ATP Geopolitics explains:

So far, four large-scale ammunition storage sites have been hit in under two weeks. The first attack was on the morning of September 7.  The depot is in Soldatsky, Voronezh region, only about seventy-five miles from the Ukrainian border.  It is where North Korean-made KN-23 missiles were held.

Next, on the night of September 18 the SBU security service, GUR defence intelligence, and Special Operations Forces hit Military Unit 11777, the headquarters of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Defence Ministry in Toropets, Tver region.  As many as 100 drones may have been used.  The depot is vast, and said to have held missiles for Iskander operational-tactical missile systems, Tochka-U tactical missile systems, as well as KAB aerial guided bombs, and artillery rounds.

On the night of September 21, the Defence Forces of Ukraine struck the Russian arsenal of Tikhoretsk, in the Krasnodar region.  This facility is one of the three largest ammunition storage hubs in Russia and one of the key ones in the logistics system of the Russian forces fighting in Ukraine.  According to reports the arsenal had received at least 2,000 tons of ammunition, including from North Korea. The Podliot radar station, which detected air targets in the direction of the arsenal, was also attacked.

The same night the 23rd Arsenal of the Main Artillery Department of the Ministry of Defence, again in the Tver region.  This was another warehouse where the Iskander and Tochka-U ballistic missiles were located. It is about 15 km from Toropets.

All four were major hits.  There are claims from the front in Donetsk that Russian Army logistics have already been affected, and the rate of artillery fire is reducing.  Can the pressure be sustained by the Ukrainians (for example, if the Russians now have to move to a multiplicity of smaller but less secure storage sites)?  What would be the potential effect on the Russians ability to continue their current offensive war?