposes of the evolutionary process, so I would like to see you argue this point further. For example, we can simulate a directed evolutionary process that has the basic features of random mutation & natural selection to automata with good results, and their workings are entirely [algorithmically] determined. Another problem I have with this paragraph is that if indeed we have some form of free will then you are suggesting that it will only exist at a level where we don’t necessarily believe it to exist! In other words, if we do have some form of free will then I would imagine that it will be found right where we thought it was all along, which at the very least would mean the forming of intentions, decisions, etc. Speaking for myself, it certainly doesn’t seem as if my will is all that involved in the forming of emotions and sexual instincts; rather, these things have a way of intruding on my consciousness, they bubble up from beneath.
My position is that some form of free will is real and that, at minimum, it exists where we think it exists (e.g. forming intentions and making decisions). The basic metaphysical facts of our experience along with what we can glean from mathematics and physics are in harmony with this position, which makes it all the more irresistible by my reckoning. The theoretical bedrock that once supported mechanism (going into the 20th century) has now been completely replaced and unfortunately while that process was underway other scientific disciplines started flowering while carrying within them the assumptions of the older [mechanistic] model. It would seem that the revolutionary nature of scientific progress is far more enduring than that of Marxism. Libet’s results are also in harmony with this position, although I have yet to argue this point. However, like all of us, I too subscribe to a version of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, so if those actions of ours that are free - whatever they are - do not depend on the past history of the physical universe then on what do they depend? The question is somewhat rhetorical as you and I both know where this is going and it is, in my opinion, an intellectual dead zone that could very well stand outside the purview of our epistemological tool chest (except for possibly a few forensic considerations). Ergo, my instinct is to abandon this problem as being hopeless and instead of obsessing over what makes life possible - how to make a complete accommodation - we should obsess over what life is (in the reality of our experience) and take it at face value with boldness. My attempt at the latter would presumably be phase two of this series. 17
Posted by uh on September 15, 2010, 05:26 PM | # I’d really like to know what they were talking about. LOL. Same here, egghead. 18
Posted by Notus Wind on September 15, 2010, 10:55 PM | #
No worries, maybe next time. 19
Posted by Notus Wind on September 17, 2010, 04:37 PM | # danielj, That blog post was painful to read! In a nutshell:
My complaint with this form of reasoning is that it presupposes the dubious premise that free will is incompatible with any kind of causal (or Leibnizian) principle, which I don’t accept. 20
Posted by danielj on September 17, 2010, 11:34 PM | # My complaint with this form of reasoning is that it presupposes the dubious premise that free will is incompatible with any kind of causal (or Leibnizian) principle, which I don’t accept. I think the major premise (not in the literal, logical sense) is that free will is incompatible with moral accountability. Additionally, it is a rejection of middle knowledge and a grounding of foreknowledge in the necessity of God’s will. It is a pretty good, blog length summary of Jonathan Edwards. Perhaps somebody of your ability would benefit from direct contact with Edwards’ Freedom of the Will? 21
Posted by Guessedworker on September 18, 2010, 11:59 AM | # Notus,
The fact that time/entropy has not won its struggle with Nature already tells us that we are not dealing with a machine that is merely imperfect, and makes choices on a random basis. If there is a machine it must be one with the capacity to discriminate for adaptiveness at a very fine level of detail, such that more of the random appearances of mutations which will lead to fitness gain can be selected than mutations which will lead away from fitness gain. Otherwise, there could be no evolution and no life, and time/entropy would win. This seem to me to point to an element of free will requisite in the evolutionary process. My thesis is that there is sufficient free will to select for gain and against stasis or loss such that, statistically, the bias is for gain. It may be that this free will is precisely the modus operandum of a machine that has learned to do this. But the difference between a learning machine and an agency of willed selection may be nothing at all. What finally decides for will is the intentionality of consciousness. This is not the well known claim that consciousness is ordinarily directed - I don’t accept that. It is a claim that we can will consciousness to intensify through the use of attention. This intentionality is the fulcrum between mechanicity and conciousness (in a more complete and centred sense), and there can be no fulcrum and no consciousness if all is only a machine. That said, the tendency for a declension into mechanicity and pure function is enormously powerful. We do not instinctively know about the fulcrum or about consciousness or about any aspects of self-hood, such as self-possession, to which they may lead. 22
Posted by Notus Wind on September 20, 2010, 12:26 PM | # GW,
Exactly.
Yes!
There are some interesting ideas here that I would like to reflect upon before commenting further. This concept of intentionality as a fulcrum is quite new to me.
Yes, but these are natural tendencies almost by definition - for whatever phenomena we can wrap our minds around becomes mechanistic by definition. Furthermore, while it’s easy enough to abstractly model a non-mechanistic process I find it impossible to imagine how such a process might actually work. All this is to say that we should view these tendencies as being natural and, perhaps, a product of our own limitations. 23
Posted by Jimmy Marr on September 20, 2010, 02:12 PM | #
Master Ichu picked up his brush and wrote one word: ‘Attention.’ The master wrote, ‘Attention. Attention.’ In response, Master Ichu wrote simply, ‘Attention. Attention. Attention.’ Master Ichu replied, ‘Attention means attention.’ 24
Posted by Guessedworker on September 20, 2010, 05:58 PM | # Thank you for that Jimmy. Zen seems quite popular around here, judging by the occasions on which it crops up in these discussions. Not sure if it can conquer evil and save the West, but it’s nice to have some confirmation, anyway. Notus, I will modify my clumsy little diagram of the Mind dynamic accordingly: mechanicity ? absence ? (inattention ? intentionality ? attention) ? presence ? being 25
Posted by PF on September 20, 2010, 06:51 PM | # Gentlemen and gnomes, In looking at neurobiology as the cause for the effect we see (the mind!), I fail to see where such a mechanism as free will could exist in that structure. To me the illusion of choice arises from our ignorance of the pre-determined setup. For example, in choosing whether or not to run down one of two hallways, the rat probably uses hippocampal gamma-theta oscillations to recall what lies at the end of either hallway. These can then be compared, and a choice be made. But there was no choice about the content of the oscillations. A higher level of meta-processing (meta with respect to the question of what hallway to run down) might look at the whole task of running down a hallway and say: should I perhaps not run down a hallway, should I instead eat this bagel? We might look at each and declare free will, but for every decision-level there is a meta-level that is one higher. Should I use shampoo or conditioner on my hair tonight? Wait, higher level: should I go on a bike ride instead of taking a shower? Wait, higher level: Instead of deciding this right now, should I attend to my open sores? We are limited in what we can think, and thus we reach a level beyond which there is no ‘meta’ anymore for us. This can be limited by available knowledge, capacity to generalize and decipher trends/patterns, or instantaneous awareness of what one is doing. At that level then, are we not concretely unfree? Thus there is always a level higher where we cannot venture. There is also always a level lower where we cannot venture in our resolution of the processing-behind-decision-making. We see people often enough reasoning using glyphs (“Anglos”, “Krauts”, “women”) which have special definitions. They can reason but they cant examine the thought-content and assumptions implicit in their glyphs, which are the symbols they reason with. These, too, are assembled according to a process. Just as many people cannot see what they are ‘doing’ when they think with any clarity of resolution, even a Peerless Gnome such as you or I cannot pierce the veil of the physiology underlying our thought processes. Meaning we can’t choose to use a different coding scheme for episodic memories, for example. In that we are unfree, no? You only have one method of episodic memory recall, not an endless bag of tricks. If we grant that we have *freedom* within these two boundaries, in what sense is it an absolute thing and thus worthy of the name? GW - are those inequality signs reversed on the second half of your word diagram? How is Being less trendy and hip than Presence? 26
Posted by Jimmy Marr on September 20, 2010, 08:00 PM | #
If I understand you correctly, you question the existence of free will. For what it’s worth, I think I agree with you, but I tend to conceptualize an inverted gestalt. I tend toward an implicit reliance on the existence of free will, but entertain strong doubts about the constancy of any self which might be viewed as employing it. My view tends toward feeling that the rat who evolves from the experience of going down hallway A, is a different rat than the one who evolves from the experience of going down hallway B. The rat who stood at the juncture and embodied free will was neither A nor B. It’s existence as a “self” is no more related to Rat A or Rat B, than some hypothetical, bagel eating cyclist with oily hair and open sores is related to the PF who is experiencing THIS. Somehow, the contemplation of this stuff reminds me of the experience of looking at my reflection in a mirror, and wondering what “it” was going to do next. As if my “self”, as the observer, was going to be unmoved by the movement of its reflection. Unfortunately, the experience is best facilitated by a dose of LSD. The GW calls Matt Parrott, is not the GW who contemplates calling Matt Parrott. GW implicitly knows this, which is why he feels no need to apologize, and thus create yet another clone of himself in order to experience forgiveness. Rise against the enemies of God! Your reflection will too. We need all the support we can get. 27
Posted by Guessedworker on September 20, 2010, 08:19 PM | # PF, Apologies. They were meant to be simple directional arrows. Never occurred to me that the technical mind would see a meaning other than the one I intended. Corrected it now anyway. 28
Posted by Notus Wind on September 20, 2010, 08:24 PM | # PF,
But aren’t these just articles of faith? I would say, along with many others, that there exists at least two metatheoretical models that fit the facts in production (mind is caused) and transmission (mind is causal). These statements of yours only seem necessarily true under the framework of production, which does indeed suggest that mind is this incredibly complicated physiological mechanism and that the freeness of our mental life is only an illusion. However, under a more transmissive framework none of these statements seem likely.
At least as used in the main entry, an outcome is free if it’s not completely determined by the past history of the universe. 29
Posted by Guessedworker on September 20, 2010, 08:55 PM | # Jimmy,
What self, never mind constancy, could there be in a state of absence? It is an illusion, the work, imo, of the three mind systems mechanically ascribing self-hood to every pool of light thrown on their own activity (the focus of this light being undirected). Simple as that. The ascription is “meant” for a pool of light at the centre of, and separate from, the workings of the systems (the focus of this light being caused by attention). But in our ordinary waking state there is no maintained centre, no maintained separation, and no consciousness in any meaningful sense of the term.
It decided several milliseconds ago according to Libet. 30
Posted by Jimmy Marr on September 20, 2010, 10:27 PM | #
Do you imagine the discovery of some practical means of exerting control over this heretofore, un-self-directed attention, or do you suspect that simply by understanding the struggle to do so as a conundrum, you will be liberated from its existential taxation? Or, am I out of my depth in even asking? 31
Posted by PF on September 21, 2010, 12:12 AM | # Notus wrote:
You always make me wish I could be more constructivist, since it appears to me that the only thing I ever say is: how can this be? Mind is causal… perhaps I should let that stew a bit in the old mind. If mind is causal, according to what you’ve said, it follows that:
So the working of the mind is not completely determined by the past history of the universe. Wow. Big thought. I’m going to watch this lecture series. You are amazing Notus, thanks for bringing us this marvelous food for thought. Always something to wrestle with when your pseudonym pops up. 32
Posted by PF on September 21, 2010, 01:33 AM | # Preemptory reply? Its really not respectful to the work both you and the men cited have done on this, to answer so quickly. Big ideas require digestion. However I am still typing so lets see what happens. Here is how I see things. 1. Freedom of the particle to choose the direction of it’s spin Is there a possibility that what we are seeing is an ‘optical illusion’ based on the limitations of our present knowledge of causality at the level of particle spin? Before the discovery of subatomic particles, there was no explanation for the reactions observed in organic chemistry. Something like resonance reactions, which can lead to multiple outcomes for one chemical reaction, could not be explained in terms of valence electrons becoming available and influencing bonding. Our ‘level of resolution’ was limited to the chemical compound, we could say nothing of the electrons that influenced it. Therefore it appeared as if the production of different stereoisomers by the same chemical reaction was occurring independently of any known cause; in other words the chemical reaction appeared to be
Is this parallel inadequate or an affront to the work these men have done? Quite possibly. Please enlighten me if you think this to be the case. I really feel I must have misunderstood something because this all sounds so obvious. Any causation that is occurring at a level of resolution below that which we can presently see, is a putative candidate for the source of ‘Free Will’, because it appears as if it is operating non-deterministically. This is because we have no apparatus to view the sensory resolution-level where the agents - which we will not yet have even identified - are acting causally to bring about the phenomenon we are seeing. So 150 years ago, the particle whose spin we are discussing did not officially exist. Bearing that in mind, is it out of place to suggest that undiscovered lower levels of resolution - including agents which we dont know of, and “forces” acting on them - hold the clue to the cause of each particle’s spin - and the clue to the spin of all three molecules in the example? What if a network of sub-sub-sub-particle ‘force waves’ is discovered in the next 100 years. A knowledge of the force wave in the space around each particle could explain the choice of spin. Here is where I’m near certain I have misunderstood something - please correct. Is the spin then deterministic, because it can be predicted by the instantaneous configuration of the ‘force wave’? We would then have to look to the ‘force wave’ for the one element that is not determined by the prior history of the universe. 2. Granting ‘freedom of quantum spin’ - does it translate to free will? So an element of stochastic motion is declared to be uninfluenced by the prior state of the universe. I dont think so. I reason thus: freedom of one foundational element in a system (quantal spin) means that it has an unknown cause, or is ‘uncaused’ (i.e. “causal”). This translates into a specific sort of freedom for the particle, but does that freedom translate to the will of a being composed of these partially free particles? Why does it? What is the meaning of freedom? Increased range of a parameter relative to a prior observation. What before had one outcome now has two. What before had two now has thirteen. Any observable parameter having its range of possible values increased is interpreted as an increase of freedom. But freedom, being a socially sourced concept, is seen as a property of something - in humans it is seen as ‘belonging’ to someone or something. The chair has freedom because its particles are free to spin in whatever direction they choose - but does this mean that the chair has freedom? It experiences no known increase in parameter range as a result of this freedom of quantum spin. Can the chair now decide to overturn itself? You see, at the level of the chair, I don’t see any freedom having been gained by the attainment of freedom of quantum spin. If the authors of this theory intend for it to apply from the particle-level to the level of things-composed-of-particles, they have to suggest a mechanism of how this freedom of spin translates into increased parameter range for higher-level traits. Or somehow admit that human beings are still miserably deterministic, only that the vibrating particles that compose us have an element which is independent. You can see why this, for me, doesnt translate into ‘free will’. We can’t predict an element of stochastic motion. Does that mean that the heroin addict now has a way out of his perceptual prison, that screams at him - “only one thing can make you feel good!” ?. 3. Relevance of free will concept The example of a heroin addict is dramatic and provocative - but if the point of free-will discussion is not ultimately to resolve its conclusions to address issues of human choice, agency, and responsibility, I can’t imagine why it is being discussed. I believe that human beings discuss this because of a fascination with the concept of attribution, responsibility, fate, and potential in the context of human life choices. Is it too ‘nihilistic bastard’ of me to then say that nobody cares about the spin of a particle? Or at least, this was not the motive of the investigation? The point of me saying this is: if our sudden interest in particle physics is a masked proxy for our real interest in the ultimate validity of choice-attribution in human psychology, then shouldn’t the explanation show how quantum spin not being completely determined by the past history of the universe equates to the heroin addict being able to put down his needle? “Hey, Jonesy, the particles composing the atoms of your body can spin any way they choose - why can’t you spin yourself towards a sobriety clinic?” 4. Hypostasization of Freedom and Will
The reason I reject the existence of God is because its too socially convenient. It fits too perfectly to our needs, and is clearly socially-sourced. The concept of freedom in this sense is also socially-sourced; the importance of it because of its (would-be) implications for human reasoning is *very* obviously socially sourced. I don’t see it arising in nature - thus little need to discuss it or think about it. I therefore think the whole question is an artifact of a humanesque perspective-bound entity and dissolves with the advent of another viewpoint. Remember what importance we attach to the shape of a persons nose: an inch here or there will make or break you. Yet that has nothing to do with health (alternative perspective giving a value hierarchy for human bodies), and our obsession with it is very much because of where we come from, evolutionarily - i.e. we spent whole eons looking at noses. That doesnt mean that they matter very much in themselves (i.e. from a summary, absolute perspective). Same thing with the concept of ‘freedom’, to my mind. 33
Posted by Particle In Question: on September 21, 2010, 03:03 AM | # I had to come in here and comment that although I am thankful to PF for the chance to get out of the whole Quantum jungle and onto the MR blog ....I was disappointed he did not recognize a particle’s demonstrated free will of patently ignoring him. It was a battle of wills, but PF ‘zero; - Particle ’Notch’. The question here should be: ‘does PF have free will’. 34
Posted by Particle In Question: on September 21, 2010, 03:14 AM | # And the answer would be ‘obviously not’. Free will requires a mind to be grounded in reality, and not arcane thought models as disposable as they are easy to think up given an objective.
35
Posted by Particle In Question: on September 21, 2010, 03:16 AM | #
The above is not so much ‘Reductio ad Absurdum’ as it is ‘Reductio ad ridiculum’ or perhaps ‘ad incommodum’. Here we have to deal with literally impossible suppositions that are not just dramatically but necessarily false thanks to their logical conflict with clearly necessary truths, be the necessity at issue logical. conceptual, mathematical or physical. Suppositions of this sort commonly give rise to per impossibile counterfactuals. Impossible to prove, worthless to disprove. 36
Posted by uh on September 21, 2010, 07:43 AM | # The question here should be: ‘does PF have free will’. I don’t know, but these obviously mock-nietzschean dialogues he’s having with himself have run their course. Rise against the enemies of Jimmy Marr. 37
Posted by PF on September 21, 2010, 11:01 AM | # wow I have dedicated trolls. must be in the big leagues now. 38
Posted by Notus Wind on September 21, 2010, 11:09 AM | # PF,
No problem, that’s why I’m blogging.
First of all, I argue in the main entry that it is impossible to deductively prove freeness in the universe via the considerations that arise from the eternal recurrence thought experiment (or what Conway refers to as the “second time around” argument). What the FWT does show is that if humans have the freedom to setup their experiment in measuring the squared spin component of a spin-1 particle then the particle has precisely the same kind of freedom in its response to the experiment. Moreover, the kind of freedom that we’re talking about has nothing to do with randomness, which is ruled out in the proof of the FWT. In answer to your second set of questions, all the considerations of the main entry are translated into a handful of inductive arguments in support of free will, which are given in the conclusion. I have hidden nothing underneath my cloak, everything is made explicit.
In short, no. The FWT argues that the response of the particle is not dependent on the past history of universe in any way, which means that it’s response is not a function of on any undiscovered hidden variables (or “force waves”) nor is it a function of randomness. We’re talking about honest-to-goodness freedom here.
All this talk of free will is made technical and precise in the statement of the FWT, which I give in the main entry. The use of the term “freedom” is meant to be suggestive. 39
Posted by Notus Wind on September 21, 2010, 11:12 AM | # Particle In Question, Are you the same person as AT from the Gödelian thread? 40
Posted by PF on September 21, 2010, 11:16 AM | # Notus wrote:
I really dont understand that, and yet its central to the theorem. oopsies. 41
Posted by Notus Wind on September 21, 2010, 11:25 AM | #
Another way of putting it is that if humans can setup their experiment independently of the past history of the universe then the particle’s response is similarly independent of the past history of the universe. All of this is discussed at length in the article and lecture series that I linked to in the main entry. I forgot to mention one more thing. The proof of the FWT is really something special in that it reaches its conclusion by using all the well-known paradoxes of modern physics (e.g. relativistic invariance, EPR, and KS) in a very elegant way. 42
Posted by PF on September 21, 2010, 11:31 AM | # Notus OK, I’m seeing the beginnings of my non-understanding of what was the thrust of this. Its weird to blog about something that might take 2-3 weeks reading and thinking about to properly and finally ‘get’ - even for a casual understanding. Like a lot of stuff GW has said, I only understood it many months later. That didnt save him from being subjected to the rapier-slashes of my obviously mock-nietzschean dialogues though! You too, Notus, will not be spared from the shrill battle cry of the authoritative once-over! 43
Posted by Notus Wind on September 21, 2010, 01:46 PM | # PF.
My recommendation for this material is to watch all of Conway’s lectures, which are entertaining in their own right, and then engage the linked article. After all that, even if there are still a few details that you don’t understand you should at least be able to grasp the overall picture and see how the different pieces of the argument fit together. I am sensitive to the fact that the reader of these entries on the FWT and the Gödelian Argument is exposed to something akin to an intellectual fire hose that’s blasting their face with all this technical theory and argument. It’s a bit much. However, I feel that it’s better to briskly cover the main points and leave references for all the messy details rather than expand out each of these entries into a series of their own. Besides, even if I were to give all the details they wouldn’t be much different from the references I provide. Anyway, this entry should conclude my take on what the “hard” sciences have to say about the mind. The next entry will cover more empirical material that anyone can easily grasp (promise!), but I feel that it will be easier to swallow the statements to come given the theoretical foundation that has been laid in these first two entries.
No problem, these ideas should be able to withstand scrutiny. 44
Posted by Notus Wind on September 23, 2010, 10:55 AM | # An interesting footnote. In the last of Conway’s lectures, which are listed here, he actually makes the point that “there is more than a vague analogy between” the FWT and the ideas that go into the Gödelian argument (from 8:00 to 9:40 in the embedded video). In other words, the suggestion is that the FWT is the physicist’s analog of the Gödelian argument. 45
Posted by Jimmy Marr on September 23, 2010, 11:57 AM | # Having only just glimpsed the introduction to part 1, I can’t escape speculating that Conway’s willingness to be cloaked in Magen-Davids wasn’t pre-determined. 46
Posted by Notus Wind on September 23, 2010, 01:49 PM | #
No, it’s a geometrical object taken from Escher’s Waterfall. More pertinently, this object also appears in the proof of the KS paradox. 47
Posted by Guessedworker on September 23, 2010, 03:55 PM | # Notus, A serious if perhaps leading ontological question, well, three ontological questions, really: If our own faith had never been replaced by Christianity ... 1) Would an Enlightenment have been necessary and ... 2) if necessary, would it have come, and ... 3) if it would have come, how would it have differed from what we got? 48
Posted by Notus Wind on September 23, 2010, 10:43 PM | # GW, How can anyone answer such difficult questions! Nevertheless, I’ll press on.
Yes, and for the same reason that future enlightenments will also be necessary. The Enlightenment was not simply about a commitment to rationality but sapere aude, a willingness to critically examine stagnant institutions (either in thought or physical form) and seek after truth no matter the consequences. In the context of the 18th century, it was about moving beyond the stagnant doctrines of medieval institutions and laying the groundwork for the modern world. Consider our own secular age, does our society not lack the courage to confront those inegalitarian truths that might upset its political foundations, and how is this fear of the truth in our time any different from the situation a few centuries ago. The need for sapere aude - that spirit of the Enlightenment - transcends any particular religion or secular consensus and (I would argue) is part of our political cycle.
Definitely. Men from ancient Egypt, Babylon, and China looked up into the sky and recorded the heavens with painstaking detail. In contrast, their Greek counterparts raised their head and considered the possibility of an invisible rational order of universals that could give an account of the heavens and not simply record them (from this instinct Platonism was born). I would say that just as surely as we are an individualistic people we are also an abstract thinking people, and when you combine the latter with the courage implied in the former you have the spark needed to ignite a season of enlightenment. It’s only a matter of time.
Certainly, the relevant institutions would have been different. With respect to the substance of the ideas, who can say. 49
Posted by Captainchaos on September 24, 2010, 03:52 AM | # Contemporary liberalism is sustained in the minds of its adherents by little more than crude double-think and moral vanity. In debating some I’ve gotten them to concede that the peoples of Europe are genetically distinct from peoples of other continental origin and that peoples of closer geographic origin will be more closely genetically related to one another than those lesser so. The sticking point for them was my labeling the peoples indigenous to Europe as “White” though I was explicit in saying that is what I meant by “White” - and that this is what would be lost if not preserved. This was not a non-arbitrary delimitation they decried. Why not include, say, Middle Easterners in one’s definition of “White” and they would also be “White”? That they had just earlier conceded that European-derived peoples are genetically distinguishable from peoples of other continental origin seemed not to intrude at all. As if, merely by expanding the definition of a thing, what was before perfectly distinguishable is not now. Rank verbal alchemy. Ah, yes, a few quips about “mobile gas vans”. Despite every indication that these were intelligent and well-informed people, they could not think their way out of a wet paper bag.
An unstated, yet important aspect of the above described is the sense of awe and reverence for this intellectually anthropomorphized universe. The religiosity of projecting a meaning and order that involves Man which is intertwined with the process of discovery. Can the obvious potential pitfalls to this in the form of non-adaptive instances of the above simply be gelded by “breeding out the faith gene” without collapsing the entire edifice? 50
Posted by Captainchaos on September 24, 2010, 04:28 AM | #
And that is why those who wish to co-opt Heidegger to their purposes cannot use his terminology without evoking in the reader a emotionally mystic connotation. Heidegger is not talking about merely a exceptionally clear perceptual presence to what exists presently that enables adaptive behavior but to the experience of a Weltanschauung - the perception of what is one’s place in existence that has the sensibility of being prescriptive. This implies a gravitas bound to duty lacking in the deracinated liberal who thinks it all a farce for it is all for nothing anyway as he sees it. There is no meaning. For Heidegger, the universe, and experiencing one’s place in the universe as part of it, is intrinsically meaningful. This is why the Jews fear Heidegger. A religion that is of our essence set against a religion that is of their essence. Athens set against Jerusalem. Or in the instance of a more robust confrontation, Sparta, hopefully guided by Athens, against Jerusalem. Hence Heidegger’s support of National Socialism (Sparta). Are you still certain you wish to use Heidegger? 51
Posted by Captainchaos on September 24, 2010, 05:03 AM | #
Such as the emotional “truth” that the role of England is to intervene in continental affairs to not only self-interested ends but also to morally redemptive ends. A Weltanschauung of not only what it means to be English but to act consistent with that being in the world. A Weltanschauung is a essentially religious conception of one’s role in the universe that entails a prescriptive sensibility. In eschewing this (“breed out the faith gene”) one jettisons the impetus for adaptive action; eschews gravitas and embraces frivolity. For example: “All those Krauts burned for nothing.” “Most of our lives are for nothing anyway.” Or: “You just conceded Whites, or European-derived peoples, are genetically distinct from other peoples.” “No, you see, if I include others as “White” then European-derived people are no longer genetically distinguishable from the newly included.” 52
Posted by Notus Wind on September 24, 2010, 10:48 AM | # CC,
Although you seem to have answered your own question I’ll go ahead and share a few thoughts. To the extent that there is a genetic basis for something as sociologically complex as faith, I highly doubt that it could be explained in terms of a handful of genes. A recent report indicates that intelligence is controlled by a network of thousands of genes and I don’t see why we shouldn’t expect similar results for other complex social phenomena. In any event, faith is irrelevant here. The abstract universalizing tendency of Western society can be found in the pre-Christian Ancient Greeks, in the Middle Ages, in the Enlightenment, and in secular modernity. It’s a tendency that shows up in our ethics (see Fig. 5), which Leon is fond of pointing out, as well as in our science; with respect to the latter, I would argue that it is the reason for why the West (and not the East) discovered the abstract principles of nature and invented the modern world. It’s a tendency that even shows up in our music. Consider the following from the wiki entry: “European music is largely distinguished from many other non-European and popular musical forms by its system of staff notation…Western staff notation is used by composers to prescribe to the performer the pitch, speed, meter, individual rhythms and exact execution of a piece of music. This leaves less room for practices such as improvisation and ad libitum ornamentation, that are frequently heard in non-European art music” Ergo, I don’t think we can escape from our abstract universalizing tendencies anymore than we can escape from our individualistic tendencies. It’s not a simple matter of any particular faith or worldview. 53
Posted by Jimmy Marr on September 24, 2010, 12:17 PM | # Notus, From an intellectual standpoint, your ideas are very impressive. Your standards of truth a very high. In fact, I fear that they may be so high as to be inactionable. Could that be their adaptive value? Do you think they could be serving to anesthetize, hypnotize, and immobilize? Could their adaptive value be in their ability to safeguard our less than optimal collective existence by inhibiting actions, aimed at our improvement, that might inadvertently lead to our destruction? I’m directing these questions to you, but they are applicable to others such as GW and PF. I firmly believe that all three of you are smarter than I am. But I fear that I could wait for the remainder of my life and never see an actionable idea arise from your debate. Maybe that’s a good thing? 54
Posted by Notus Wind on September 24, 2010, 06:41 PM | # Jimmy, Although I have commented on more practical matters at MR, I make no apologies for being theoretical most of the time. It’s who I am.
[laughs] I have complete confidence that when the time comes the doers will do their thing just as surely as I must think and communicate my thoughts. Nothing is being inhibited here.
Fear not, I do intend to go somewhere with all this. 55
Posted by Grimoire on September 25, 2010, 03:14 AM | # J Marr, 56
Posted by Grimoire on September 25, 2010, 03:39 AM | # Captainchaos: 57
Posted by Notus Wind on September 25, 2010, 11:35 AM | # Grimoire,
I’m glad to see that you’re sticking with this series. If nothing else, perhaps I’ve been able to introduce you to a few pieces of recent Anglo-American scholarship in either Norton’s Dome or the FWT.
Heh. The minimum is that I have to be able to defend these ideas from myself. 58
Posted by Captainchaos on September 25, 2010, 10:02 PM | # Notus,
I’m in agreement with you. The “faith gene” is GW’s shorthand for what you describe above. That is what I was using. But in distinction to GW, I question the prudence, or even possibility of “breeding out the faith gene”. I further question the existence of a “pure atheist” to use as the breeding template who is completely free of a persistent, faithist attachment to his belief system.
But what is to account for the persistence of belief in these notional systems despite scientifically rigorous empiricism having significantly gainsaid them? The faith impulse, I posit. I mean, what, you don’t think the Greek belief in the Platonic forms was a matter of faith?! Get out of town. 59
Posted by Captainchaos on September 25, 2010, 10:30 PM | #
You mean it’s possible to define a geometric shape to x scale mathematically that could be physically actualized within the confines of the laws of physics? Really, no shit? Moving on. I’m surprised no-one picked up on a certain portion of my comments regarding Weltanschauung. To wit: A Weltanschauung is necessary for seriousness of thought and action on the grand scale. Some Weltanschauung are inherently disposed to producing frivolity of thought and action. Even assuming a Weltanschauung is capable of producing seriousness of thought and action, once the holder of said steps outside of it they will be generally disposed towards frivolity of thought and action. Further, assuming a Weltanschauung disposes one to seriousness of thought and action according to the nature and emphasis of said, there is no guarantee it will be eternally adaptive because external conditions change over time (e.g., the English Weltanschauung that prescribes intervening in continental affairs for self-interest as well as self-perceived morally redemptive ends - didn’t end that well last time, did it?). Weltanschauung Weltanschauung Weltanschauung Weltanschauung Weltanschauung Weltanschauung Weltanschauung Weltanschauung. 60
Posted by Grimoire on September 25, 2010, 10:31 PM | # CaptainChaos: I mean, what, you don’t think the Greek belief in the Platonic forms was a matter of faith?! Get out of town. Unfortunate you think like that. It would help if you studied the Greek Weltanshauung and their insights into Religion and Legend. Also there is a distinction between Faith and Belief. Faith is not belief. 61
Posted by Captainchaos on September 25, 2010, 10:53 PM | # Grimoire[,]:
I assign things that are not subject to verification by the scientific method to the realm of “faith”. It is not that I am unaware or impervious to arguments for their existence. It is a simple matter of classification, not negation. P.S. If the impulse to acquiesce in the face of the English effort to leverage moral authority off the backs of the Krauts ever hits you, resist it. It’s certainly nothing to “call for the death of the English” over, as certain shitheads allege, yet at least cause for mild perturbation. 62
Posted by Grimoire on September 26, 2010, 01:00 AM | # CC 63
Posted by Grimoire on September 26, 2010, 01:12 AM | # CC PS: You used to write quite clearly; straight to the jugular, boot to the neck, thumb in the eye. This meta-babble is no good for any of us. 64
Posted by Captainchaos on September 26, 2010, 05:22 AM | #
That’s where I like to keep ‘em. However, I was asked politely (in not so many words) not to ask embarrassing questions of English nationalists, or draw uncomfortable parallels with the object of triangulation de jure (NS Germany) and past instances of English nationalism.
Effete eggsheads, er, elites seem to need complex and pretensious rationalizations to accomplish what, for a 95 IQ Klansman, the brainstem would be sufficient. Besides, when in Rome… Next entry: Jeweled Endives Inn Previous entry: A short prescription for a nationalism in Britain |
|
Existential IssuesWhite Genocide ProjectOf note
Recent CommentsAlso see trash folder. Salvatore Quinto commented in entry 'More on the Indian beauty question' on 05/24/12, 12:47 PM. (go) (view) Trofigiogelry commented in entry 'Top Wog embraces his Inner Englishman' on 05/24/12, 12:31 PM. (go) (view) DiefleleziG commented in entry 'Tiger Tiger' on 05/24/12, 12:18 PM. (go) (view) Martha Barreda commented in entry 'Sunic interviews Fraser' on 05/24/12, 12:12 PM. (go) (view) Classic Sparkle commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/24/12, 12:07 PM. (go) (view) Adalberto Deavers commented in entry 'The compassion of the court' on 05/24/12, 12:00 PM. (go) (view) Optigmata commented in entry 'More thread wars' on 05/24/12, 11:08 AM. (go) (view) payday loans commented in entry 'ANTI-JEWISM: The Deadly Plague of White Nationalist Slave Morality' on 05/24/12, 10:27 AM. (go) (view) Verlene Zumwalt commented in entry 'Ireland Worshipping at the Holocaust Shrine' on 05/24/12, 10:16 AM. (go) (view) Cobus commented in entry 'A genocide in South Africa' on 05/24/12, 10:14 AM. (go) (view) pay day loans commented in entry 'Heidegger: The West Texas Translation' on 05/24/12, 09:59 AM. (go) (view) daniel commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/24/12, 09:49 AM. (go) (view) uh commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/24/12, 08:54 AM. (go) (view) daniel commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/24/12, 07:41 AM. (go) (view) uh commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/24/12, 07:18 AM. (go) (view) daniel commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/24/12, 06:53 AM. (go) (view) Swan commented in entry 'The facial proportions of beautiful people' on 05/24/12, 06:48 AM. (go) (view) Swan commented in entry 'The facial proportions of beautiful people' on 05/24/12, 06:47 AM. (go) (view) daniel commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/24/12, 06:32 AM. (go) (view) Guest commented in entry 'The Torment of the Mulattoes' on 05/24/12, 06:17 AM. (go) (view) daniel commented in entry 'Beyond the 14 words' on 05/24/12, 03:05 AM. (go) (view) Lee John Barnes commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/24/12, 02:31 AM. (go) (view) daniel commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/24/12, 02:03 AM. (go) (view) Captainchaos commented in entry 'Beyond the 14 words' on 05/23/12, 11:08 PM. (go) (view) Captainchaos commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/23/12, 09:13 PM. (go) (view) Leon Haller commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/23/12, 07:47 PM. (go) (view) Swan commented in entry 'Indian beauty' on 05/23/12, 12:52 PM. (go) (view) Lee John Barnes commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/23/12, 12:45 PM. (go) (view) Swan commented in entry 'More on the Indian beauty question' on 05/23/12, 12:31 PM. (go) (view) Leon Haller commented in entry 'Beyond the 14 words' on 05/23/12, 11:43 AM. (go) (view) Leon Haller commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/23/12, 11:32 AM. (go) (view) Mellaba Pechios commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/23/12, 07:55 AM. (go) (view) daniel commented in entry 'Beyond the 14 words' on 05/23/12, 03:51 AM. (go) (view) Leon Haller commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/22/12, 10:40 PM. (go) (view) Leon Haller commented in entry 'Golden Dawn - Greece' on 05/22/12, 10:40 PM. (go) (view) Recent Posts
General NewsScience NewsScience CategoriesAll CategoriesThe WritersEach author's name links to a list of all articles posted by the writer; the hashes link to authors' homepages. LinksEndorsement not implied. Controlled Opposition Crime
General
Immigration
Islam Jews
Nationalist Political Parties
Science Whites in Africa |
Posted by Notus Wind on September 12, 2010, 11:19 PM | #
I would like to say that there’s no shame in taking your time and being patient with all that’s been referenced in this entry. Between the new material in the introductory entry and my commentary in this entry and Norton’s Dome and The Free Will Theorem I would say that there’s quite a lot of material for someone to chew on.