Majorityrights Central > Category: Political Philosophy

Border changes after World War II

It is a particularly important preliminary note that there is virtually nobody here who had anything to do with events of World War II. That fact is most relevant. Under that rubric, let us begin:

Hitler and Nazism as an overstated premise in representation of White/European nationalism; and Hitler and Nazism or the international Jew as false either/or.

Method:

Working hypotheses will be advanced

as to why these logical fallacies are being adopted despite their apparent obviousness;

how they are mistaken;

and remedies will be proposed in cooperative nationalism.

Statements will be set out as hypotheses to allow for efficient positioning of historical viewpoints as they emerge practical in argumentative service of cooperative European nationalism. In addition to the practical efficiency of hypotheses for unburdening detail, the modesty of unfinished claims is meant to facilitate participation from the commentariat to elaborate, correct and amend the hypotheses - i.e., to make optimal use of Majority Rights discussion format.

* Note: in comment number 2, I erred in grammatical present tense when discussing Brelsau (Wroclaw). Which, according to the Treaty of Versailles and through World War II, remained German. There would have been no good argument to that point in time for its not being German.

READ MORE...

GW has expressed the constraint:

“It is a pity that Christianity, as flawed as it is from a European racial perspective, is undeniably part of the unity of north and south.  We are stuck with it, for it has been too close for too long to us - and the faithful must have their faith expressions, after all.”

DanielS has expressed the constraint:

“Adding yet another knot in the tangle is the argument that with the Christian texts already being the terms in which many of our people think, the currency for two thousand years now, there must be some ontological basis beneath, and we may as well find the positive logic to it for our purposes. However, with the texts being what they are, the motivations of the texts being as convoluted, Jewish and ambiguous as they were to begin, all that winds-up happening with the deciphering of our “true” logic behind Christianity is a contribution to the mess.”

An approach offered by John Harland is to admit the historicity of Jesus in His essential mythic image as descendant of God evidenced in his own over-ruling of texts with direct bodily connection with God as Father, but to deny the historicity of the extant texts—deny them as yet another means by which dastards attempt to interpose themselves between the God-heritage of individuals and their Father, in spirit and flesh.

Ridicule of Harland’s own editing of the texts to suit his view may be conducted only at the sacrifice of the two constraints establishing the context of this presentation. Offer a superior approach if you don’t like Harland’s—either that or declare folly the entire effort to connect with the spiritual force of Christianity.

Click this link for a pdf document containing part of Harland’s account starting with “The Germans” (in the anthropological sense meaning what many identify as Celtic and Nordic pagans of the pre-Christian era), “The Catholic Church Promotes Judeo-Christianity”, “The First Breaking Apart of the Church Serpent” (regarding Henry VIII and Martin Luther), “A Further Break From the Serpent” (regarding the establishment of America), “The Strange Phenomenon of ‘Money-Mad’ Americans” (regarding the closing of the frontier and replacement of Nature and Nature’s God with money-based “culture”), “The American Dream” (the commodification, by conspirators, of the American spiritual renaissance), “The German Reich” (the parallel processes occurring in what became the nation state known as “Germany” during the 1800s leading up to WW I), “The World Picture After WW I” (the situation leading up to WW II) and the concluding section of this pdf document is “The Second World War”.

The entire book is “Word Controlled Humans” by John Harland, ISBN 0-914752-12-X available from Sovereign Press, 326 Harris Road, Rochester, WA 98579 (with which I have no business or personal relationship).

I coined the term Pervasive Ecology and hypothesized that it provides a context of the broadest utility that one may take in White advocacy because it may be universalized but not foundationalized.

READ MORE...

In political thought, perhaps the most basic, formative and necessary intellectual task is to adequately define that which one opposes or seeks to change.  This is especially true for us, devotees of an inchoate and wholly natural politic; and true for us, too, given that there is such a variety of opinion about what it is, exactly, nationalism is fighting.  An adequate definition of that lends coherence to our cause, and refines our purpose.

I thought it might be interesting and revealing to invite such definitions from readers.  Here are a couple from an email conversation between Graham Lister and me last February, which I happened across this evening.  I can’t speak for the care which Graham devoted to his.  Maybe he wrote it on the hoof.  Maybe not.  But I recall thinking quite hard about mine, which follows, and which, when I read it today, I must say seems a little formal and lacking in bite.

Anyhow, to get the ball rolling, here is Graham’s:

Liberal humanism treats the human individual subject as an abstract universal; it is premised on the paradoxical idea that all individuals should be treated the same, regardless of who or what they are by virtue of their status as radically differentiated and discrete phenomena. What grounds the reality of the social order is the universality of the ‘unencumbered’ and autonomous self, free to volitionally exert its will upon itself and the world. It offers a deflationary and reductionist ontology of the social and an inflationary account of the status and significance of the free-floating individual subject.

And here was the definition of the foundational “problem”, as I see it, which I wrote in response:

Liberalism is a product of the humanist strand in the Christianity of the high and late Middle Ages and early modern era, and the intellectual flowering of the Renaissance throughout this period.  It treats the human individual subject as an abstract universal which is capable of full autonomy but is ordinarily defined, and thereby restrained and bounded, by the given in Nature and in society.  It seeks, therefore, to liberate the subject from this definition and empower it to differentiate and author itself.  Besides this process of radical liberation, it particularly commends equal treatment, universal respect and fraternity, and continual progress towards its own goals as the chief desiderata of society and politics.

by Graham Lister

Agents, of both a collective and individual nature, have an interest in some state of affairs if it enables them to achieve their wants. But it is quite another thing to be aware of this interest; that entails both an ideological and imaginative transformation that allows that interest to be fully visible and informs an agent on how to potentially realise its interest. Often within our political discourse a restriction upon the exercise of a given interest or frustration of a want will be expressed in the idiom of injustice.

Precisely what are justice and injustice are obviously both, at least partially, ideologically and imaginatively forged concepts. For the ancients justice typically occupied a primary place in the pantheon of virtues. It was often conceived as the master virtue, the one that orders all the others. Plato tells us in The Republic, a just individual is one in whom the three parts of the soul - reason, spirit, appetite - and the three virtues associated with them -wisdom, courage, moderation - stand in the right relation to one another.

In the just city, a precisely analogous situation prevails each class exercises its own distinctive virtue by performing the task suitable for its nature, and none interferes with the others. Most philosophers have rejected the specifics of Plato’s view. Almost no-one today believes that the just city is one that is rigidly stratified with a permanent ruling class, a permanent military class and a permanent working class, whose lives differ from one another in all major respects. Yet many philosophers have retained the belief that justice is not simply one virtue among others, but enjoys a special status as the master or meta virtue. A version of this conception informed Rawls’ treatise, A Theory of Justice, in which he claimed that “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought”. By this he did not mean that justice is the highest virtue, but rather that it is the fundamental one, the one that secures the basis for developing all of the rest. In principle, socio-political arrangements can display any number of qualities - for example, they might be efficient, orderly, harmonious, caring or ennobling. But the realisation of those possibilities depends on a prior, enabling condition, namely, that the socio-political arrangements in question be just. Justice is thus the first virtue in the following sense: it is only by overcoming institutionalised or systemic injustice that we can create the ground on which other virtues, both societal and individual, can flourish.

If Rawls is right on this general point then when evaluating socio-political arrangements, the first question we should ask is: are they just and more importantly for whom are they just? To answer, we might build on another of his insights: “the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society”. This statement orients our attention from the great variety of immediately accessible features of social life to the deep grammar underlying them, to the institutionalised ground rules which set the basic terms of social interaction. It is only when they are justly ordered that other, more directly experienced aspects of life can also be just. Certainly, Rawls’ specific views of justice - like those of Plato - are problematic. However, it may be useful as a starting point if we endorse his basic idea that the justice is a meta virtue and that our reflections on justice should concern the basic structures of a community. To explore this approach I will examine the Anglo-Japanese author Kazuo Ishiguro’s thoughtful and beautifully written novel, Never Let Me Go.

READ MORE...

by Graham Lister

“Nationalism has no special relationship to political justice; but neither does it have a particular relationship to injustice. The most obvious thing about it is, after all, that it exists…and there are no objective criteria of what is a nation – but its subjective power is compelling. A nation, therefore, said Renan, is a great solidarity founded on a consciousness of sacrifice made in the past and on willingness to make further ones in the future”.

Bernard Crick from In Defence of Politics.

Nationalism has a rancid stench. It has been thought pivotal to some of the worse horrors of recent human history, yet it will not go away. If, as a character from Joyce’s Ulysses suggests, “History, Stephen said, is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake” then one of the most persistent phantoms haunting our nightly terrors is nationalism, particularly in the conditions of our freshly constructed ‘global’ village, built primarily through the medium of neoliberalism (the most successful ideology in history).

In the UK thinkers as wildly different as the ‘deep-blue’ conservative Roger Scruton and the Marxian theorist of nationalism (and Scottish nationalist) Tom Nairn both write with perceptive insights into the phenomena of nations and nationalism. Like any other ism, nationalism has its own internal spectrum. And due to its overall plasticity nationalism is hard to place within any conventional political axiality. It can take almost any political form and find support from anywhere in the ideological firmament – witness the radical-chic associated with various decolonization struggles – or indeed the burbling of the blessed Saint Michel (of Foucault) over the exciting new ‘political spirituality’ unleashed by the Iranian revolutionaries. However, some forms of nationalism are generally considered to have been radio-actively toxic.

Approximately eighty years ago, events occurred, which were obscure at the time, from whose dire consequences the world has not yet totally recovered. The location was Munich, capital of the historic Kingdom of Bavaria and second city of the recently formed all-German Reich. The time was five years after the end of World War I, when this new would-be imperial state had been defeated, and then both punished harshly and utterly humbled by the victors. What was to become the most extreme currency inflation in history had begun. By that autumn the Reichsbank would be issuing 100-trillion-mark notes; it took a pocketful of them to buy a US dollar.

READ MORE...

by Graham Lister

For the philosophical communitarian, the Sartrean cogito, spontaneously reinventing itself ex nihilo, permanently free to choose and revise its definition of the good, is a fiction that pervades all modern liberalism. From Hobbes, Locke and Kant, through to Mill and Rawls, the rootless, solitary and “unencumbered self”, as Michael Sandel describes it, prior to and independent of its ends and rationally deliberating on the value of its voluntary attachments, is adopted as the starting point of social analysis.

This conception of the subject, it is argued, precludes from the start the possibility of genuinely communal forms of association, of “constitutive” communities “bound by moral ties antecedent to choice”. This is why communitarians stress the cultural constitution of the subject, the way the individual forms his or her identity, sense of self, and intuitive system of values by inheriting and passing on an unchosen legacy of collective orientations, shared meanings and standards, networks of kinship and pre-contractual forms of solidarity which are a prerequisite for, rather than the outcome of, the subject’s capacity for moral commitment.

READ MORE...