Muammar Gaddafi and Aisha Gaddafi.

R2P, the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is the latest formulation which is used to rationalise just about any kind of arbitrary intervention without revealing the strategic and economic aims behind that intervention, lest those aims be subject to analysis or criticism in the international media.

Now that the situation in Libya has more or less settled into a repetitious cycle of instability of a predictably bad sort, it’s worth taking a retrospective look at the intervention, drawing together the various vectors which brought about this result.

Everyone likely remembers when Dick Cheney went on a sort of flamboyant tour talking down the Libyan intervention, because he thought it would result in disaster. The old Huguenot has many faults and has always been prone to over-extending his hand and overestimating the capabilities of the US military, but he is easy to understand because he actually is a true-believer in his own words, which means that he could at least be relied on to take the Global War on Terror seriously unlike many of his contemporaries. Cheney pointed out that even by R2P’s own logic, there was nothing to gain in terms of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ since Gaddafi had already given up his NBC weapons programme in 2003 and handed it all over to the United States.

Simultaneously, Libya had been an ally in the Global War on Terror and had collaborated repeatedly with the United Kingdom with intelligence sharing and even extraordinary rendition carried out against Islamist reactionaries of various stripes.

Cheney then invoked RAND RR637:

RAND Corporation, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists, 04 Jun 2014:

Research Questions

• What is the present status of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups?
• How has the broader Salafi-jihadist movement evolved over time, especially since 9/11?

This report examines the status and evolution of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups, a subject of intense debate in the West. Based on an analysis of thousands of primary source documents, the report concludes that there has been an increase in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups, fighters, and attacks over the past several years. The author uses this analysis to build a framework for addressing the varying levels of threat in different countries, from engagement in high-threat, low government capacity countries; to forward partnering in medium-threat, limited government capacity environments; to offshore balancing in countries with low levels of threat and sufficient government capacity to counter Salafi-jihadist groups.

Key Findings

The number of Salafi-jihadist groups and fighters increased after 2010, as well as the number of attacks perpetrated by al Qa’ida and its affiliates.

• Examples include groups operating in Tunisia, Algeria, Mali, Libya, Egypt (including the Sinai Peninsula), Lebanon, and Syria.
• These trends suggest that the United States needs to remain focused on countering the proliferation of Salafi-jihadist groups, which have started to resurge in North Africa and the Middle East, despite the temptations to shift attention and resources to the strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region and to significantly decrease counterterrorism budgets in an era of fiscal constraint.

The broader Salafi-jihadist movement has become more decentralized.

• Control is diffused among four tiers: (1) core al Qa’ida in Pakistan, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri; (2) formal affiliates that have sworn allegiance to core al Qa’ida, located in Syria, Somalia, Yemen, and North Africa; (3) a panoply of Salafi-jihadist groups that have not sworn allegiance to al Qa’ida but are committed to establishing an extremist Islamic emirate; and (4) inspired individuals and networks.

The threat posed by the diverse set of Salafi-jihadist groups varies widely.

• Some are locally focused and have shown little interest in attacking Western targets. Others, like al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, present an immediate threat to the U.S. homeland, along with inspired individuals like the Tsarnaev brothers — the perpetrators of the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. In addition, several Salafi-jihadist groups pose a medium-level threat because of their desire and ability to target U.S. citizens and facilities overseas, including U.S. embassies.

Recommendations

• The United States should establish a more adaptive counterterrorism strategy that involves a combination of engagement, forward partnering, and offshore balancing.
• The United States should consider a more aggressive strategy to target Salafi-jihadist groups in Syria, which in 2013 had more than half of Salafi-jihadists worldwide, either clandestinely or with regional and local allies.

Now, why would Dick Cheney be going around hawking this research in defiance of the US government in 2014? We know that it is not due to the usual partisan party-political reasons, because US party-political divisions are largely illusory anyway. The only explanation is that he seriously thought that the US was doing something that he didn’t think it was ‘supposed’ to be doing.

This means that there was a fundamental rift between Dick Cheney’s view of reality, a view of reality which had evolved between 2001 and 2007, and the new (or old, depending on how you look at it) reality that had asserted itself after 2011 as Hillary Clinton happened to be steering the ship of foreign policy as Secretary of State. This is not due to a difference in character of the individuals per se, but rather, a difference in the circumstances at the time, which Cheney had not caught up to because he was no longer in office and was not subject to the countervailing winds of lobbying (this includes not only positions taken by companies, but also positions taken by whole states, significantly, Israel and its ‘Clean Break’ programme going into effect in Libya) which reflect the change in economic necessity. Cheney is still living ‘in 2007’. The logic of capital was thus partially revealed through the nature of the ‘gap’ between Cheney’s—now out of office—and Clinton’s—then in office—understanding of the situation.

After 2001, there was the perception among the Americans—or at least, it appeared that such a perception existed—that the days of leveraging Salafist-jihadists as a tool of American foreign policy had ended, because the events of 11 September 2001 had shown them that a new enemy had emerged and that this enemy was the very same Salafist-jihadism that they had been patronising in one way or another through the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Some of the Americans seemed to actually be of that mind themselves, and so it may not have been a mere perception.

However, we live in a reality in which material economic factors have predominance over the idealist conceptions, and in cases where the two do not line up, the longer the timeline is extended, the more the economic factors come into predominance. As Friedrich Engels said:

Marx and Engels Correspondence, ‘Engels to Borgius’, 25 Jan 1894 (emphasis added):

Their efforts clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by necessity, which is supplemented by and appears under the forms of accident. The necessity which here asserts itself amidst all accident is again ultimately economic necessity. This is where the so-called great men come in for treatment. That such and such a man and precisely that man arises at that particular time in that given country is of course pure accident. But cut him out and there will be a demand for a substitute, and this substitute will be found, good or bad, but in the long run he will be found. That Napoleon, just that particular Corsican, should have been the military dictator whom the French Republic, exhausted by its own war, had rendered necessary, was an accident; but that, if a Napoleon had been lacking, another would have filled the place, is proved by the fact that the man has always been found as soon as he became necessary: Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc. While Marx discovered the materialist conception of history, Thierry, Mignet, Guizot, and all the English historians up to 1850 are the proof that it was being striven for, and the discovery of the same conception by Morgan proves that the time was ripe for it and that indeed it had to be discovered.

So with all the other accidents, and apparent accidents, of history.

The further the particular sphere which we are investigating is removed from the economic sphere and approaches that of pure abstract ideology, the more shall we find it exhibiting accidents in its development, the more will its curve run in a zig-zag. So also you will find that the axis of this curve will approach more and more nearly parallel to the axis of the curve of economic development the longer the period considered and the wider the field dealt with.

In Germany the greatest hindrance to correct understanding is the irresponsible neglect by literature of economic history. It is so hard, not only to disaccustom oneself of the ideas of history drilled into one at school, but still more to rake up the necessary material for doing so. Who, for instance, has read old G. von Gülich, whose dry collection of material nevertheless contains so much stuff for the clarification of innumerable political facts!

For the rest, the fine example which Marx has given in the Eighteenth Brumaire should already, I think, provide you fairly well with information on your questions, just because it is a practical example.

By quoting this, am I implying now that the United States and some of its allies have been drawn into finding it economically ‘necessary’ to support Salafist-jihadists? Yes, it seems that economics has reasserted itself.

Previously I had, with some degree of confidence, said this on the issue:

Kumiko Oumae / Majorityrights, ‘North Atlantic: You Have Spread Your Dreams Under Their Feet’, 11 Jul 2015 (emphasis added):

Islamists feel that their economic and social relevance is being sidelined by the dominance of international finance capital and the national bourgeoisie of countries in the developing world who have been activated by the unbinding of the circle of North Atlantic finance that took place after the 1970s. After the 1970s, capital flowed out of the North Atlantic area and into the developing zones in the periphery.

As a result of that movement of capital, social transformations took place, which Islamist reactionaries of different sorts interpreted as being a threat to their own dominance over the civic spaces - some of these being countries, some of them being zones within countries - in the Middle East and Central Asia.

However, this chaotic process, out of which a new order will emerge, is entirely necessary and is justified by the role that the actors in the North Atlantic are playing. I use the word ‘justified’ not in the petty-moralist sense of the term, but rather, in the scientific and economic sense of the term. The international financial system exhibits its justification for existing - its historical role - through the fact that it takes its surplus wealth and uses it to wend its way through every corner of the earth looking for new ways to engender the development of productive forces. This is a role that it will continue to be justified in taking on, until such time as it exhausts its progressive potential and is necessarily sublated and superseded by new social and economic systems, ones which would be established on socialist or syndicalist foundations. There is considerable evidence since 2008 that the system of international investment is already approaching its structural limits, and that various actors are attempting to explore those limits. And that after the development and interconnectivity of South East Asia is completed, ‘zero-profit capitalism’ could next emerge.

It’s clear now that the progressive potential of American and French capitalism is drawing to a close. Whereas previously the trajectory seemed to be that these states would find themselves locked into a zero-sum conflict over the fate of the Arc of Instability, the present interest of monopoly capital in maintaining their market share in the face of competition from elsewhere, is to enter into a ‘Holy Alliance’ of compromise and retrogression in which the United States and France begin to cooperate with their former ecclesiastical and feudal adversaries against a common threat of expropriation in the local sphere. They find themselves united in a common antipathy toward socialism, to shore up their global hegemonic position.

Bold statement, right? Do I have any proof at all to justify this view? Yes. See here:

U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779612 Date: 31 Dec 2015:

I don’t think that requires any particular comment. It practically speaks for itself.

However, could any of this have happened without tacit Russian consent? Let’s continue our retrospective:

The Jamestown Foundation, ‘Russia Placing Itself Above the Fray in Libya’, 29 Apr 2011 (emphasis added):

Russia made the US/NATO military intervention in Libya possible in the first place, by abstaining in the UN Security council vote on resolution 1973, rather than vetoing it. Russia’s March 27 abstention was a diplomatic masterstroke, poorly understood at that point by the Obama administration, which credited its “reset” for the Russian green light. As Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee, spelled it out: By abstaining, Russia has positioned itself to demand full observance of the resolution’s provisions by those who voted for it, and without sharing responsibility with those countries for the political consequences of their intervention (EDM, April 25).

As it turns out, the Western belligerents have undertaken this operation with insufficient forces; the US has withdrawn its most effective strike planes prematurely from action; and NATO — to which the US has largely devolved the operation — fights with one hand tied behind its back, unable to reinforce and escalate as long as Russia does not approve this via the UN Security Council, or by some tacit arrangement.

Arming the rebels is a poor option because it would simply prolong the conflict without a decisive outcome, absent of a massive US/NATO offensive. The top rebel commander, General Abdel Fattah Yunis, has rushed to Brussels, with a shopping list of weapons for insurgent forces that are yet to be trained. “We don’t mean light arms,” Yunis clarified for the press in Brussels. He wants Apache helicopters, anti-tank missiles, and torpedo boats for the rebel forces. “NATO has everything,” he judged (Interfax, April 28).

Russia will not necessarily or permanently veto a massive US/NATO offensive. Moscow will almost certainly negotiate its position, seeking trade-offs on issues of priority interest to Russia. For the time being, it can de facto tolerate an incremental escalation of offensive operations, insufficient for Western belligerents to win quickly, but sufficient to entangle them in yet another protracted conflict. If this scenario materializes, Moscow plans to emerge in some mediator’s role above the fray. And irrespective of the tempo of military operations, Russia is set to collect a windfall on European oil and gas markets, due to the halt in Libyan supplies for an indefinite period.

And:

The Jamestown Foundation, ‘Russia Unveils Political Objectives In Libya’, 21 Apr 2011 (emphasis added):

Based on statements by Medvedev, Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov, and other officials (“Moscow Positioning to Exploit Libya Stalemate,” EDM, April 21), Russian objectives at this stage in the Libya conflict can be summed up as follows:

1.  An early ceasefire in place, to be followed by mediated negotiations between Muammar Gaddafi’s government and the insurgents. Russia opposes regime change in Tripoli, but seems noncommittal on two key issues: Gaddafi’s personal departure from power and Libya’s territorial unity. With or without Gaddafi, an early ceasefire in place would result in dividing Libya de facto into eastern and western territories, pending an uncertain outcome of negotiations between Tripoli and Benghazi.

2.  Adherence to the UN Security Council’s existing mandate, which is limited to enforcement of a no-fly zone. Russia tolerates US/NATO air strikes in support of the outgunned insurgents, but opposes any ground operations, or arms supplies and training, to the same insurgents. Such prohibitions ensure the military superiority of pro-government forces, while the air strikes merely help the insurgents to fight defensively. Thus, Russian policy favors an inconclusive, open-ended civil conflict in Libya.

3.  No legitimate US/NATO actions without the UN Security Council’s, i.e. Russia’s, consent. Russia wants the Security Council to evaluate NATO’s compliance with the relevant resolutions on Libya. Such deference to the United Nations (instrumental in Moscow, ideological in the Obama administration) can open a way for Russia to affect NATO policy decisions through its role in the UN Security Council.

4. A halt on Libyan oil and gas supplies to the European continent. Russia gains from the unexpected interruption of those supplies and is interested in a prolonged halt. This has become, tacitly but indubitably, a Russian objective in the Libya crisis. Thanks to this conflict, Russia free-rides on higher prices for its oil and gas; it can increase its market share in Italy, Austria, Germany, and potentially other European countries; and gains more lobbying power for Russian energy projects that increase European dependence on Russian supplies.

Beyond the objectives linked directly with this conflict, Moscow has a broader interest in seeing the US and NATO tied down in wars of choice and other protracted confrontations. These increase Russia’s leeway for action in ex-Soviet [Central Asian] territories, Russia’s top priority. Moscow must welcome the disproportionate allocation of Western resources to expeditionary wars from shrinking defense budgets in NATO Europe, where lack of military investment stands in contrast with Russia’s ambitious military modernization program.

So, that’s that. My intent was not to rehash things that are already known, but rather, to draw a view of the conflict which may not be known to the average observer, particularly not observers taking the positions favourable to Russia that have become standard to “WN” and “the Alternative Right”. Positions which are of course completely at odds with the actual nature of the Russian Federation.

Part two will fill in some gaps on the role of Israel and Ethiopia in the Libyan conflict and its aftermath, as both countries made strategic gains as a result and were invested in the outcome. So stay tuned for that.