Nations have different physical hardware, which governs their relations amongst themselves and the methods they use to construct culture and build societies. These correspond roughly to the triune division of man, as explained in

What It Means To Be Human. Sub-Saharan Africans can be seen as utilizing primarily a blend of instinctive and emotional circuits. Their societies are governed by physical force/circumstance, superstition, and tradition - in roughly that order of importance. Middle-Eastern and some Asian groups can be seen as utilizing primarily a blend of emotional and intellectual circuits. Their societies are governed by tradition, physical force, and superstition - in roughly that order of importance. East Asian societies skew more towards the use of intellectual circuits, which means that tradition and the rule of law is more important in the formation of their societies. (Tradition can be seen as representing man’s “best-understanding-up-to-this-point” of how to structure social life profitably). White European societies utilize the intellectual circuits more than these groups when forming societies, and in such a way that actively reasoning through problems has replaced and eroded tradition in our consensus-building. We use reason and thought for consensus-building. Therefore, ideology and its diffusion are very important in white societies, but of less importance elsewhere. For example, a revolution in an African society consists in one tribal army overpowering tribal army; a revolution in white society can consist in one body of ideas overturning another.

This is because whites synchronize activity and thinking with one another on the basis of abstract moral imperatives. These are calculated in a method similar to Kant’s formulation of the categorical imperative: I act in such a way that, if everyone else also acted that way, we’d all receive maximum strategic advantages. Where shibboleths don’t intervene, this is how things work. A great example is recycling, which spreads like wildfire among precisely those people who are ‘most white’ in their sensibility, ie, follow abstract moral reasoning’s conclusions with the most tenacity.

The State of Emergency

Underlying the whole reasoning structure of palingeneticist thought is a commitment to one specific, instinctive/emotional paradigm: the state of emergency(Ausnahmezustand).

Normally, thinking among Europeans involves the weighing of arguments and considered debate.

This has become submerged recently under the flood of media content, which is patently devised to subvert the process in essential ways. Nevertheless, white people still think like this. Its clearly observable in any intelligent white person who one happens to know, that they will base their behaviors on reasoning processes of this kind. Even non-intellectual whites will often orient themselves on the basis of these reasonings, absorbing them osmotically, which gives rise to the millions of people who cannot argue for or against the opinions that they hold. This is because of the supremacy of intellect in our culture, which counts for so much in terms of prestige.

We said that building a social consensus on reasoning was a facet of white societies. There is however, one escape-hatch ... a little trick that, when used, allows the whole intellectual apparatus to be temporarily cast aside in the service of the instinctive and emotional circuitry. This is the declaration of a State of Emergency (Ausnahmezustand)- something which happens in the mind, before it becomes a social or political phenomenon. Basically it is the recognition of an impending threat to survival, which allows all other considerations, even the practice of strategic reasoning, to be jettisoned in favor of the more quickly working instinctive and emotional circuitry. When death is on the immediate horizon, the hugely complicated and slow reasoning calculations which whites have developed become impractical, and suddenly ... “one thing is necessary”.

Consequences for Consensus-building

Thus palingeneticist thinking has a pre-rational justification: a justification based in instinct and emotion. It can never suggest itself, or cultivate forcefulness by reasoned argument, because it is only compelling in proportion to the difficult experiences which trigger the ‘state of emergency’ paradigm to be adopted viscerally *before the ideas themselves are even considered*. A white kid of who has been brutalized by non-whites, or perceived for one long moment the newly nascent possibility of this, is conditioned to accept the meme set.

Palingenesis itself is a whole body of interleaved systems of thought, but the door-way into this philosophy is the appeal to emotion of the state of emergency. This is one reason why palingenetic thinking does not bleed over into other systems of thought: access is debarred to all but those who have felt the cold chill of adrenaline at their impending displacement. The corpus of palingenetic ideas does not even become accessible until one passes this emotional milestone of realized impending doom.

For this reason, Palingenesis advocates on the internet generally never convince anyone. Some of them are quite observably not even really interested in the discussion of facts - one has
one’s visceral convictions, and nursing these, and seeing these realized in the world is what drives them.

The reason why Palingenesis is only accessible after this change in visceral self-relation is because it is predicated on the acceptance of retrograde understandings in a variety of thought-areas, for the purposes of political expediency. In other words, white culture has advanced to a more problematized, complex, relativized, nuanced and emotively sophisticated way of observing and experiencing the realities which palingenetic thinking understands coarsely. It is therefore felt to be a step backward on a variety of fronts, and only something as visceral as the State of Emergency can be used to justify this.

What are these advanced understandings, which contradict the worldview of Palingenesis? Advances in nuanced understanding of human psychology, which teleology’s crude woodblock prints can’t tolerate; advances in diplomatic relations between nations, which palingeneticists chafe at as inhibitors to militarism; advances in heart-culture and understanding between men, in which palingeneticists often see a weakening influence or one that sets limits to militarism and authoritarianism; advances in perspectivism’s questioning of shibboleths and authority, which palingeneticists see as destroying their claims to cultural and thus social/military hegemony; decentralized models of culture and society, with which the whole palingenetic model is in outright contradiction. Palingeneticists gesture towards the excesses caused by these understandings and their viral manipulation by various interested parties, but have no superior alternatives of their own to offer, and more importantly, no counter-argument except ‘“your society is falling apart”.

Romantic, historical, and weaponizing tendencies are preserved in palingeneticist thought as in amber or a time capsule. Although these could have a palliative effect on the post-modern psyche, palingeneticists poison the well again, without meaning to. They do this by demonstrating that they haven’t achieved a higher summit of thought, from which to put the one side of man they represent, and want to give back to us, into his proper context. There is no principle to which the “Will To Survive”, once thus conceived in the mind, can ever be made subordinate. Aesthetic considerations may be made, allowances for our modern sensibilities; but the paradigm cannot change because it is self-evidently the ultimate analysis. In the mind of the believer, at least. 

Consequences for Philosophical Development of Palingenesis

As most are aware, only a rare type of man is actually able to control his emotions. Generally, emotional paradigms pre-determine intellectual paradigms and dictate the conditions of their existence. But a man who doesn’t know he is experiencing emotions does have the option of believing that he is not controlled by emotions. After all, he cannot see them.

By the time Palingenesis appears on the stage to sing and dance its perennially unchanging tune, the puppetmaster and stagehands have already agreed on the ordering of affairs. The State of Emergency has been apprehended as life’s salient fact, and all the thinking that gets trotted across the stage flows from this viscerally-apprehend paradigm. You can argue with the arrangement of individual puppets, but not with the right of the puppetmaster to conduct the show.

This internal unfreedom of its exponents is the main reason why Palingenesis has been so philosophically barren. One can discuss the attributes of various idols (Evola), and methods of realization (Hitler), one can portray the enemy in a limitless series of blistering critiques (Sunic), but much more beyond that one cannot say or do. This is because the deeper paradigm was already decided upon, so the philosophical problem set of Palingenesis is always some rephrasing of this question: How do I maximize my gains against the Other?

With such a setup, philosophy has nothing more to do than to ask, “Is the enemy behind that hill or this one?”

Who decides how much of an emergency this is?

Guessedworker has said that Palingenesis was profoundly unwestern. I have said that:

[Palingenesis] cannot use the appeal to reason which is the basis of European social consensus-building. They are left with an emotional appeal, [extending only] to those who have actually internalized a visceral feeling of danger at the prospect of being race-replaced.

And again:

The steering of a political community based on the emotional [visceral/instinctual?] drives of a ruling clique implies authoritarianism. This is because much of what they do will be seen as arbitrary, and suppression will be seen as the immediately available solution.

Palingenesis brings back the sociobiology of Asia and Africa and imposes it upon whites. When we dispose of reason, however much we may dislike its universalizing tendencies and its anti-visceralism and ease of corruption, we are at the mercy of gut-imperatives. Gut-imperatives cannot be synced in the same way that intellectual imperatives can be, or even in the same way that emotional imperatives are (custom, tradition, mores). Gut-imperatives are so idiosyncratic, not in the way they are felt, but in their interpretation (i.e. how they are made sense of and put into practice).  This idiosyncracy suggests an infinity of possible actions which will vary with person to person. How does one govern a society using these imperatives? With violence, coercion, and authoritarianism. How does one survive in a society using these imperatives? By submission, dissimulation, and keeping-your-head-low. Palingenesis infuses white society with Asian and African sociobiological norms, including meaningless submission to authority/tradition, and brutish thug culture. One has to be pretty far under the spell of the State of Emergency paradigm to discount these simplifications and violence against the nature of European man. However, in truth there is nothing that will not be discounted and thrown overboard in the name of collective survival; if we have to become like Africans or Asians then so be it. This is probably a point on which all nationalists would agree. However, the palingenetic mindset brings forth these sociobiological dynamics from itself, as cultural adaptations to its inevitable authoritarianism, and then justifies them as a necessity of the perilous times. In reality they are a necessity of palingenetic order.

The ascent of palingenetic politics is based on a successful coup or mass movement of people who are united in their belief in the State of Emergency, and what must be done about it. As a first order of business, organs of propaganda are created to give the average man access to this understanding of the world: he too must be made to see that we are in a State of Emergency. But where and amongst whom exists the actual ability to assess the true threat level, ie, how much of an emergency actually obtains? Its a vital question, for several reasons. Mainly, because the perceived State of Emergency controls the degree of military mobilization, which in itself can give birth to new dynamics (e.g. escalation) and unintended consequences (e.g. war).

There will be a tendency for the threat level to be inflated, given that it is now a direct path to power and increases the grip strength and legitimacy of the Diktatur. Also, whole swathes of people now understand no other way of reasoning besides zero-sum visceralism (see ‘cretinization’ or CaptainChaos archetype), which consists in one single three-step mental algorithm.

1. Find the enemy in this situation.

2. What is the best way to counter the enemy.

3. Repeat.

With these dynamics in place, the hope of rationally considering what constitutes a threat and what does not, goes out the window. These mindsets will in themselves tend to precipitate wars irrespective of external circumstances, just as they precipitate denunciations and threats of violence on our own discussion boards, amongst ourselves.

Consequences for Memetic Diffusion

Palingenesis has low virality, but not merely owing to the cultural programming against it. It cannot diffuse because its memes are only interesting or valid if one has already undergone a visceral change in self-relation, adopting the State of Emergency as paradigm. Currently this is the only way that inchoate nativism learns to speak: when it becomes sufficiently radical to accept the state of emergency, it can then dare to accept the risks and overlook the contradictions inherent in palingenetic formulations. It will consider totalitarianism, consider heroism, consider militarism, consider apologetics, consider radical inequality between men as a basis for social existence, consider negating the rights of others, consider radical transhistorical critique, consider all the implications of zero-sum thought. The finer and more delicate points of white nature will be discounted, perhaps even denounced as weaknesses, as man wishes upon himself the desire to be still crasser, still more desensitized, still more blood-besmeared, still more weaponized.

Those nationalists who would place their bets on Palingenesis, must imagine that as conditions deteriorate, the State of Emergency paradigm will be adopted more widely and people will turn to Palingenesis. The experiences which provoke one to apprehending a State of Emergency are ever more available.

On the other hand, the simulacra that shield people from deteriorating social realities are also ever more available. Escape is ever more available, in its various forms. Furthermore those with influence, wealth, and valuable skills will always be the most effectively insulated against the State of Emergency. In other words, precisely the most influential and empowered segment of white society will be the one that never apprehends the State of Emergency in the visceral way that is a prerequisite for the beginning of adherence to palingenetic philosophy.

In light of this, it seems reasonable to consider and try out new ways of thinking, that might one day lead to a philosophy of nationalism, which can be argued in cold blood and without prior initiation, without The State of Emergency and the internal unfreedom that comes with it. At the very least one has to assert that it is only after the recognition of these things that philosophy can be said to properly begin.