“Natural rights”, “human rights” or “social classification”, what is the difference that can make a difference for us at this point? I would argue assertion of social classification. John Law is distinguishing our relative difference as a people but places it in the background to a distinction of “natural rights” as an expression overwhelmingly distinct from other peoples and a singular expression of Europeanness - apparently forever lost if we set it aside as a priority at certain times in the life span, in our system and in our history? I would argue that rights are one product of our social expression which will be lost if we do not, as de Benoist would advise, learn to prioritize the social from whence individualism derives. It’s a White Left thing.

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John Law’s erudition is in evidence in distinguishing “natural rights”  vs “human rights” in European history.

He argues that de Benoist is making a mistake in bundling “human rights” with “natural rights.” That he is throwing out the latter along with the former in his criticism of human rights.

In effect, I would say that de Benoist is arguing that “Human rights” are a Cartesian, universalist derivation of rights which are to be done away with as both destructive to the very grounds of what individualism there is to be had and at the same time done away with as a naively adopted, neo-liberal, universalist imposition aimed to break down market barriers to, and differences from, the rest of the world.

Law’s point is, in effect, that in not distinguishing the universal and Cartesian “human rights” from its forerunner, the telos of “natural rights” as a telos relative only to European cultures, that de Benoist is also discarding the distinct and inherent civic rights as natural rights born of Europeans and meant solely as a means to express and maintain our particular European character, civility and liberty. These civil liberties are an epiphenomenon that are both a unique prerogative in expression of our relative kind and a crucial means to maintain our peoples.

It appears to me that de Benoist’s emphasis in criticizing individualism is more correct at this point. De Benoist may not be so much mistaken at this point in not distinguishing the kind of rights as in not emphasizing relativizing social grounds in firm contrast to other peoples and support as such that dynamic classification of bio-racial systems provide.

Law, on the other hand, is jumping the gun a bit in presuming our relative distinction in the telos of natural rights. I can’t speak for de Benoist but of course I have acknowledged the importance of something like that protection of rights and individual liberties within the relative and bounded classification of European peoples, but I would favor a new way of devising them which would suffice for post modern performance requirements (e.g., warrant, accountability, coherence, agency, obligation, legitimacy, prohibition), since the telos of natural rights are likely to prove a partly obsolete relic of a more “stable” order and perhaps on a slippery slope to the Cartesian universality of human rights that came of them.

In either case, returning to the rights structures of bygone epochs is not our priority. Far from it, and in that respect, de Benoist is not wrong to be strongly critical of individual rights as a key agent in leaving us susceptible to destruction.

Neither again is Law wrong in emphasizing that something like rights are necessary to Europeans.

But until such time as we have overcome the Cartesian de-legitimization of social classification and Jewish exploitation of that de-legitimization, particularly in regard to White peoples’ ability to discriminate for that prohibition, individual rights are better treated as a subset and permutation of positive attributes that the class (whole social groups of European peoples) would birth were it not in jeopardy - rights would be an epiphenomenon and not the sole distinguishing characteristic and means of our salvation - indeed, preoccupation with abstract premises as such can be a hindrance at this point, particularly if belabored where no “rights” grievances are, or indeed, can be raised. Rights treated as a shining beacon of European virtue (even in teleological form) would tend to run stiffly roughshod over the radically social source of our distinct character, our interdependence as a social group, and the performance requirements of our post modern condition, which require the assertion of our classification as relatively distinct from the rest of the world - a crucial social classificatory distinction that makes a difference.