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A hermeneuticist confronts a sortocracer with a provocative issue Challenge or corrective process to Enlightenment puritanism, depending on perspective [Note: Søren chided me for not proofreading this sufficiently; and he was right. There was a typo in the very title and an uncouth repetition of the word “suggests” in the same sentence in the second paragraph. It’s fixed now] There is a provocation from the other direction as well. You see, this hermeneuticist naturally wants different nations to have different, sovereign ways, and for there to be a variety of ways among the nations, including individuals who may believe themselves to be descended from god, as they see fit. So, the question, “do you accept the prerogative to exclude you?” is only mildly insulting in that it proposes the necessity to enforce something that I am advocating with all my might, in line with, and by my very natural preferences. And it is not to be capricious or to look for serpentine ways for an inroad into a foreign culture, but rather to point-out a loophole in this Enlightenment model of “sortocracy” - the a-historical linearity of modernity - which indicates that consideration be given to the possibility that it might indeed, be enhanced by some consideration of the hermeneutic turn. That loophole of a-historicity/historicity and the necessity of narrative coherence may be used in a positive or negative way. Hermeneutics was, after all, conceived for friendly purposes, to protect our people from the arbitrary ravages of a-historical scientism. And typically, abused by Jewish interests. Hermeneuticist: Nice interview, but her listing Nazism as a minor quibble (she “doesn’t care if people are Nazis”) makes my point. Though he pretended to be defensive, Hitler was clearly not respecting the prerogative to exclude Nazis from Eastern Nations. Sortocracer: The same can be said of “Judaism” of course. The problem then becomes whether one is allowed to identify as the nonsupremacist portions and therefore qualify for inclusion in humanity. But WN’s are not acknowledging the negative aspects of Nazism Sortocracer: If not, one opens one’s self up to all manner of smear tactics and the equivalent of presumption of guilt by association without due process. Sortocracer: I think its a pretty simple matter to treat Nazis as I said Jews are to be treated: Do you or do you not permit me to exclude you? If so, you’re in the federation. If not, you die. And I definitely agree that national socialism as a concept is not necessarily supremacist in entirety and not necessarily imperialist in all its aspects, but.. Hitler was clear in his intent. He wasn’t going to honor right to exclude him and it was his intent to lord over the East. I don’t know about the Strasser brothers or NS Sortocracer: Under sortocracy the corridor would have been sorted very rapidly. Hermeneuticist: but Hitler was clear that borders were a matter to be imposed by will of the nation as the people and that he saw it as German destiny to expand eastward, almost indefinitely. By time of “Table Talk” certainly, up to the Urals. If it was really just a modest border dispute, I would be more careful not to emphasize Hitler’s not fitting the program. Sortocracer: Hitler would have had nothing to say about it. Hermeneuticist: Perhaps not.. Sortocracer: Indeed, he would never have become chancellor. The whole idea of “the reich” was fundamentally flawed from a sortocratic point of view. the german provinces should never have been so united. Hermeneuticist: see, from a Polish nationalist perspective, much of that land was stolen from them a few generations before (by Friedrich “The Great” et al, who Hitler so admired); it was an occupied part of the historical nation they sought to re-establish at all; so it’s not a simple matter of consent of those living there at that time. It is a good point about the unifying aspect of the Reich being unsortocratic, but it seems an interesting question of a-historicity and historicity being problematic, helpful, necessary to some extent. You probably have an answer, but I am wondering what you say to throngs of migrants who might vote their sort to stay right there in the U.K., irrespective of historical basis. Comments:2
Posted by Robert on Thu, 02 Oct 2014 21:41 | # Could you expand on the opposition between hermeneutics and sortocracy? It would seem that someone like Heidegger would be supportive of and compatible with sortocratic ideas. 3
Posted by DanielS on Fri, 03 Oct 2014 08:08 | # Agreed, I don’t think Heidegger expounded upon hermeneutics; but he set it forth into philosophical prominence and the reasons for it and the implications of how it might act as a corrective were there; however, it was taken-up, distorted and popularized by his student, Gadamer. Teasing apart and merging the differences and convergences of proper Hermeneutics and Sortocacy is the point of this thread. I will try to be of help toward that end and would appreciate any sincere input from others. To begin, as opposed to the Cartesian dichotomy, on the one hand, in quest of axioms transcendent of natural relevance and circumstance and on the other hand, locked into empirical scientism (both sides being analytical means which tend to minimize interaction and historical perspective), hermeneutics rather takes into account particularly how the empirical end’s myopia is clumsy, certainly not deft in taking into account historical patterns, whereas language and narrative can take those broader patterns into account and achieve protracted coherence from the arbitrary quite deftly; and as hermeneutics is not Cartesian, but an engaged process of thinking and inquiry, it will then take this more speculative breadth of historical conceptualization and bring it to bear, testing it against extant facts; looking perhaps to establish patterns, operational verifiability, warranted assertability. Thereupon, one may infer the basis for accountability to one’s genetic/historical background where empirical scientism is short-sighted of the case. * It is interesting to note that the first Constitutional republic based on Enlightenment principles was The U.S., the second was Poland - we saw what happened to Poland soon after its Constitution; its nation was taken over and partitioned by other nations; now we see it happening to The U.S. 4
Posted by neil vodavzny on Fri, 03 Oct 2014 13:08 | #
I was reading http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/trapped-history-france-and-its-jews The Enlightenment view of attainment is history, IMO. Anyone who inhabits particularities of space and time and is aware of the passage of time in a locale, is aware of creative intelligence. Artists are aware. Birds have it (they build nests). This might be the sort of world we should aspire to. Not birds, I mean the general idea. I’ve tried to point out in various ways that the fractal, spontaneous aspect of DNA is creative intelligence, what we are. The cyber-age, by that token is just the end-product of the outmoded Enlightenment. Algorithms, codes, complexity. 6
Posted by DanielS on Sun, 05 Oct 2014 11:03 | # In further answer to your question, Robert, I would guess that a hermeneuticist’s approach, valuing the time immemorial and deep social interactive patterns as it may, would be a bit more wary than sortocracy, with its emphasized valuation of individual freedom, “Testing” and “Lessons derived” as they can excuse a myriad of abuse and reckless liberalism; without the broad reach of a sufficiently deliberate hermeneutic to assimilate the forms that a scientific focus might otherwise truncate, too ready to concede liberal deviation. Behind the liberal destruction is the presumption of foundation, of course; and wrecked on its course is much that a hermeneuticist might rightfully treasure. Some of liberalism’s chief scientistic inroads to pernicious change may lie in testing and the value of “the lesson” derived; whereas the hermeneuticist can ensconce protracted patterns into sacral accountability - say, of the episode of the rite, the ritual, the tradition. In fairness, talk of being derived of god and collective civilizations being dragons and serpents against individual cultures is certainly hermeneutics - but that only makes my point, that there is no escaping it. So why not embrace it to deploy it more consciously to our ends? Why take the angle that it is anti-science when it is not and cannot be escaped; it is rather to complement and enhance science. Sortocracy does have the control variable and the DNA evidence that the empirical end has discovered, however the means of putting the protracted strands of those sequences and systems into a a valued coherence requires the augmentation of hermeneutic process - i.e., the other, more communal, symbolic and narrative end. 7
Posted by Robert on Tue, 04 Nov 2014 02:51 | # As far as Heidegger goes, there is no “time immemorial”. Rather time is the meaning of Being. I’m not sure I understand the opposition to scientism, since race, DNA, genetics, ethnic genetic interests, and other such concepts are ultimately products of scientism according to an existential hermeneuticist like Heidegger. Furthermore the radical valuation of individual freedom of sortocracy does seem in accord with the existentialist aspects of Heidegger’s though. On the other hand, I don’t understand the scientism of the sortocracer, since scientism ultimately obliviates individual freedom, or I should obliviates Dasein or Being-in-the-World for beings. 8
Posted by DanielS on Tue, 04 Nov 2014 07:21 | # Posted by Robert on November 03, 2014, 09:51 PM | # “As far as Heidegger goes, there is no “time immemorial”. Rather time is the meaning of Being.”
“I’m not sure I understand the opposition to scientism, since race, DNA, genetics, ethnic genetic interests, and other such concepts are ultimately products of scientism according to an existential hermeneuticist like Heidegger.” I do know that Heidegger did not consider himself an existentialist whereas Sartre did; and there may be some confusion in that regard, as Sartre turned Heidegger on his head: Whereas Heidegger said that we are free because the time-span of our lives is delimited by death, Sarte said that we are free because we expand into the infinite nothingness beyond death. I favor Heidegger of the two, but I am still not so concerned with trying to read Heidegger faithfully, as I am trying to interpret what scholars that I respect are doing with hermeneutics in contrasting it to scientism – by scientism I mean not science, of course, but bad science or mis-application of science – linear and overly deterministic, not sufficiently taking into account Praxis - the multi-interactive and less predictive social world, its complicating interaction, agency and expansive language being beyond scientific simplicity. An example of scientism: the difference between blacks and Whites is just a few genetic markers determining skin tone. “Furthermore the radical valuation of individual freedom of sortocracy does seem in accord with the existentialist aspects of Heidegger’s though.” I don’t think that Heidegger would approve though I’d really have to brush-up on my Heidegger to provide a better example; nevertheless, I’ve read him as too respectful of the importance of the nationalist context and history of the folk to place such a value on mere radical freedom. The later Heidegger would probably criticize that as an American thing in contrast to the Soviet thing. On the other hand, I don’t understand the scientism of the sortocracer, since scientism ultimately obliviates individual freedom, or I should obliviates Dasein or Being-in-the-World for beings. I wonder about that too. Interesting talking to you. Its the kind of discussion I might hope for at MR.
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Posted by meta-ontology on Tue, 04 Nov 2014 15:32 | # (Heidegger would probably argue something like that) Come to think of it, yes, based on Greg Johnson’s recent discussions of Husserl and Heidegger, it seems safe to say that Heidegger would be concerned to emphasize the meta-ontological aspects of Being, as it can hold non-physical referents through language, time and space. 10
Posted by Graham_Lister on Wed, 05 Nov 2014 00:39 | # Someone said “as it [Being] can hold non-physical referents through language, time and space.” I know I’m going to regret this but what precisely is the concept or idea behind the idea of the ‘non-physical’ in that comment? 11
Posted by DanielS on Wed, 05 Nov 2014 06:42 | # I don’t think you should regret it. If something can stand corrected so much the better for your participation. Yours and other well considered and backed thoughts are what we should hope for here. Non-physical probably wasn’t the right choice of words either. Non-physical - by that I meant presence not readily perceptible/ not easily conceptualized by empirical verification in anything like its full structure or meaning (significance) to us.
“God” the creator and judge of all.. I suppose traceable to language and then neural pathways…
Maybe Heidegger suggested that time provided an elusive but permanent being beyond which was yet available to contextualize meaning. 12
Posted by Robert on Wed, 12 Nov 2014 04:10 | # Sartre adopted and popularized the term. Most of the prominent thinkers associated with existentialism, such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, never referred to themselves as existentialists. Sartre did not so much turn Heidegger on his as misunderstand him entirely. He took Heidegger and tried to place him in a Cartesian framework, which is what Heidegger was trying to escape. The nationalist context for Heidegger differs from the common contemporary understanding of the nationalist context, which is a scientistic, metaphysical one. The localistic elements that sortocracy would presmuably make possible seem in accord with the existentialist aspects of Heidegger’s thought. Many contemporary nationalists employ Heidegger’s language and, for example, speak of Being while implying a traditional Western metaphysical, scientific understanding of beings. Heidegger was not referring to sortocracy or anything like it when he described the US and the USSR as being metaphysically the same. 13
Posted by Robert on Wed, 12 Nov 2014 04:14 | # Johnson’s essay is misleading. It repeats the relatively common misunderstanding of Heidegger as being some sort of German Idealist or merely a Husserlian phenomenologist. It is precisely subjectivism and Cartesianism, of which Husserl is sort of a culmination, that Heidegger is trying to depart from. 14
Posted by Hermes on Wed, 12 Nov 2014 06:52 | # Posted by Robert on November 11, 2014, 11:10 PM | # “Sartre adopted and popularized the term. Most of the prominent thinkers associated with existentialism, such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, never referred to themselves as existentialists.” OK. I first came to Heidegger in a book surveying existentialism. But I do recall Heidegger explicitly rejecting the term as applied to himself.
That I’ll buy. “The nationalist context for Heidegger differs from the common contemporary understanding of the nationalist context, which is a scientistic, metaphysical one. The localistic elements that sortocracy would presmuably make possible seem in accord with the existentialist aspects of Heidegger’s thought.”
Seem to accord with a grappling wiht existential aspects yes, but I would venture to suggest rather, that it “needs to come into accord”, and perhaps can accord, with deepened hermeneutic practice.
Your observation seems to be sound there. That is, you are marking and important distinction. There is a meta aspect that is being ignored by scientism. However, it is precisely the “meta” that can be misundertood too, as Graham pointed out, misunderstood as unconnected with the physical - where as “meta” properly understood by its etymology, simply means “above.” Thus, above the situated fact, as language, narrative, symbolism, metaphor and conceptualization can capture “meta’physical” frameworks in their protracted and systemic breadth. That is to say, hermeneutics is necessary to coherence, to escape Cartesianism on the empirical end, myopic attention to arbitrarily presented facts - mere facticity. “Heidegger was not referring to sortocracy or anything like it when he described the US and the USSR as being metaphysically the same.” Hmm. Heidegger applied the US/ USSR distinction to different social problems (e.g., both too materialistic), but I suspect he would look upon sortocracy at this point in its development as largely expressing some of the American side shortcomings. I would guess there is a bit more deliberateness, chosenness, more freedom and less thrownness and ancient place than Heidegger would accept for a sufficient hermeneutic analysis.
“Johnson’s essay is misleading. It repeats the relatively common misunderstanding of Heidegger as being some sort of German Idealist or merely a Husserlian phenomenologist. It is precisely subjectivism and Cartesianism, of which Husserl is sort of a culmination, that Heidegger is trying to depart from.” He was trying to yes, but did not advance the hermeneutic project to maturity. He seems to be taking awkward first steps at times in its negotiation, veering a little too much this way or that. Not that that is not important of itself. That generosity of Heidegger, honesty, modesty in allowing one into his very cobbling process, is one of the things that makes him a valuable philosopher - especially a philosopher to the recovery of a devastated Western man. However, I believe Johnson’s college essay was helpful in fleshing out Heidegger’s indebtedness to Husserl and the nuts and bolts of crucial points of departure that he took-up as Husserl provided.
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Posted by Graham_Lister on Thu, 13 Nov 2014 00:48 | # Frankly you all need to be reading Merleau-Ponty 16
Posted by Hermes on Tue, 18 Nov 2014 05:15 | # Someone said that hermeneutics is epistemology. No, unlike the Cartesian divide of Theoria, which according to Aristotle’s tradition, corresponds with Epistemology and detached the observer in contrast with the real world of practice, hermeneutics is a non-Cartesian method for investigating the world; thus hermeneutics acknowledges that the observer is engaged and in a process involved in interactive, reflexively responding phenomenon, especially when dealing with the social world - which is Praxis - and acknowledges necessary incompleteness and changeableness of observation there as a result of human agency in particular; therefore hermeneutics is not epistemology but a matter of Phronesis - which is practical judgment as Aristotle advised we must use in correspondence with Praxis, the social world. But in dealing in utmost honesty of care, hermeneutics views all investigation as a matter of Praxis at bottom - for what we care (about ourselves, our social involvement and our meas of knowing thereby). Hermeneutics is not epistemology, but the method of phronesis. A necessarily engaged and ongoing process of investigation. Whereas epistemology is a detached way of relating, or rather not relating to the world - which is a problem that Heidegger et al would have seen as set in motion with the pre-Socratics, in teleology and culminating in Descartes. The third category of Aristotle after Theoria and Praxis, was Poesis - the arts . Just as Aristotle held that Episteme (the foundation of thinking) corresponded with Theoria whereas Phronesis (practical judgement) corresponded with Praxis, the social world, he maintained that Techne, technology and craftsmanship, corresponded with Poesis, the arts. A problem that came in with the Cartesian divide is that Techne became separated from Poesis as well. Technology became the means to Theoria as opposed to what Vico might call the topics, the art of judgement or Phronesis. Techne became separated from the arts and from the social world and became “the method” for knowing, the relation of knower to known and for arriving at foundational theoretical knowledge. This was a central problem Heidegger and his students were addressing - http://majorityrights.com/weblog/comments/hannah_arendt_far_from_innocent - the relation of knower to known and how technology was being abused as the means to Theoria in pursuit of perfect, Cartesian foundational knowledge in detachment from concern of the social world, Praxis. Thus, how to heal the authentic relation of knower to known that had been ruptured by technology as it become a defacto, celebrity, quasi religious means of all knowing - since epistemology was rejected as an art, the ostensible method of knowing remained only technology. Heidegger offered a correction to this by observing that thinking was more like Poesis. Now, in saying that, he is not making a vague statement. He is referring to Aristotle’s three major categories. And he is doing this in criticism of the over application and misapplication of technology as it detached knower from known. That thinking is a more organic, meandering, historically, socially indebted and interactive process than reverence for pure technology might acknowledge. It is more like Poesis. And its comprehensive domain is Phronesis - practical judgment as it concerns the social world. Can you see how this detachment from social concern and reverence for technology by Western man could contribute to both our achievements and our social demise? And why Heidegger et al was focused on correcting this Enlightenment hubris? Technology became a mechanical substitute for thinking as a means to Theoria - a Cartesian objective; the method to that pure foundational objective was to be “pure” as well, a method detached and unsullied with the messy social world, its concerns and accountability; this was a wrong turn for Western Man that was set about by teleology. Hence, Heidegger’s corrective advice that thinking authentically described relates to the world more like Poesis than technology; his further efforts to un-do the Cartesian divide and alienation would look to subsume epistemology into phronesis, of necessity, of concern for our greatest Care which is ourselves, our people, our midtdasein (being amidst our people); and would prescribe that the relation and management of our relation to the world be conducted by hermeneutic process, moving back and forth as judgment saw necessary between narrative comprehensive expanse of the social and historical; and back to empirical verification in weeding-out of the destructively speculative; and back again into the broad view where empiricism is destructive for its detachment, arbitrary myopia, technological denial of social involvement and concern. Thus, unlike the Cartesian detachment as re-prescribed of Marxist artifice, a concept being applied to the people irrespective of their true nature, proper hermeneutic process would merely draw the line to delimit a social group as a hypothesis, not imposing an illusion, but tending a well founded hypothesis to be verified or, as you might say, to be unconcealed amidst the ongoing back and forth process of hermeneutics. Nevertheless, because hermeneutics is not Cartesian it does not deny the reality of a people’s ontology but provides the authentic means for their authentication. Note the massive bust of Vico heading this essay
Part 3 reaches out to Vico at the end
http://majorityrights.com/weblog/comments/leftism_as_a_code_word_part_1_the_white_left In terms of what Hitler promoted, at least originally, what legitimately inspired people to unify as a people, was a form of White leftism. Hitler set-about to betray that already with The Road to Resurgence 1927 (as WWS notes), culminating in the Night of the Long Knives (as TT is careful to point out). Thus, that one fine aspect of inspiration betrayed was mixed in with the corrupt aspects - such as the Judaic affectations as GW notes, of The Fuher principle, supremacism and millenialism.
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Posted by empiricism in context, patterns that connect on Wed, 11 Mar 2015 11:46 | # Once said by a Christian: You want to tell a Christian story, most people, myself included, do not think it fits the facts and collates them well enough. Of course empiricism is true in a moment and rationalism can seize onto a sliver of broader truths, but it takes hermeneutics to put these things in context, and the narrative pattern which connects these facts to our human interests can be more or less true. Post a comment:
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Posted by Robert on Thu, 02 Oct 2014 21:36 | #
I don’t think Heidegger developed hermeneutics for practical or political purposes.
Also, Heidegger was a German nationalist, and more specifically, of a more provincial, parochial rural Germany in which he grew up.
He also had a chauvinistic attitude. He thought only the Germans and the ancient Greeks really mattered. He was quite dismissive of the other European cultures.