Majorityrights Central > Category: Liberalism

17th century English coins, from an entry on coin-clipping at Collectors Universe forum

We nationalists have a lot to say about many things.  But the freedom of the individual is not generally one of them.  We do, of course, necessarily reject the liberal philosophy as the ruling Idea of our age.  Famously “beyond left and right”, nationalism exists in a state of permanent and total hostility to it, which posture is fully reciprocated by the liberal Establishment.  In consequence, our focus is only really group-based.  That natural and inevitable individuality which so characterises our race becomes altogether too much identified with the liberal pursuit of individual-ism, and all possibility of a fitting identitarian paradigm is lost.  One can’t help but wonder whether, in consequence, our politics is fatally weakened and incomplete.

That said, let us agree that human freedom is a lodestar of the mind, and a primary value of the European mind and thus the European sociobiology.  Obviously, there is no denying the uplifting and inspiring effect of its clarion call.  Of course, there are clarion calls and clarion calls.  At the ethnic and/or national level, the principles of independence (ie, a negative freedom) and autonomy (positive) are valid even when, at an intermediate, constitutional level, principles such as pluralism (negative) and democracy (positive) are absent.  At both levels (ie, national and constitutional), the various principles are valid even when, at the level of the individual man or woman, personal liberties are absent.  A captive or slave society might, therefore, still be ethnically and/or nationally independent and autonomous.  Equally it might be, to a greater or lesser extent, pluralist and democratic.  Even while Stalin’s Terror was in full flood, elections were held to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.

From this we may ascertain that, notwithstanding all the noise that national liberation struggles create, and the noise about “liberal democracy”, secret ballots, and so forth, freedoms at the collective levels have a clear universality to them that goes beyond the specifics of the liberal philosophy.  Among other races with other evolutionary strategies and, perhaps, more naturalistic political systems, those freedoms may even be sufficient unto the day.  The individual’s needs may be met in the main elsewhere, by non-political culture and religion.  But the European evolutionary strategy of individuality injects a different energy at the level of the individual.  It accentuates the value of the individual life, and imbues our truths and meanings.  It cannot be contained, but bursts forth as the political.  It is no small part of what we are.  Its action in us is responsible for the whole of the liberal analytic since its mid-17th century inception.

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The Conservative Woman, one of the last remaining Brit Disqus sites where it is possible to speak nearly honestly, published a piece this morning on the co-incidence of “the bio-security state” and fascism.  The connection was dependent on the veracity, or otherwise, of the late Umberto Eco’s undisciplined Eternal Fascism: Fourteen Ways of Looking at a Blackshirt.

There is so much nonsense written about fascism - mostly by tediously conventional minds who insist that Mussolini was a socialist so fascism was socialism - that I thought I would post a comment very generally expressing my own comprehension of the dread philosophy.  Here it is.  Naturally, it will not be understood by the tedious.

Eco was an Italian so one would have thought he might have something useful to say about fascism, but evidently not.  Perhaps it’s just not possible anymore.  So much rot is now talked about fascism, with so many people enworlded in liberalism and modernity so incapable of reaching its essence, that the thing itself is reduced to a mere hate-label.

The first and most essential point is that it was an extreme and assertive nationalism of becoming.  It sought to be historically active and nationally transformative and, therefore, it had to be Nietzschean or it was nothing.  It was not traditionalist but modernist and radically forward-looking - “Fascist Man” was newly if not freely self-confected.  He followed the party’s prescription for the rebirth of, or return to, heroism and action.  It is not, of course, traditonalist merely to recognise that liberal modernity has reduced Man to a meek and compliant instrument of the economy, or to ask if he was something more than that in the pre-modern age.  However, its modernism meant that it accepted modern capital and sought a new and inhering role for the corporation within its transformative scheme.

The second point is that it was against the massifying tendencies of the modern world, including democracy and equality.  It was not, therefore, socialist in the sense that socialism is understood within the liberal thought-world.  It did not apprehend class but nation, and not class consciousness but ethnic consciousness in an age when ethnicity was naturally and beautifully synonymous with the nation state.  Socialism in nationalism refers to the singularity and solidarity of the folk, and the natural bonds thereof.  A huge number of somewhat simple-minded folk assume for the horseshoe theory of a single universe of thought.  It’s a falsehood.  We live in an intellectual multiverse in which the politics of genetic interests never come near to the politics of the unfettered will.  They mutually seek the other’s destruction.  Within nationalist thought, fascism (with National Socialism and Judaism) stands at the imperialistic pole of the axis, in opposition to nativism.

The third point is that it was peculiarly statist.  It rejected the destining of the folk (which inhabits National Socialism and Judaism).  Instead, it encompassed everything within the vehicle of the dynamic state as the centre of a restored greatness and empire.

This is the general flavour of the thing.  If we dispense with the horseshoe, the hate-label, and so forth, do I really see it shining through modern global elitism?  No, not at all.  Most obviously, global elitism sees no precious folk but a deracinated, a-causal, coffee-coloured mass from which its own rare and perfumed subjects are uniquely different and, by that difference, may royally inflate themselves and endow themselves with all the world’s riches.  It is not a politics like fascism, or politics at all.  It is the crime of the century.

Our friend in the north responds to an article at the Guardian titled, Europe has rediscovered compassion for refugees - but only if they’re white.  It is written by a typical Global Boy.

Morgoth tells me that someone who viewed the video wiseacred to the effect that Salter’s thesis is falsified by the truth that people prefer a dog in their home to an African.  If proof were needed that Salterism itself has already dropped out of common use among nationalists, there it is.  Or maybe that person’s relationship to his pooch is just a bit different!

After the closing of comments at Klondrive, The Crows Nest is the second site to operate as heir to Morgoth’s Review, allowing the commentariat to continue its labours.  Its owner Gentleman Jim posted a fine podcaste from Morgoth, which I now embed here; with some comments below which give my reaction:

The initial comment is from a decent poster Tsnamm:

tsnamm • 4 hours ago
The age old question postulated by Milton, “is it better to rule in hell, than it is to serve in heaven.”
On the flip side from the gospel of Matthew “where your treasure lies, there will be your heart also. “
As it stands today we’ve been indoctrinated to believe the former at the expense of the latter. The corruption of the west has been sold as “choice”, “free will”, and “individual rights”. Yet all of these things have been perverted to the extreme so that what passes for our treasure today is the celebration of destruction of the core of our being spiritually, as a good. All of this being done concurrently with the physical contamination of our lands and replacement of our peoples by outsiders. It’s beyond an existential crisis.

My first reply:

Guessedworker  tsnamm • 2 hours ago
Very good formulation. I am cautious about the words “spirit” and “spiritual”, which do not have a precise meaning, and which tend to be used to indicate something that is just hovering about with which everybody is familiar anyway. They are attractive to people, not infrequently liars and rogues, looking for a mechanical agreement to an agenda, perhaps religious, perhaps philosophical, cultural or political, without feeling the necessity to explain in what, precisely, that agenda is constituted.

For me, anyway, the problem of “spirit” is resolved by the concept of emergence of properties which are in and of our nature, and from which we cannot resile. Where there is genetic expression there is phenotype, and in this case the phenotype is behavioural. We are always seeking its application to the world. That might be denied by the dictates and circumstances of the day but it does not change.

We are not East Asians. Conformism as a herd behaviour to centralise and harness group power is not our evolutionary survival strategy. Authoritarianism does not belong to us in that sense. The authoritarian Christian g-d is not our true god, and release from its authority only supplies us with release into the notions of liberalism because liberalism is also a Judaic model, albeit one in which Man the Creator dispenses salvation by self-authoriality ... by the same breaking of the bounds of our nature.

So, yes, while I like Morgoth’s presentation I do not agree with the central dichotomy. We do not have to live forever inside the Jewish mind. We do not have to be in this cage of authority contra hyper-individualism. Neither are emergent properties of the European mind.

And my follow-up

Guessedworker  Guessedworker • 36 minutes ago
There is an article at TCW this morning by a doctor - the subject is Covid, as usual for TCW - but she had this to say about the supinity of her colleagues before the government Covid juggernaut:

https://www.conservativewoman.co.uk/why-have-we-doctors-been-silent/

It is typically those of us most conditioned by the expectations of society, utterly obedient and deferent to authority, who gain entry to medicine. One can see the path: we were good, compliant children and then good, compliant students. Now we are good, compliant doctors. I’m beginning to understand that goodness is measured in a different way, and obedience is not a virtue.

Obedience is learned through fear, threat and intimidation; it is in fact trauma programming and achieved through small control gestures when we were young and helpless. Now we are adults but still operating under these childhood programmes of beliefs and fears. We still feel helpless and beholden to a higher authority. We still submit to an authoritative decree even when it overrides our inherent moral compass.

Our inherent moral compass.  That is what is true of us, or a non-trivial part of it.  That is what belongs neither to the Jewish g-d nor the self-authoring individual.

In other words, our liberation from liberal modernity is also a liberation from Christianity’s Judaic content.  What there is in Christianity that is not Judaic is another matter, and one probably best explored by nationalists with religious sentiments.

As the conversation between James and myself on his post detailing the sociobiological history of Euroman has drifted towards some thoughts of my own on the doomed Levellers of the English civil war period, I thought I might post those thoughts here in the following form.

The history of how the ancient, socially vivifying quality of fair-dealing between English brothers in law-conforming pre-Norman society flowed not into the timeless, naturalistic ethnic politics which we espouse today but into the modernist politics of equality and class conflict … that history is interesting and instructive.  It centres on one event in the autumn of 1647 at the very dawn of the modern era itself.  It is a story about the coming time of an idea, and the ideological clamour and energy which impels it into the political consciousness and into history.  It is a story about the ease with which an ancient contention can be suborned and bear consequences quite opposite to it.  It is a story, for us, about what might have been, but also a reminder that we possess the prior right to speak from those vivifying moral virtues which both socialists and Establishment anti-racists so readily and promiscuously ascribe to themselves.

A year and a half before Charles Stuart’s beheading, officers and men of the New Model Army (which had just driven the forces of the king out of London, and set up headquarters at Putney) had gathered along with commoners at St Mary’s Church.  They were there to debate the rights of free Englishmen, the meaning of sovereignty and consent, and the future Constitution of England, all which they did over the course of fifteen days from 28th October to 11th November.  They were the very antithesis of a rabble and a wondrous demonstration of the creativity and high-minded principle which abide among the ordinary and unassuming like water in the rocks.

St Mary’s Putney, sketched by Thomas Rowlandson, though over a century after the Putney Debates

St Mary’s Putney still stands today, hard by the bridge over the river.  Emblazoned on a plaque above the transcept is a single sentence uttered by Colonel Thomas Rainsborough, a Leveller, member of Parliament, and the highest ranking officer present in those fifteen days.  It was the enduring sentiment, and it reads, “For really, I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest he.”

The Putney Debates resonate strongly with liberals, and have an honoured place in their socio-political iconography as a watershed for the rights-based liberty of the individual against the over-bearing power of the state.  But Rainsborough’s truism, so plainly of its time in its usage, is also of its time in its relational certainties.  They are not the certainties of present-day liberals.  They do not relate to bloodless civic entities, each induced by the philosophical gods to unfetter his or her (or whatever’s) individual will while domiciled in the constitutional space otherwise known as England.  They relate to “the free people of England”, in the words of the Leveller Manifesto of 1649, actually titled An Agreement Of The Free People of England, signed by Lieutenant Colonel John Lilburne – “Freeborn John”, as he was known – and leading Levellers William Walwyn, Thomas Prince, and Richard Overton.  The text styled England as “this distressed nation” and, most interestingly, “this Common-wealth the land of our Nativity”.

Rainsborough’s England, then, was not at all the neutral administrative space of the liberal rationalist who would come a century after, nor neutral at all but the home we nationalists of today would recognise, where mutual belonging and fellow-feeling bestowed meaning and worth upon the life of every Englishman and woman.

The English Civil Wars are situated in the long (and, obviously, on-going) struggle of the Anglo-Saxon sons and daughters of the soil for deliverance from the Norman heel, and thence from all arbitrary power.  Lilburne – as near to an English nationalist as one could get in that religious age - actually wrote of common law as a Norman Yoke.  It is easy for us as nationalists today to understand the instinctive sense of English peoplehood which imbued and inspired Lilburne and all the other Levellers.  They were populists, and could command the stated support of a third of the populace of London.  But they were a minority in the New Model Army.  While all the parliamentarian forces made war on the degrading, subjugating power of absolute monarchy, the majority did not support the cause of a people’s participatory democracy, as conceived, for example, by Rainsborough who, after uttering his celebrated dictum at Putney, said:

“I think it clear, that every Man that is to live under a Government ought first by his own Consent to put himself under that Government; and I do think that the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a strict sense to that Government that he hath not had a voice to put Himself under.”

And therein is the outline of a second struggle of that time.  The greater part of the senior officers or Grandees, including Oliver Cromwell, the future Lord Protector, had fought not for a parliament with supreme authority over the law but for a constitutionally sovereign parliament above the people.  They fought not to give the people an equal vote but to restrict the vote to landowners like themselves.  They rejected the Levellers’ insistence that the people, not their elected representatives, are the final source of authority, and must be so because, in the words of the Leveller’s Manifesto:

… having by wofull experience found the prevalence of corrupt interests powerfully [incline] most men once entrusted with authority, to pervert the same to their own domination, and to the prejudice of our Peace and Liberties ...

Nothing is new.  Nothing really changes.  Nor would it change after the crushing of Leveller mutinies at Bishopsgate, Banbury, Andover and Burford by forces under Cromwell’s command, all in April and May 1649.  That proved to be the tipping point.  The great London funerals for the murders of Rainsborough in Pontefract in 1648 (in a bungled Royalist kidnap attempt), and Robert Lockyer, executed by Cromwell pour encourager les autres after the Bishopsgate mutiny, were forgotten.  The last full-throated Anglo-Saxon cry for all the people’s freedom and for fair-dealing died away.  It was not, after all, the time for a politics of the people.  It was the time for the modern, and the modernist understanding of the individual and his unfettering will and, thereby, a novel freedom abstracted from its ground in human presence and affirmation.

As the hiatus that was Cromwell’s authoritarian, puritan rule passed, the path was open for power elitism to slowly reinvent itself in the form of the elected representatives of the people and all those who enjoyed special access to them.  Ahead lay Lockean subjectivity, complete with the tabulu rasa, which would take hold in the next generation of elites looking for some promising ideology of human artifice to sink all trace of the populism and naturalism that, for a few short years, had lit the darkness, and which had ... indeed, could have … no place in their own scheme of things. 

Further ahead still lay revolution in France and radical ideas of a social progress which somehow left out the human in substance, and ideas of equality which left out the human in scale; bringing us to where we are today, beset by all manner of deadly and estranging harms but without that recourse to self and kind and nature which the generation of the England Civil Wars had through the voices of the Levellers.

As the urban industrial era solidified so Man became more and more a creature of caesura and of mere socio-economic import.  The Levellers’ cause, especially Rainsborough’s famous dictum, was not purloined exactly but re-interpreted in the only way it could be: as a somewhat picturesquely doomed but nevertheless noble struggle for the franchise and an interpretation of fairness in terms of social conflict and economic inequality.  The real principle ... the cohering principle of being and belonging that animates and explains the Rainsborough dictum (which liberal individualism does not)  may be formulated as:

However rich or poor in circumstance, each and every Englishman and woman has the life inherent to us all to live as he or she may, and none can be insensible to that English life in another of the English yet remain a whole and moral human being.

… and that’s what was lost to working-class solidarity and the nebulous ideal of social justice.  The capitalist stood in for Lilburne’s Norman.  The new political Grandees deftly drew a veil over their Cromwellian proclivities and jumped into the moral shoes of the Levellers.

Even so, it is not liberals or their socialist offspring but nationalists who are the Lilburnes and Rainsboroughs ... the passionate advocates for the people … the populists of our time.  For one thing we actually know who the people are (ie, not Africans or Pakistani Muslims or Roma, or whatever else 21st century Grandees like to claim).  For another, the decades of Establishment destructiveness towards the native British people are far more onerous than any transgressions of Charles 1st upon the religion and estates of his subjects, and it is nationalists who are reminding the Establishment of that.  It is nationalists reminding the English people that we all enjoy a negative right not to be subjected to government abuse and coercion.  Each of our folk has the right not to be cast down and oppressed for his or her love of our people and his or her desire for their freedom and good, and may bring opinions to that effect (or, indeed, to the effect that we do not love Africans or Pakistani Muslims or Roma or whatever) to the public space ... the St Mary’s of our time ... as freely as anyone else.  Fairness requires that those opinions are heard and, moreover, respected by our arrogant latter-day Grandees and, if they are the majority opinion of our people, acted upon.

The Levellers’ fight for fair-dealing, then, is ours now, and in its fundamentals it has not greatly changed.

To define the political against politics may seem only to be of interest to a few geeks and wonks who are unsatisfied with the usual utilitarian definitions.  “The stuff politicians do” ... that sort of thing.  But, actually, an understanding of how the political delimits politics, opening in any given time to the new, is key to its historical dynamic and also to people like us who wish to subvert and even replace that dynamic.

Perhaps the first thing to note is that, “great men” aside, politicians themselves are almost never the source of change.  As we saw with the long and disgraceful Remain rebellion, politicians of all mainstream parties are conservative in matters of their own position and persuasion.  They don’t welcome instability in their own political careers, or anything that might result in them being found out and forced out.

Because the class is self-selecting, its politicking from parliament to parliament, from generation of MPs to generation of MPs, tends always towards something vested and, in the longer term, alienating from the voters.  That self-selection occurs in no small measure on the basis of the possession of certain canonical values and beliefs which themselves refine and radicalise as other influences are brought to bear - for example, the agenda of those who actually fund political activity in this country, and all those who, at once or perhaps twice remove, participate in the process of developing (in our time, radicalising) “the stuff politicians do”.  Thus ...

i. Formal advisors have, of course, been a staple of government since the Pharoahs, and probably earlier.  The breed populating Westminster and Whitehall these days is the SpAd, dozens of whom provide ministerial teams with political strategy options and a very few ... Dominic Cummings being the notable case in Boris Johnson’s government ... with blue-sky thinking.  SpAds fill the party-pris space between ministers and their civil servants, whose terms of service include party-political neutrality.  They tend to come from, and eventually return to, the policy institutes and PR firms which have likewise thickly populated the political scene over the last few decades.  But while they are “in the thick if it” at their ministries or in Downing Street they are as much part of the political class as the honourable members and noble lords of Westminster.

ii. Immediately beyond the Westminster class is the oft-termed chattering class, the professional reporters, commentators and critics of the legacy media, all of whom have daily access to politicians, and whose relationship with them is symbiotic.

iii. Also very close to the politicians is the huge array of quangos, policy institutes, charities and organisations such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, and pressure groups such as the British Board of Deputies, the Muslim Council of Britain, Stonewall, and Hope Not Hate.  Their contact to MPs is more formalised, since information really only flows one way and MPs don’t need many of them as such - excepting left-of-centre MPs, of course, who can find gainful albeit chrony employment among the forest of Blairite quangos, international panjandrum bodies, and what-have-you when the Westminster career is done.  Much like Blair himself.

iv. The most cordial of political relations are those between Conservative MPs and corporate and banking interests.  Of course, said interests have to become party donors to gain access to ministers and actual influence over policy.  But it’s always money well spent - and valued by the politicians much more highly than, say, the loyalty of voters.  Career-expired Conservative ministers who have proved useful can expect to rack up a fine collection of non-too-taxing, two-afternoons-a-month non-exec directorships and consultancy arrangements.  Keeps the wolf from the no longer ministerial door, doncha know.

v. Beyond the clamour from all these entities is the source of the most fundamental input to the political process, and that’s the professoriate: the political philosophers, the political scientists and theorists, the economists, the sociologists, the historians, the jurists, and so forth.  It is their historical function to shape the future.  There are some instances where the political connection is direct.  Freidrich Hayek, for example, shaped Thatcherism.  Anthony Giddens shaped Blairism.  Even archly pragmatic governments such as David Cameron’s have their intellectual gurus (in his case the rather more humble Steve Hilton, an original member of the Notting Hill Set).  As a rule, though, the most historically re-defining government is informed by the most philosophically re-defining intellectual.

vi. Way out in the distant margins are the radical street activist groups such as Black Lives Matter and Unite Against Fascism, publicly toxic because of their extremism, but not so toxic that politicians can’t slavishly follow every demand they chant.  And that’s without these groups having any formal contact with them.  In these cases, of course, it’s not always about political cowardice.  A significant fraction of MPs, and not all of them in the Labour Party, very likely agree ideologically.

So these are the six sources of “the new” which feed the political class.  They define the boundary of the political not via their broad output (books, papers, lectures), much of which may never attract MP’s attention or interest, but via their input to Westminster and Whitehall itself, however restrictive that might be, however that may come about.  The political is the totality of theory in metamorphosis and theory already metamorphosed into practise.  The political is all that can be talked about in party political circles. 

We should note at this point that this essentially technocratic arrangement came to real prominence not in Thatcher’s time but a decade later with the drive by Clinton, Blair and Shroeder to fix for all time the then regnancy of the progressive left all across the West.  In part that was to involve ideological radicalisation.  The formal institution of culture war, anti-racism, and political correctness moved wholesale from the American campus, where they incubated in the 1970s and 80s, into national party systems; and at the same time Third World immigration was massively ramped up.

So it was that in his famous and very candid article for the Evening Standard in October 2009 Andrew Neather, a previously unheard-of speechwriter for Blair, Straw and Blunkett, reported “coming away from some discussions with the clear sense that the policy was intended - even if this wasn’t its main purpose - to rub the Right’s nose in diversity and render their arguments out of date.”

The other weapon in the progressive toolkit was the system of appointments to Third Sector bodies at all levels.  John Major’s government had installed Tories in 57% of these appointments.  But Blair completely changed the ideological balance. By 1998, Labour supporters made up 75% of appointees and Conservatives only 13%, a trend which carried right through the years of Labour rule, Gramscian style, and onward to that of Theresa May.  They were the years of the networker in an ideologically progressive, state-funded managerial system allying not in their hundreds but in their thousands with like minds in government.

Blair’s intention - to render right-wing opinion politically inoperable and thereby dominate government in perpetuity - was never achieved.  But he did succeed in insulating party politics from the more inconvenient opinions of the people.  In place of the steering hand of the voting public MPs had all the expert advise and creative thinking they could possibly need.  Politics could function for four or five years at a stretch without once taking account of what the people thought.  And why not?  The votes still rolled in on election day.  Blair won three general elections.  Brexit notwithstanding, he made politics safe for politicians.

For nationalist parties trying to mount electoral challenges dependent on unbridling the will of the natives his dispensation presents a near-insuperable barrier.  How do you make a breakthrough when your own arguments are simply, cleanly excised from every area of the political, and all anyone ever hears of you is the usual mechanical abuse and condemnation?  How do you make a breakthrough when you don’t really understand why the political is so impossible to penetrate ... not just ideologically because the Establishment and the media are hostile to nationalist thought, but literally, because the political is filled to the brim with the unholy marriage of economically hyper-individualist policy and socially hyper-egalitarian policy.  There is no room for kinship when all is individualism.  There is no room for particularism when all is universalism. 

The question, then, becomes one about how to drive a nationalist wedge into the rockface - or, perhaps a better analogy, how to strew the political ground with nationalist seeds.  The good news is that it is possible.

Within days I will set up a website to advance the best in White advocacy/nationalism as it is known to be - a place for the resource brought to bear, for its cultivation by those who recognize the crucial value of this resource.

I will endeavor to maintain a presence at Majorityrights in order to correct any misrepresentations of my positions and to challenge any perfidy which might make its way back, hoping for my riddance.

Some may think that I might be disheartened with the marketing campaign and those beholden to it having held sway over me thus far, but it is not the case.

Some will mock me as having spent my time in futility, but I think not; especially as compared to the likes of those who spend $10,000 only to die on the side of Mt. Everest.

I have achieved what I set out to do, which is to summit (what I am satisfied to be) the most vital and necessary in theory for the advocacy of European peoples. Similar as those not understood for having undertaken a quest of Mount Everest, it was my objective. Something that I had to do. But unlike their project, mine was not so personal or futile; rather it was in service to my broad understanding and to our people (and, ok, if I am to be most honest, perhaps as much against antagonists and those who do not care - their practices which are objectionable for the destructive impact they are having upon us), and against those who time and again mislead the theoretical trail; by contrast, I have left clear maps on trail for the sovereignty of European peoples: I know that I have brought the best in truth and in depth; while some may be determined to deny this truth out of custom, habit, tradition, their prejudices or vanity - or in red caped misdirection, as I have particularly shown - all one has to do is take a look honestly at my efforts which I will carry over to the new site to be disabused of pseudo justification for antagonism to the platform which I bring to bear.

Whether the new site achieves popularity or not right away is not an issue; any more than popular approval might not be first in mind for the guy who dies on the side of Mt. Everest, singularly focused in his aim, irrespective of how futile and impractical popular opinion may deem his quest to be; however, by contrast, the objective of the new site is not vain nor impractical, nor destined to be unpopular or out of the mainstream as those who do take a look will see; as the perspicuous overview from this summit has shown what is most relevant; a manifestation of the most necessary resource for our people.