The most fundamental questions of who we are and how we might organize in our defense has a cogent, preliminary answer outlined by the Euro-DNA Nation 

We organize our identity as advocates of our people, who are of indigenous European descent, for the maintenance of our distinct genus on the whole and in the maintenance of our distinct species as well.

The very act of participating in the Euro-DNA Nation establishes a degree of merit to individuals as worthy members from the onset: This person is willing to undertake a minimal act in essential distinction of themselves and their group in flight or fight for the defense of European types.

There are additional qualities that need to be drawn-out by means of criteria other than genetics, of course. For example, Bowery might seek demonstrations of particular skills to confirm the type that he is looking for in his particular community. Lister would be correct to look for additional criteria beyond genetics and so on. These particular qualitative concerns are provided for in the Euro-DNA Nation as well.

We may hypothesize and verify that we do have a definition of White/European Nationalisms which can move easily in consensus, neither yielding to slobs or snobs.

Although there is some confusion over what constitutes White/European Nationalism by way of slobs and snobs, there is a de facto consensus that all people of indigenous European parentage, including Russians, are valid members. With that, there is a normal provision that the various kinds of Europeans ought to be able to maintain their distinct demographics and not have them blended away, not even with other European types. This normal provision protects against the slobs, those who cannot see the depth and importance of European differences from one another and in some of their slovenly cases, not even seeing difference from non-Europeans. It also protects against snobbish definitions of White, which would deny the overwhelming Europeanness or the value of some European kinds; in this case again, they are not seeing or acknowledging a difference that makes a difference from non-Europeans. Their concerns that some patterns among those others which are unlike theirs and not distinctly European might damage their kind if integrated, are alleviated by the human ecological accountability of the particular national and subnational bounds.

Thus, by maintaining national, regional and communal differences and values we may handle concerns of the snobs and the slobs. The snobs, those who do not really care for certain native Europeans, not recognizing them as a part of “us”, may be placated by the fact that borders with these groups that they do not particularly care for are maintained. They have the means to stem limitless blending away. Therefore, they do not need to throw these people overboard along with the non-Europeans. On the other hand, the slobs, people who have a tendency to be lax in recognizing the differences between Europeans or even worse, from non-Europeans, are, by the means of these national, regional and communal accountabilities, also prevented from going too far.

This framework allows for more and less pure alike, it maintains both genus and species of Europeans and thus provides a crucial basis that in theory might serve organizational grounds for our identity, its defense and expanse, even, into new territories.

 

We have answered the fundamental question of who we are as an identity. We have even answered to an extent the question of how that might be achieved. We have not answered how we might get people to act on this quite benign level of participation.

Nevertheless, I am satisfied that fair premises have been set-forth on the fundamental question of who we are, that is, who we are advocating: people of native European descent, including Russians, and their discreet categories.

For those who might harbor hatred against European neighbors for atrocities past, to where they even resent their legacy, I may offer this consideration – that the manifestation of their genetic legacy will probably reveal eventually any moral inferiority if that has in fact been carried forth on ill-gotten gains, and they will come to account for their injustice.

While we have resolved important theoretical complications and obstructions (see Leftism as a Code Word, my discussion of incommensurability and more), one obstruction remains intransigent to organization - those who wish to embrace Hitler and the Nazis, believing that they can be conducive to unification.

In theory, it seems clear that whatever good ideas they might have had can be approximately reconstituted (better, we can think these matters through anew), while we may drop whatever horrific mistakes of theirs. Moreover, as Dr. Lister notes, we may drop its radioactive brand name. I share his disgust with those who cannot plainly see that necessity. I do not think Cobb was providing a service in promoting “White nationalism” by hoisting the swastika; on the contrary, that undoubtedly caused aversion to many worthwhile people. Defenders of this manoeuvre are the same sorts who say we should not offend Christians by being honest about what we think of this religion, that we should not use epithets and so on. But Hitler and the swastika, who could be offended? Ridiculous.

Despite the self delusions of his advocates, one of the reasons why many of us have been angry with Hitler and Nazism from the start is because they have given racial classification and protective discrimination on its basis - which are in fact a fundamentally necessary means of human ecology and accountability - a very suspicious and frightening image. And no, it is not all the fault of Jewish propaganda.

Make no mistake, the epistemic blunders of Hitler and the Nazis are clear enough, seized upon by Jewish propaganda obviously, but nevertheless, tactless and unwise enough so that racial classification has been stigmatized, successfully prohibited even, as “racist” and “white supremacist” in large part due to their lack of judgment.

This has long been a part of my disgust with the Nazis, that their narrow, headlong and scientistic approach has stigmatized the very important capacity to protect patterns in their protracted, developmental stages. I went through a phase where I had a chip on my shoulder with Germans about that. Interesting to note, it was Polish people who encouraged me to divest myself of that angle.

Even so, I don’t believe that I should have to be apologetic for being against Hitler and Nazism. I am not against Germans, German nationalism nor even some ideas that the Nazis used. However, the Nazis were, to say the least, against some other Europeans and the war (which they claim to have had no choice in) was vastly destructive to European interests. They had some pointedly wrong ideas. Nevertheless, I can easily include Germans and their best attributes while the Hitler/Nazi brand cannot be symbiotic of European concordance. You can blame people for being against Germans, but you cannot really blame them for being against Hitler and the Nazis. Whatever the case, it is history and where the history created European destruction, it would be foolish to resurrect its lines and associations.

Clear though it may be, I do not trust myself to use the right psychology to get this simple message across, to disabuse Hitler fans that it is not all Jewish spin that is working against them; I can rather see creating intransigent identification as such. Enough of that for now. I can in fact, dismiss it as stupidity.

The aversion to Nazism is not only an image problem created by Jews on Madison Avenue. Part of it is rather because of the right’s tendency, probably in a quest for transcendent foundation, to reify matters, to take them out of systemic process and relation. And in a word, people are rightfully scared and/or repulsed by its lack of the wisdom of process, negotiative symbiosis and human ecology. 

As touched upon in discussion between GW and I, the right’s light exists for a moment, shining on the provisional responsibility of stewarding and governing that whole social process, not to truncate it to where it is at odds with what might in fact be crucial systemic constituents, supportive, buffering, instructive, circumspect, formative or otherwise elements of itself.

The problem remains, now that we do have a brand, including Germans and excluding Nazis, a product which should be viable, popular, but is not, why is not popular yet? I suppose that there are marketing issues that should be gotten into, but that is for another time and place. For now, we might need to go deeper than marketing still, into the nuts and bolts of communication itself.

I am not endorsing all prescriptions of Shotter nor of this piece written years ago, but I believe the issues discussed are worth looking at. Shotter is a communications professor, a social constructionist and a communitarian. While my brief experience with trying to practice communitarianism soured me on the notion, I would still like to hear Dr. Lister expound on the matter for my better appreciation (though he might not be willing to do that).

Aversion to my effort to make the Euro-DNA Nation popular may well be due to my personality and my nonstandard grammar. Therefore, I intend to do something about that: I will begin rather to provide some analytical tools for examining the grammar that may obstruct our organization of White/European identity; and more non-standard grammar which may prompt ideas as to how our identity might gain in vivification, in the way to organization of our authentic and popular strength.

Fortunately, Majority Rights is the right place to analyze such minutia of identity. This paper of mine from a graduate class is looking at the “enemy camp”of the ontology project. It is in fact, in the realm of deontology. Nevertheless, that is not to say that it cannot be instructive and informative to the ontology project to examine the resources of “enemy practitioners.”

One trick of this school has been to avoid “why” questions as they tend to generate causally lineal answers while asking “how” questions by contrast, has the positive effect of tending to generate theory. However, this piece provides some clues as to why that question – how? -  is not working to galvanize White/European advocacy. The question is indeed, why?

Analysis: John Shotter’s “Social Accountability and the Social Construction of ‘You”
Part 1

Introduction: Whether used for special investigation or simply as used through ordinary language, “ways of making sense of the world”, or “language games” are characterized by grammars. Different language games entail different grammars; these grammars are logics of meaning and action – grammars (re) constructing a) “discursive structures” -  i.e., resources manifest clearly enough to suggest social rules that afford and constrain how endeavors should proceed, and b) “deontological necessities” - prohibitions and obligations: as opposed to transcendent or foundational ontological morality, de-ontological necessities are non-transcendent moral rules which, despite affordance and constraint of action by discursive structures, remain mutable and multi-interactive as are the discursive structures that they reconstruct.

That is not to say that the practitioner within a discursive structure will assent to the notion of deontological as opposed to ontological necessity. For prime example, in the language game of scientific endeavor, two grammatical ontico-polarities emerge. In the first case, of behaviorism, investigation is conducted with a third person passive emphasis – the observer, being part of a deterministic universe, “merely observes and records atomistically causal necessity.” As self-reflexivity is negated, so to is deontological accountability. The second stance is that of a typical cognitive school; it conducts research from the grammar of first person possessive. As social indebtedness is negated, again, so to is deontological accountability. Both of these polemic emphases are byproducts of Enlightenment “texts” - that is, a detached first person “I” (think therefore I am) acting toward a third person observational field.

Of more incisive interest, these Cartesian grammars impose not merely through the more culpable objectivist scientific endeavors and the non-reflexive overviews in social constructivist {1} work, but are remnant even within the specifications of scholarships more capable and deeply imbued with the temporal. In “Social Accountability and the Social Construction of You”, Shotter seeks in particular to attenuate this grammar’s scientistic effluence in the texts and practice of identity. By taking an ironic stance toward his own discursive rules (viz. a disabuse of the rigorous “how”), he is able to maneuver the notion of individuality into a more thorough social constructionist direction. This does (or can) rectify some of the residual behaviorist tradition hankering within the constructivist work. However, Shotter takes as his primary foil the more intellectually idolized objectivism of the the first {2} Cognitive school, though not directly. Rather, he differerances from the grammar of motives of that school’s most formidable opponent –  Rom Harré

Shotter asks, why not create a proviso to act “through differently structured means” than the conventional Cartesian starting place so that individuals might discover, as put forward in the Theatetus, “different aspects of [their] surroundings in relation to [themselves]?”; you might say that in order to rectify the Enlightenment’s legacy of brutal relativism, he leaves the constructionist fray momentarily for some Platonic “why-ning.”

THESIS: The thesis is two part. First, in this article Shotter seeks to deconstruct The Story Told through the (“the”) Enlightenment text(s) by distinguishing its grammatical starting point, the first person possessive: and in lieu of this grammatical emphasis he proffers an amelioratively overcompensating counter-text toward The Story Lived in second person address.

The second thesis is a metatext: As serious consideration of the possessive and detached relational grammar of The Story Told falls outside of JS’s language game, he opts to emphasize difference not so much from the Cartesian text, but tacitly against Rom Harre’s “Personal Being.” Exemplary of most counter-Enlightenment texts it has begun with the same grammatical starting point, changing only the relational emphasis from a possessive to a more active voice; according to Shotter, this is insufficient emancipation from The Story Told of uninvolved individuality. But interestingly, as passivity is rejected in Social Constructionism, the apparent alternative text of the second person passive also falls outside of JS’s language game. Thus, his proffered counter text of The Story Lived in alternative relationality, not having recourse to passivity, must negotiate novel grammar.

Key Terms:

Not having recourse to a “middle voice” (as did ancient Greek) JS introduces the novel grammatical implication of active and “acting into” voice to describe discourse between first and second persons. He also describes the discursve activities between voices in terms of “addressivity”, which pertains to the necessity of pronominal address in our identity creation. “Specificatory structures” are the partly finished logics of meaning and action that we are offered in address, to afford and constrain, shape and craft clearer sense making. And terms of “conjoint or joint action” deal with a non-lineal, but socially participatory notion of coherent identity. “Stories Lived” approximate the distinction, blurry and interrelated as it actually is, between rules of conjoint enactment and hermeneutic rules less bound to physical reality. Stories Lived through conjoint creation I contrast with Enlightenment “Stories Told” of artificially possessive and detached individualism.

Again, “discursive structures” are resources manifest clearly enough to suggest social rules that afford and constrain how endeavors should proceed. “Deontological necessities” are prohibitions and obligations; as opposed to transcendent ontological morality, de-ontological necessities are non-transcendent moral rules which, despite affordance and constraint of action in discursive structures, remain mutable and multi-interactive as are the discursive structures that they reconstruct.

Other frequent usages are {3}: a) making common: playing on the etymology of communication, it deals with the purpose of communication, viz. to achieve common understanding b) deontics: non-transcendent, interactive moral rules. c) enmesment: necessary participation in rules d) praxis: reflexive, agentive and socially negotiated reality e) rules: a different and potentially more agentive way of looking at necessity than standard physics models f) tfg’s: what is taken for granted, frequently a cause of intransigent conflict g) logical force: the degree of compellingness of a rule h) reflexivity (of effect or need): interactional or agentive response of observed, as opposed to lineal and passive results in forces and impacts. I introduce the term i) “corprisocial” to indicate the physical entering point to discursive structures.

Because Harré and Shotter’s common deontic language game, viz., discursive structure, bears as a melding and differencing point between their usages, I use the term of discursive structure as common ground, and finally contrast that to the terms which Harré uses concomitantly, “appropriation, postion and order”: Appropriation is how he sees identity is garnered, position describes varying capacity and responsibility to the order, which is a moral field of relation (Shotter uses the latter two terms, postion and order, as well) with Shotter’s differences – specifically, Derrida’s “Differance” {4}.  (yes, I despise Derrida now as I did when I wrote this).

I use the thematic metaphor of Appropriation versus Differance to underscore the central objective of my article. “Appropriation”, a mechanistic metaphor, has crept into the masterful constructionist work of Harré; inasmuch, it symbolizes indebtedness to prior ways of talking (prior discursive structures). The Appropriated discursive structure of Social Constructionism (Shotter and Harré are among “charter members of its constitution”) provides background in which Differances of this article are embedded. And “Differance” is Derrida’s deconstructionist metaphor for a contrast internally related to its context; Shotter is not abandoning internal dependence on the Social Constructionist context, but differing with some habits in order to deconstruct pejorative habitual influences.

Partition: To complicate matters further, I too am tracing Shotter’s position from within this overlapping framework, and with the same social constructionist take. This article uses the same pentadic arrangement as does Shotter. He describes 1. a notion of coherence 2. a relationship of knower to known 3. a purpose 4. what counts as data – a unit of observation and a unit of analysis and 5. how those data count. With great attention Shotter moves the analytical frame from paragraph to paragraph, from sentence to sentence, and sometimes from word to word (!) in a continuous hermeneutic circle establishing his differances to a social constructionist notion of identity. In overstating the relationship of knower and known, he does create a qualitative difference in the rules of this frame. Nevertheless, intentionality and perspective remain similar enough to render for this critique a challenging task of “elaboration and transformation.” As Shotter makes clear, there must be differences, changes and contrast from a given account (if not “creative misunderstandings”) if there is to be any way to judge its meaning, and thus for there to be any understanding at all. If I am to differ while using the same pentad, it is imperative to elaborate his tight analysis and highly regulative scheme against the transformative background of a more protracted form of the structure (i.e., a wider frame and “interior” information which does not circle from sentence to sentence). Therefore, though Shotter’s pentad circles against myriad sources, including those which go into making Harre’s positions, I organize Shotters Differances of the pentad more simply against Harre’s Appropriations thus:

First, against Harre’s notion of person positions in relation to one another, each making themselves coherent through reflexive reflection as prospective first persons by means of appropriations from third person constructions, voices in conversation, Shotter moves individuality into the more rigorously actional and practical involvement of joint shaping and crafting of coherence through second to first person address.

Second, JS takes Harre’s notion of relationship of pre-nominal person positions acting toward, and appropriating voice from third person conversation, and largely reverses it to where the provisional relation of second person voice directs specificatory structures toward pre-nominal persons in conjoint negotiation of relation.

Third, from Harre’s quest for the “how to” practicality of individual agency, JS differances by asking “why.” Arguing that asking “how”only leads back to the Story Told of detached individuality, he endeavors to shake its intransigence by proffering an overcompensating counter-text toward the Story Lived in relation to others in second person to first person interface.

Fourth, appropriating Harre’s observational field constituted, in his analysis, with empirical person positions, JS differs by using smaller, more active units of observation – momentary situations -  and analysis – Voice and Person of the verb as unintelligible apart from what they do.

Fifth, against Harre’s notion of accountability as possible through the creation of coherent individuality, wherein data count as one is able to conceive of oneself as an individual, JS contends that individuality is, and can only be, constructed through accountability to the data of pronominal positions.