Pragmatism as ethnonationalism’s tool against radical skepticism

Posted by DanielS on Monday, 10 July 2017 18:49.

Even if universal foundations were possible and believed to be prerequisite of perfect ethno-national guidance, we cannot abide delays for radical skepticism in service of that end in lieu of what is already clear and indubitable in ethnonational interest; particularly as that way of pursuing truth and comprehensive serviceability is unnecessary; and particularly given our crisis, which by definition calls for immediate practical responses.

Pragmatic philosophy has conceptual tools that could serve and save us as ethnonationalists, but it is necessary to wrest their application from civic democracy, taken for granted as a virtue at its onset by its liberal American charter members, and taken over the top in universalizing that application against ethnonationalism by the YKW.

It is not far fetched to believe that they have taken good conceptual tools, exactly which we would need as ethnonationalists, only to apply them against our interests; moreover, taking them so far over-the-top in misapplication as to get a didactic reaction from ethnonationalists - who react by playing opposite day from the tools that we most need - and who, in reaction so overdrawn as to reject its humane virtues, repel and antagonize the would-be sufficient bases of ethnno-nationalists that they might otherwise coordinate with. That is not far-fetched, it is by now highly detectable as standard operating procedure of YKW academia with regard to conceptual tools which would best serve ethnonatonalists.

Nevertheless, there are important differences between a philosophy necessary to uphold ethnonationalism as opposed to the philosophy of pragmatism as it has been taken into practice; but these differences are not to be found only after successfully overcoming our fallibility through establishment of universally unassailable foundations for ethnonationalism.

The difference that makes a difference for ethno-nationalists is rather in emphasis and elevation of the concept of indubitabililty - working hypotheses of which there is no reason to doubt as being in ethnonational interests; whether a logic so plain that we may take it for granted, or more complex, but warrantably assertable through operational verifiability - we recognize no need for anything remotely like a relentless critique of these working hypotheses - especially not from those known to hold antagonistic ideologies to ethnonationalism. Thus, we de-emphasize critique and presumed correctability of working ethnonatonalist hypotheses, particularly by those with antagonistic motives and ideologies - markedly, those advocating civic democracy drawing upon genetically universal population; and those advocating imperialistic and supremacist ideologies which would not allow for ethno-nationalist sovereignty.

The principle working hypothesis of ethnonationalism, of course, would be the assertion that in our given genetics we are warranted to go on existing as a nation while our nation is warranted in turn to maintain our genetics inasmuch as we can allow for others to maintain theirs; and vice versa.

We may proceed without the pseudo-prerequisite of universal foundations, recognizing radical skepticism as being misdirected for that aim and an expression of Caresian-anxiety caused by philosophical abuses such as those promulgated under the rubric of pragmatism; alleviating that Cartesian anxiety in fact, by attending in contrast and emphasizing instead pragmatism’s finer virtues, which are three:

1) Acknowledgement of fallibilism and affordance of its participatory correction not only provides ongoing availability of correctability of our knowledge, but it can do so for ethnonationalism as such, providing for a correction of mere pragmatism, and into an institutionalizing of ethnonational delimitation. As such, it allows us to build our ranks qualitatively but also quantitatively in the varied contributions necessary for our community to flourish and defend our people against infiltration, exploitation and genocide.

2) As such, it is not just any correction, but an ongoing correctability which, when coupled with pragmatic delimitation in the aims of correctability to the requirements of our community as ethno-nationalists, can relieve “the Cartesian anxiety” - an anxiety given our antagonists’ relentless attack on our ethno-nationalist community (and yes, they have made me hate that word too, for their didactic abuse of it - the disingenuously vague, merely cultural, non-genetic connotations they’ve associated with the word “community”), we feel a sense of anxiety, a longing for the grand Cartesian either/or. To explain that further..

“But lets turn to the ideas of these thinkers [Pierce, James and Dewey]. Now I’m going to present a composite picture with some dominant themes. The first theme is anti-foundatonalism and the critique of Cartesianism. Descartes in his meditations, was searching for a solid foundation, for the edifice of knowledge. Something that is indubitable and incorrigible; a truth that can be known with certainty, and that can serve as the real basis or foundation for knowledge. Descartes is haunted by what I have called in some of my writings, “the Cartesian anxiety” - the grand either/or. Either, there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelope us with madness and intellectual and moral chaos. Now, there is a way of reading a good deal of philosophy from its beginning, to its present, and especially from Descartes to the present, as a search for a firm foundation. Whether we take the foundation to be the intellectual grasp of eternal forms, or the direct grasp of immediate empirical intuitions, or the cogito itself.

The appeal to such a basic, rock bottom foundation, cannot be underestimated. In our time, the failure to discover, quote, such a foundation, is said to lead straight right to a defeating relativism, that denies the very foundation of truth, objectivity and moral fealty; and I think unfortunately to a great extent, that still infects a great deal of popular consciousness. ‘If I don’t have something basically to believe in, then anything goes.’

Now the pragmatists, all of them, challenge this way of thinking, challenge this kind of grandeur, they seek to exorcise this Cartesian anxiety; they reject the ideal that there is an absolute grounding or foundation of our being. I think one of the best statements of the pragmatic alternative was succinctly stated by Wolfred Sellers, when he writes, “for empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is rational not because it has a foundation, but because it is a self correcting enterprise that can put any claim into jeopardy, although not all at once.” The alternative to the foundation metaphor is to think of inquiry as a self correcting enterprise; that has no fixed absolute beginning points and no absolute end.”  {1}

What is requisite is what is required, not a universal foundation.

In fact, participation in our fallibilistic correction can include contributions as deep, abiding and scientific as any - i.e., you can, in theory, question anything, even the most verified scientific law; though sane people, in vast percentage may consider you insane, dishonest, at best engaged in some speculative inquiry that will require you to compile verifiable information for you to bring to bear once you’ve completed your rather impractical inquiry; but the skeptic is not owed a privileged position of non-accountability for the initiation of inquiry over that which the community holds fast, that which shows no practical need to change for the rather impractical inquiry; this holds true for many requirements of ethnonationalism -

3) The great contribution of the pragmatists is to show that fallibilism and anti-skepticism are compatible:

This alternative paradigm, this alternative way of thinking, leads me to a second theme, that I think is characteristic of the pragmatic tradition, and that’s the theme of fallibilism. If inquiry is a self corrective activity, that can put any claim into jeopardy, then this means that all knowledge claims, indeed all validity claims are fallible, in the sense that we never can claim that we know anything with a type of certainty that cannot in principle be questioned. But there is a difference between indubitability and fallibility. Many of our beliefs are indubitable in the sense that we do not doubt them; and indeed may not even be aware that we have such beliefs. But what is indubitable today may turn out to be false tomorrow. Furthermore, fallibilism is not to be confused with epistemological skepticism. Hilary Putnam, who is one of the outstanding pragmatists of our time, and still alive, once wrote that the great contribution of the pragmatists is to show that fallibilism and anti-skepticism are compatible. Pierce, for example, never doubted that we can know a reality that is independent of ourselves. But he also argued, that we’re never in a position to claim that we know this with absolute certainty ...and I think we can illustrate what is meant by anti-foundationalism and fallibilism by an appeal to an understanding of scientific inquiry (or we could relate it to all kinds of inquiry). The validity of a given theory or explanatory hypothesis in any of the sciences is not dependent on showing that it rests on an absolute foundation, but rather that it is supported by the best empirical evidence and the best reasoning. Every serious scientist today knows, that our current theories and hypotheses will most likely be mollified or even abandoned in light of further inquiry and evidence. So strictly speaking what we take to be true today might turn out to be false. Nevertheless, it would be hyperbolic to say that consequently, we don’t really have any knowledge because any knowledge claim that we make may turn out to be false… rather the pragmatic point is that all knowledge is fallible and all knowledge is corrigible - in principle it can be corrected.

[...]

The question arises, if we cannot know anything with absolute certainty, how to warrant and secure our knowledge claims? And answering this will bring me to our third theme, the importance of the community of inquirers and the sociality of our practices that shape us. {1}

The principle working hypothesis of ethnonationalism, of course, would be the assertion that in our given genetics we are warranted to go on existing as a nation while our nation is warranted in turn to maintain our genetics inasmuch as we can allow for others to maintain theirs; and vice versa.

That our genetic genus and species exist as significantly discreet from others on the planet is indubitable. That sheer skepticism of the “reality” or “significance” or “sufficient grounds to defend” these classificatory differences will jeopardize these differences, particularly when discriminatory rules in their defense is prohibited though anti-racism and anti-discrimination laws is indubitable.

That there are good reasons to want to protect these differences is indubitable.

That game corresponds directly with an attack on any would-be gentile left, i.e., socially accountable, nationalism and unionization; particularly as Jewish interests have reached clear hegemony, they have sufficiently greased the palms of right-wing elitists to be complicit as they take control of right-wing reactionary platforms as much as possible; and have promulgated the vilification of “the left” (“speculative” social organization/unionization) as much as possible to try to counter any gentile social classification gathering as left, social nationalism to challenge their hegemony.

However, whereas the pragmatists stance against foundationalism and Cartesianism and its charge for us to accept fallibilism has been co-opted against us, it also offers us the best tool, weapon in fact, by which to warrant our defense - viz., that anti-racism itself is Cartesian. As such, we may come loaded for bear against the enemies of ethno-nationalism:

The attack on the ethnonational community comes principally from Jewish community’s extrapolation on the prejudice against social classificatory discrimination, with facilitation of their fellow Abrahamics (note that Abahamics are not nationalists, they are imperialists; and we do not have to respect them as nationalists) and the liberal community: The central component of anti-racism is a game of weaponized social classification against gentile ethnonationalism.

This Abrahamic attack is well cast in terms of Manichean as opposed to Augustinian devils. Judaism and Islamics were coming from a place in evolution to compete more against other tribes for resource - thus, how to trick (Manichaen devils) them became a central skill.

Whereas for Northern Europeans in particular, but all Europeans, the issue of survival was more a competition against nature - thus a skill set more evolved to handle Augustinian, viz. natural devils, where human agency to deploy and solve trickery is not so central a concern.

By all evidence, Christianity is a Jewish trick, prescribing universalism and self destructive altruism to us, taking advantage of our evolved European nature in predilection to attend to Augustinian devils - as I have said, our predilection to attend to Augustinian devils is not necessarily bad, as we will ultimately be up against Augustinian devils to solve; however, we must not be naive simply because we’d rather not be bothered with the pettiness and trivial mindedness of Manicheans.

Anti-racism is Cartesian, it is prejudice, it is not innocent, it is hurting and it is killing people.

How is anti-racism Cartesian?

By artificially separating us from engagement in account of our broad, but very real, biological patterns and relative interests as such; as opposed to approximating our natural homeostatic delimitations, we are prohibited from observing these relative delimitation by means of classificatory delimitation - incited for the modicum of vaguery, ambiguity, arbitrariness and contingency at the edges of these classifications; for the history, where classifications were often used by one group to abuse another, we are obligated instead to put these patterns at risk to pure objectivism - on universal foundations - which is Cartesian.

Because our classifications are fallible in the sense that we can interbreed with other races, their communities charges that there are no important differences to warrant discrimination. This is Cartesianism on the empirical side, where the classificatory distinctions are held to be arbitrary and of dubious, if not fictional significance. Furthermore, as our antagonists and liberals confront us with the fact that all races can interbreed, they can and do argue that evolutionary competition and integration will produce good, if not the best results.

It is not practical for our community to try to foundationalize as an objective fact that this cannot possibly, in any way be true; and fortunately, it is not necessary.

The best we can do, and we can do very very well, is make the best arguments (practices, e.g., might of arms, count as “argument” here) in our defense, achieving warranted assertabilty - with operational verifiability of that warrant so much the better.

How do we argue in the face of this Cartesian incitement?

To begin, it is practical is to acknowledge that we can interbreed, but to argue and assert, in the event that their hypothesis just might just be wrong, that it is nevertheless indubitably valid to classify peoples according to genetic groupings for the sake of accountabilty; to keep “reserves” (i.e., the vast majority and their prerogative for a separatist homeland) and with that to build counter-arguments in warranted assertability that we and our qualities are worth saving despite their purported infallible claim that they aren’t. We establish warranted assertion in defense of our classification - as having distinct and long standing evolution, merited to remain in its trajectory, provided we allow for others to maintain theirs. The act of classification and its implementation affords agency thus, coherence, accountability, warrant in inherited social capital and human ecology.

And again there is a crucial difference for ethno-nationalists from academia’s (particularly Gadamer’s/Derrida’s ) crucially abused (as Cartesian) notion of “marginality” - where “marginals” are taken to be those who are from without, outside the classification and/or antagonistic to it, as opposed what would be the ethno-nationalist concept of marginality - i.e., those remaining just within the classification despite pressure, but well disposed to its reconstruction; and having the additional existential benefit of “knowing where the shoe pinches.”

“Those who are marginalized” in this sense, does not necessarily mean those who are falling behind, but can also mean those who are outstanding, though they would be ostracized as they are not understood and appreciated as being out in front; and well intending.

We would be bringing to bear correctiveness from the “rich and diverse perspectives of our ethnonational community.”

As such, marginals would contribute to a homeostatic function of the ethnonational system, against incursions and crass exclusion of sufficient basic function and of outlier advance.

What is practical toward that end is the unionization of our relative interests as classifications so that we may not only have criteria to be accountable to our relative interests, but also to objective facts beyond our relative group interests; and to the relative interests of other genetic classifications.

But either way, pure racial distinctions or “one race, the human race”, it is an unnatural and impossible standard of purity which, when observing history and what happens with this void in means of bio-historical accountability, will show that it is prone to reaction and attack on other classificatory groups. It is a game that can be countered with pragmatism and hermeneutics applied, as I have said, with ethno-national delimitation - but we must ask, why has that not happened? To answer that question we have to know a bit more about where the prohibition of classification comes from, the context it operated\s in, and where these remedies came into play.

Where does this classificatory game, a game that is weaponized against us, particularly as Whites, come from? a little history is in order:

The YKW, in their ordeal of civility, as a self interested group classification, were confronted and threatened by the civic nationalism of America, viz., its civil individual rights which, as an instrument holding no proviso to recognize their group interests, observed that America’s civil rights were based on the Cartesian and following that the Enlightenment and modernity’s prejudice against prejudice - viz., given Locke’s prejudice against social classifications as they happened to operate against him; he took a position against social classifications that they are necessarily, universally pernicious fictions of the mind, only a machination of the dishonest; and against that deployed the Cartesian notion (on the empirical end) that only sense perceptions of the individual mind are real and that group classifications are non-empirical, nefarious fictions which should be prohibited in favor of civil individual rights.

To deal with this, the YKW made American Whites live up to their rules (Saul Alinsnky style), but weaponized them over the top as “civil rights acts” which denied White freedom from association, thus effectively put them into involuntary servitude where operative. Moreover, they made Whites live up to Locke’s prohibition against classification and took it over the top as well in the form of “anti-racism.” Anti-racism is essentially a prohibition against social classificatory discrimination.

Kant had anticipated the dangers of Locke’s purely empirical perspective, how destructive it could be perhaps especially to conscientious people, and his major work, “The Critique of Pure Reason” was an effort to solve this problem, to provide universal foundations in “the nouminal concept” against this empirical arbitrariness; a noble effort, thought it failed; as Heidegger said, it was still Cartesian.

The analytic school’s Whitehead and Russell, in taking it upon themselves to try to solve the liars paradox [classically, “all Cretans are liars, I am a Cretan”, or plainly, “I am a liar”] provide a later example of a philosophical method insufficiently equipped to deal with skepticism of social classification. The analytic school’s tools in fact would be susceptible to paradox and dealt with these issues clumsily - with Russel admitting that the “theory of logical types”, viz, “that a class cannot be a member of itself”, was “the most ad hoc thing he’d ever had to do.” Nevertheless, while it may have been ad hoc to his analytic sensibilities, logical types did have practical applications.

We are all pragmatists - because we have to be - and Whitehead, a renowned mathematician was acknowledging this when he said: “we cannot continually investigate everything, but must be able to take some things for granted and proceed from a given state of partial knowledge. Even a false or inadequate working hypothesis is better than no working hypothesis.”

And he was in the ballpark before WWII forced a shying away from more explicit, concrete applications, when he said “philosophy must now perform its final service and save a race of people sensitive to values beyond mere physical pleasure.” If his having used the word “race” was not made radioactive by the supremacist Nazi campaign of WWII, we might have been sooner to implement the idea of classificatory function, despite its fallibility.

The experience of Whitehead and Russel of trying to solve the liar’s paradox with the ad hoc theory logical types, that “a group cannot be a member of itself”, is an example of the clumsiness of a sheer analytic philosophy in dealing with classificatory paradox; while right-wing purity spirals to go beyond social problems are equally prone to paradoxing and hoodwinkng into runaway. By contrast, these are matters which a judicious implementation of pragmatic correctability could handle, well, practically, and matters which an additional hermeneutic component can handle gracefully - it will deftly put aside “paradoxes” with narrative sequentiality, furtive, hierarchical and other provisos.

The Vienna School of Logical Positivism (from which the Vienna School of Economics derives) was another effort in this vain. The tried to establish a pure positive language free of metaphor and failed for confrontation of the fact that words have more complex, ambiguous and contingent relations to their referents - they couldn’t avoid metaphor, in a world. The later Wittgentsein was forced to acknowledge this, calling the Tractataus upon which the Vienna School of Logical Positivism was based, “not a very good book.”

Heidegger’s invocation of hermeneutics was effort in the right direction as a way of dealing with Cartesian duality, the Cartesian anxiety, and our authenticity of dasein. As one might guess following the coherence of this article, I would add the dasein of social classification, some facimile thereof to round out his philosophy, falling a bit shy of a sufficient philosophy as it did for phenomenology’s first person overemphasis and lack of emphasis on group pattern connecteness, criteria and accountability - there was something like that in Heidegger but not emphasized enough; his philosophy strained in the reification of anxiety before individual death as the source of meaning, being, dasein. Like the pragmatists, the method for our interests was there, but underused for lack of proper basis (for what we’d fallen into) and emphasis, especially among later practitioners.

Like pragmatism’s “participatory correction” from an ever more enriching and diverse basis of civic democratic universalism, hermeneutics could serve the YKW in its academic big business of selling talk, to any mathematically challenged, verbal brained undergraduate with an axe to grind against White men in particular, in non-stop culture of critique; and any fallback they might take in science: as if hermenutics is anti-science simply because its capable of critiquing scientism, viz., bad science or bad scientific application. 

Thus, what happened when I tried to talk to Professor MacDonald on the basis of hermeneutics - he insisted that “hermeneutics was anti-science” because all he’d seen in academia was YKW fostered abuse of the concept - they’d done what they always do; they’d taken concepts which would be most serviceable to ethno-nationalism, de-emphasized the aspects which would be most helpful to ethnonationalism and put over the top those features which when exaggerated would be most destructive; made them didactic; so instead of the coherent means to pursue our authenticity in organic form, and take hold (responsibility, the other interpretation of ownmost “guilt”) for our historical and systemic breadth, hermeneutics is associated with people who think that history and events can mean virtually anything they imagine, rather what cultural Marxists might think, divorced from empirical reality.

The pragmatists have shown that fallibilism and anti-skepticism are compatible; that we can hold up to our opponents outlandish metaphors, speculations and narraties; while asserting and warranting our interests instead, more imperfectly at first and less so with ongoing correction by community interests. And together with that, hermeneutics has shown the means to overcome the Cartesian anxiety, a way to overcome paradox, arbitrariness and nefarious positivist chicanery against ethnonationalism. However, given (dasein’s thrownness into) the setting of its charter, America’s civic, democratic nation, the liberal democratic motives of its charter members and YKW co-opting, pragmatism has over-emphasized and rather exaggerated fallibilism’s correctability through social participation - viz., extolling a “diversity” of critique, alternative “narratives” in an ever broadening, and thus ever more arbitrary “democratic community”, giving us an “enrichment” which is, like classical liberalism, insufficiently committed by state administrators charged with accounting for the upholding of biological groupings, and citizens accountable to uphold their biological grouping, as would concern the ethno-nationalist; nor do they conceived to account for protection of these protracted historical bio-systems by delimitation of ethno-nationalism (that classification = “racism”); hence the predictable denouement into radical skepticism, as it becomes more and more the case for gentiles that one must look after one’s narrow interests completely (a problem not sufficiently helped by the pragmatists or Heidegger, and especially not as they’ve come into popular discourse), whether that position is most advanced by those who’ve managed to do well for themselves, despite and perhaps because of their complicity with group classificatory disintegration, or those, notably the YKW, who also do well for this disintegration, hypocritically promoting the prohibition of unionization of social group classifications where they cannot be exploited by their own institutionalized group classification.

This democratic correctibility, now called “social justice warriorism” for its didactic form as promoted by YKW pragmatism and neoliberal complicity, is already a skepticism of gentile classifications, its relentlessness and hyperbolic attack provoking a longing on the gentile part for otherworldy foundation by contrast; and offered (((“neo” reaction))) in kind to promote a new skepticism to social justice and unionized, participatory means of correction; the (((alternative right))) is offered to institutionalize their new position in defense of their supremacism, YKW and complicit supremacism, at the expense of institutionalizated accountability to ethno-nationalism.

Skepticism toward the unionization of group discriminatory classification is institutionally perpetuated, assimilating the “reality” that one must accept - this “inequality” not only has force of itself, but also the intellectual cache of the elites; both elitist gentiles and now also promoted more as a form of activism by Jews via the alternative right; promoted more now as a mere fact of nature, to which only the delusional and unrealistic would object and try to be so leftist as to unionize against, given their increasingly obvious hegemonies. Radical skepticism, especially toward the practicality of ethnonational classification and unionizations thereof, is almost part of our DNA and its inherent susceptibility to be exploited by now; it is the last things we need.

Nevertheless, gentile vulnerability to skepticism of group unionization and aversion to taking what we might refer to as the anti-Cartesian turn with the Pragmatists and the hermeneuticists, has also been exploitable not only because their anti-Cartesian remedies were taken over the top in didacticism; but because anti-Cartesianism came only after Cartesiansim and its means of exploitation had already been institutionalized, taken for granted and embedded in civil individual rights - divorced as they were, in fact prohibiting discrimination of group classification - while especially promoted through the rule structure of America - that is no small matter; as its rule structure spread in ostensibly warranted hegemony to further purity spiral given its victory over right wing reaction in WWII; a reaction which was similarly a purity spiral, though more explicitly seeking to throw-off, to purify itself of the guilt and burdens of the YKW and their priorly institutionalized means of infiltration and exploitation of group classificatory interests; viz. to throw off Jewry and their ensconced purity spiral of guilting the gentiles with ethno-sacrificing Christianity by means of “natural law”. American victory only increased the hegemony of liberalism’s liasz ez fair relation to the YKW purity spiral of Christianity, a liasz ez fair relation reinforced initially by its Cartesian constitution; and later, as intersectional (where Jewish hypocrisy is confronted) reaction increased to the point where it might notice Jewish ethnocentrism, paleoconservatism and its spawn, the alternative right, were unleashed to maintain that liasz ez fair - “our Judeo-Christian, ‘western’ culture.”

On a level of more common concerns, as Cartesianism was institutionalized in the American Constitution, leaving patterned concerns only implicit, and suspicious of groups, particularly those suspected of Aristocratic snobbery, Locke’s form of empirical individual rights increasingly ran roughshod over biological systems, doing its purity spiral, in prejudice against classificatory prejudice - mostly done naively by the gentiles, but often disingenously by elites beholden only to their narrow interests and a quid pro quo with an equally disingenuously YKW.

Note: we are not proposing doing away with the concept of individual liberties and rights, only that the Locketine technology was not the way, we have better ways now. But failing the implementation of those better ways, the ethnonationalist community remains largely in reaction to hermeneutics and pragmatism’s participatory correctability for the exaggerated misuse of those disciplines against our classification and truth; laregly in a reaction not only instigated with didactic exaggeration, but on pain of social ostracism. You gonna question muh rights? - nothing more sacrosanct than to an American (or to many UN charter activists for that matter) than their rights; you a Nazi? - need I say more? We remain stuck in the Cartesian realm of reaction, where analytic at all - and failing that, engaged with its faith cousin - you gonna question muh Abrahamic religion?

But another factor which had lent to the taken for grantedness of Cartesiansim and its increasing hegemony was the impetus of its yield to science and technology (and the lucrativeness of that); modernity’s progressiveness indeed, running roughshod over the human ecologies that left nationalism might otherwise serve and protect - commie leftist pinkos.


You gonna question muh capitalism, science and technology? muh manly pristine theory with that messy pinko lefty rag girly social pragmatism stuff? With this amateur understanding of the philosophical remedies that we are up against, the lack of understanding of the problems that we are up against and the means to correct them for the inability to see past and get past their abused forms; even though we would get past theme if we use of their correct forms. However, so long as we remain in reaction, we remain outside of our advanced philosophy and correctabilty for ethnonational ends. And in this mindset bereft of hermeneutics liberation from mere facticity, we remain stuck in the physics envy of clean lines and highly predictable cause and effect (to our enemies too), as opposed to the (only somewhat) messy but facile narrative coherence, agency, accountability and warrant to wrest our ethnonational sovereignty. And in this wish for pure analytic coherence, we remain unduly hindered by paradox and chimera that can be used by our enemies to hoodwink casual, implicit ethnonationalism.

Thus our plight begins with a form of skepticism, that such patterns exist that can and should be classified for their discriminatory protection, and that terrible things will not necessarily happen if such discriminatory classifications are rendered. The YKW version of universal civic democratic participatory correctabilty is a steady, grating skepticism writ large.

The assault by the YKW on our people, as if we are not importantly distinct - neither ideally nor practically, in classificatory assessment of genus and species, and not precious in such distinction, is centuries long.

As GW observes, it is an assault evidently prescribed by Jewish tribal interests to rupture differentiation and defensive exclusion among “the gentiles”, viz. the non-Jews, as gentile distinctions, complementary, coordination and the defense thereof may threaten Jewish power and influence. 

This centuries long assault on our distinction began with neither Boas nor Descartes. It is narrative of classificatory disintegration, divorcing us from our complementary relations and coordination, from our land, nature and and earthy connection; it is a narrative that has been hegemonic over European peoples through and of a YKW mass media control that is not only decades long but, as Bowery observes, it is centuries long, with their Bible having functioned as the predominant “mass media” and medium of this narrative transmission for the better part of two centuries - promoting a narrative culminating with Jews as the chosen people, the light of the world, while the gentiles might only enter the hereafter by being purely altruistic, non-self interested. Dissent of that narrative, on the other hand, was on pain of otherworldly damnation, or literal, this worldly persecution - at times, even penalty of death.

And when in church, the priest did not say “let us think”, he said “let us pray” - viz. repeat by rote the priest’s call to submission to the Jewish god. It is a narrative trajectory increasing in hegemony and culminating in their story told as light of the world over the correspondingly undifferentiated gentile other.

European thinkers only began to shake this hegemony, throw it off as imposed superstition and return to the rationale of the Greeks and our own northern lights in The Enlightenment. Nevertheless, European peoples were not fully emancipated, as they would need to be in distinction of our peoples, by means of Luther’s proclamation that “here I am, I can do no other”, nor by Descartes, proclamation that “I think, therefore I am”  ...as he was, in pursuit of universal foundations.

These pursuits would have a loyalty nevertheless, but a loyalty not to the organization and relative interests of group patterns, but rather a loyalty to elitist objectivism, to mere facts and the upholding of the pretext of their objective pursuit - if one was to have the tacit approval of the scientific mavens and engineers who were becoming a new priestly caste, and that panderers (and pandered-to, frequently puerile females) against those who would operate against our classificatory interests.

...as with Nazism, warrant was not to be located in the differentiation and coordination with the other, but in the demonstration of purity of “natural law”, and supremacy that served the purging reaction of the meme virus.

Speaking of what is indubitable, taking advantage of the obvious disagreeableness of this concept, a reaction really, like a massive fit of coughing and diarrhea - a case of your struggle and stink is ok only if you are German supremacist - the YKW have with this indubitable didacticism amplified means to lay guilt trips and cause the gentile other to pursue warrant of innocence by a doubling down in Cartesianism; particularly through the victorious American enshrinement of enlightenment Cartesianism in the Lockeatine notion of civil individual rights - as they serve their aim to rupture the danger of opposing group classifications as “non-empirical”, a rupturing imposed on lines of “anti-racism”, “anti-Nazism” etc.

Marxist and neo-liberal YKW both would, in their elite mentorship, recognize the susceptibility of European peoples’ defense in their adherence to Cartesianism, and the YKW operate against it in mimicry of its own terms, in anti-racism, naturally - with particular emphaticness after WWII, they would be marching through our 7 institutions, and let us add another, even more so would they march through our very genome.

If the young White man is to have hope to be let past their gate-keepers - often the bitches who didn’t want to be fair, but want to incite genetic competition beyond their merit (their typical shit test in initial interaction episode, “isn’t racism terrible?”) - he must embrace the advancing meme structure, loyalty all the more fiercely to objectivism, to anti-racism, to the incursion of African and Arab hoards - if he hopes to extricate himself from the broader community of subjects as they are beholden to objectivist naivete, blind to individual and group Manicheanism (rule changing devils), who only mimicked adherence to Augustinian (natural) devils where it suits them in their “objectivism” as it is bound to be infiltrated by YKW: from Wittgensteins’ Austrian school positivism to its heirs Hayek and Austrian school libertarianism, to its neo forms, neocon, neo anything, as Irving Kristol admits, it is weaponization against Whites, still holding the undifferentiated gentile other as template of purity, innocence and warrant - the prejudice against prejudice was to make Whites live up to their own rules, as those rules worked against them.

Categorization, what I call classification, is not an artifice, is not Cartesian - it is a perfectly natural and necessary emergent function, to sort out, to discriminate healthy social patterns from unhealthy - “Women, Fire, and other Dangerous Things” (lets call that chocolate women, fire and other dangerous things). 

Anti-racism is Cartesian, it is prejudice, it is not innocent and it is killing people.

Even if it is by means by a crass version of Darwinist competition:

As I have said many times in one of my original theories, Modernity’s Cartesianism has had a vast disordering effect on society. And the “anti-racist” extrapolation of anti-social classificaiton is a union busting function of the YKW writ large, playing manichean games with social classification/anti-classification as it suits their interests. Just because European peoples are prohibited from discriminating by social classification, doesn’t mean that other’s aren’t doing it, allowed to do it; and doesn’t mean that classification (categorization) doesn’t happen naturally - it happens anyway; with the categories too difficult to ignore, because they are basic, even in “universal” human terms: particularly male and female.

The result is that the patterns of our protracted maturity as K selectors are truncated, our female co-evolutionaries are pandered to from males from every direction, predated upon by R selectors, particularly as the YKW foist race mixing upon Whites to demoralize White men and to bust gentile unionization; they pander to the basest tendencies of females to incite genetic competition.

They take advantage of another category impossible to ignore - black men, particularly by contrast to White females, a category and contrast so stark that it is almost impossible to ignore as a tropism. They take advantage with their “anti-racism”, with the fact that blacks are not necessarily at a disadvantage as they say, in all cases and ways - not given their license to discriminate on their behalf and make coherent sense; not within the disorder, where black aggression, hyper-assertiveness and abilities on an episodic levels are a more salient criteria for partner selection; they are not disadvantage in these circumstances of anti-racism, if you take into account that opportunism is acting in concert with their ancient history, the bio-power of their long pre-evolution to Whites; which serves them in this mix, to privilege them over females, to provide them with females and children (frequently at the zero zum expense of Whites); along with the fact that their coherence, their classificatory identity is allowed, they are offered remedial programs by the liberals and YKW, to make up for a history of oppression that we had nothing to do with; furthermore, their daring is increased as expectations of them, as individuals, are low; group ethnocentrism backs them in their risk taking. They often have less to lose (some of their women are nice, but….). Whereas European men have a lot lose, and become skittish; furthermore, the merit of European men tends to show over protracted patterns, patterns that are ruptured by anti-racism; and truncated by the opportunism of males, R selectors and what-not, that they are not allowed to discriminate against.

Meanwhile the one up position in partner selection that females occupy (because eggs are precious, gestation vulnerable and sperm is cheap) emerges with increased significance, with puerile European females gaining in premature confidence and discretionary power as gate-keepers, as they are talked-to, solicited from every direction and pandered to - her opinions matter; as she has ready recourse in all directions to brute enforcing males, if anyone objects to her prerogatives. As she is pandered to, she is encouraged by the power of her position in this liberal mix. Her base tendency as female to incite genetic competition, which would be vastly and healthily sublimated in classificatory maintenance, is exacerbated, probably exponentially. This incitement further ensconces the Cartesian rupture of ethno-natinonalism, as liberalism affords puerile females incentive to maintain the easy advantages her increased one up position affords in the disorder - it is, as it appears, “only natural.” - Just as the gamers will tell you, as they promote R selectionism to move through European girls. And the disorder and disintegration absent the assertion of our classificaitons is perpetuated as such.

Thus, the Cartesianism of anti-racism is disastrous for our species.

The central component of anti-racism is game of weaponized social classification against Whites. As exemplified in the racist’s paradox:

Again, the “racist’s paradox - if you say, “no, I don’t discriminate, I judge everyone by their individual merit”, then you can be charged by the anti-racist with disingenuously ignoring the history of (your alleged) classificatory discrimination and exploitation of blacks ...on the other hand, if you say no, “I take affirmative action on behalf of their group to take into account the history discrimination and oppression against their group” then you are classifying, thus a racist by definition.

Thus, by means extant of Cartesian structures the proposition nation was brought to bear in exploitation by the YKW and complicit liberals against our fallible hypotheses, with predictable results..

It is a purity spiral ever more Cartesian and divorced of practicality in its reaction than that of the Cartesian anxiety which they had already exploited.

And their rhetorical flourish magnifies the anxiety that we must have a foundation somehow prior to words and discourse for our peoplehood, otherwise we cannot potentially challenge with their rhetoric, anywhere in the universe.

But toward our defense and in defense of human ecology broadly thus, it is necessary to overcome the Cartesian anti-social classification that underpins anti-racism ..its Cartesian detachment from land and resource relation as well.

With the pronouncement, denouncement really, of the Cartesian prejudice against prejudice - specifically its proposed innocence in prohibiting discriminatory social classification - that:

Anti-racism is Cartesian, it is prejudice, it is not innocent, it is hurting and it is killing people.

Given the existential threat to our people for the devastating, decades long march through our institutions, of the YKW and their lackeys wielding the wholly unnatural, weaponized Cartesianism that is “anti-racism” ....the last thing that we need is mis-applied skepticism regarding the very antidotes to mis-applied skepticism - i.e., mirroring the anti-classification which is “anti-racism.

And we must avail ourselves of pragmatic correctabilty and the hermeneutic turn delimited to ethnonational aims - that is the way to resolve Cartesian anxiety. It is the way that allows for historical and conceptual breadth to capture the “non-empirical” classifications, that would provide for agency, coherence, thus accountability and warrant in maintenance, use and protection of our social capital and human ecologies.

It is not my purpose here to defend Pragmatist philosophy nor to proclaim myself a Pragmatist philosopher - Pragmatist philosophy is rather to be treated as a tool. It is not only to be taken to where the school of thought has been taken by academics, against the loftier aims of our people…  it has made its way to the ordinary language of our “communities” that it might otherwise serve, to be taken as concerns ranging from laboriously dull to obnoxiously undeserving of participation. No, rather something like Sam Dickson’s suggestion that we subscribe to a kind of race idealism - that might be most pragmatic; and those who complain that Aristotle’s turning away forms was a turning away from the breadth of European imagination, they can find imagination resurrected in hermeneutics, along with rigor! Finally, though pragmatism tends to be associated with a lack of deeper concern in a particular respect - that is a lack of sufficient respect for prefigurative force - for matters of enduring importance - it is a bit unfair, particularly if we see pragmatism as a tool.

If GW wants to tighten the connection between what is, the ontology, and what ought, that could be part of correctibility - any organization of sense making in that case, in an instant anyway, would have to a part of inherent evolution.

Emergentism has kindred aims with pragmatism and hermenuticism, namely and aversion to the reductionism and anti mind body distinction, if not anti-Cartesianism on the whole; however, it has run into some problems that may receive aid from pragmatism and hermeneutics. Again, pragmatism and hermeneutics proper would not look at emergentism as necessarily adversarial, but rather a closer reading, at a more rigorous and of an ongoing survey.

It is confronted with difficulty in managing dichotomy that may perhaps be mollified by hermeneutics.

At least one problem for emergentism is:

Jaegwon Kim

Figure demonstration how M1 and M2 are not reduced to P1 and P2.

Addressing emergentism (under the guise of non-reductive physicalism) as a solution to the mind-body problem Jaegwon Kim has raised an objection based on causal closure and overdetermination.

Emergentism strives to be compatible with physicalism, and physicalism, according to Kim, has a principle of causal closure according to which every physical event is fully accountable in terms of physical causes. This seems to leave no “room” for mental causation to operate. If our bodily movements were caused by the preceding state of our bodies and our decisions and intentions, they would be overdetermined. Mental causation in this sense is not the same as free will, but is only the claim that mental states are causally relevant. If emergentists respond by abandoning the idea of mental causation, their position becomes a form of epiphenomenalism.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergentism

It is true that more (and more) information about more genetic and emergent levels will help guide us better; the process of ongoing correction does provide for that.

Anti-racism is Cartesian, it is prejudice, it is not innocent, it is hurting and it is killing people.

With anti-Cartesianism, we’re precluding the “that’s just the way it is” according to nature argument ...a void of accountability that the YJKW and Right Wing contingent can mess with to no end—- a nature argument so fundamental to liberalism and so destructive to us.  ...viz., how is anti-racism killing people? By holding them to a momentary and episodic basis of evaluation only, thus exposing them (particularly those on the margins of the lifespan or the systemic classification) to predation from outside group patterns - skeptically treating those patterns as “speculative”, even where those patterns are demonstrable as predatory and/or destructive patterns to the group that is not supposed to invoke classificatory discrimination.

Thus, it is a discrimination against those in marginal stages of a more protracted process, especially those who’s group evolution is of a more protracted yield to maturity, as K selectors in particular are going to manifest more often; exposing them to killing, consumption, subsumption by those that anti-racism is prejudice on behalf of - the victorious of “objective” standards - viz., those displaying winning moves by highly physical momentary and episodic evaluation, the “universal standard.” Actually, a better anti-Cartesian, anti-anti racist mantra would read:

“Anti-racism is anti-broad classification of peoples for the purpose of discriminatory accountability. This prohibition of discriminatory classification is Cartesian, it is prejudice, it is not innocent, it is hurting and it is killing people.”

That’s a safer mantra because anti-anti-racism is less likely to be misunderstood as such, in a supremacist or other needlessly aggressive, exploitative, destructive senses.

European ethnonationalists will do well to avail themselves of hermeneutics; there are some good examples in WN - here’s an example from counter currents that expresses a good understanding:

Facts are important, but stories are more important. Facts are isolated data that can easily be forgotten, but stories coalesce to form the infrastructure of our worldview. The stories that we learn inform our worldview and our worldview filters the stories that we hear in an ongoing feedback loop. This is why it’s so important to control the narrative.

When Grenfell Tower went up in flames on the morning of 14th June, the narrative practically wrote itself. Here we had the poorest people in the country living next door to the wealthiest. The first victim to be named was a Syrian refugee, Mohammed Alhajali. Two miles away, the penthouse flat in the tower block at 3 Merchant Square was recently sold for £7.5 million, perhaps by one of those Russian oligarchs, semi-mythical creatures who buy up reams of expensive property in the desirable areas of London seemingly on a whim. A tale of two cities, a tale of two immigrants.

As the story continues, the residents of 3 Merchant Square are protected by smoke detectors and sprinklers in each flat whilst the poor residents in Grenfell Tower have no sprinklers and apparently a few faulty smoke detectors. Worse still, Grenfell Tower had only last year had a refurbishment which was designed to improve its appearance to outside observers (i.e. to the purchasers of those luxury flats). As we now know, having all become leading experts in the cladding of tall buildings in the last week, the insulating fascia built on the exterior of Grenfell Tower seems to have acted as a chimney, spreading the fire all around the building.

So the story is one of poor, immigrant favela dwellers whose safety doesn’t matter at all but whose ugly building must be dangerously disguised so as not to upset the delicate sensibilities of neighbouring millionaires. This narrative was immediately and effortlessly translated into one of murderous, racist Tory scum ethnically cleansing Kensington and Chelsea. The former narrative has some merit but the way that it so easily slips into the latter interpretation is due to the fact that the assumptions of the liberals have become hegemonic throughout the British political system. Chris Pankhurst, 22 June 2017

We will also do well to avail ourselves of pragmatism’s tools, obviously not only accepting fallibilism and participatory correctability on a sheer civic universal democratic basis, but in utilizing it to our ethnonational ends; following-up anti-founatonalism and anti-Cartesianism to purge from our midst the residual Caresianism in Pragmatist philosophy for its liberal, civic national democratatic premises, ad hoc introduction of the Cartesian prejudice against prejudice, put over the top by the YKW in the form of anti-racism and anti-semitism - “indubitable” Not innocent.

Anti-racism is Cartesian, it is prejudice, it is not innocent, it is hurting and it is killing people.


That our genetic genus and species exist as significantly discreet from others on the planet is indubitable. That sheer skepticism of the “reality” or “significance” of these classificatory differences will jeopardize these differences is indubitable, particularly as the prohibition of their maintenance though anti-racism and anti-discrimination laws is enforced.

........................................................


Though it may seem like heresy to WN that I am quoting a Jewish philosopher, Bernstein is mostly just describing the distinguishing ideas of the American pragmatist philosophers Pierce, James and Dewey. I am precisely observant of those places where he begins to take pragmatism in direction that serves Jewish interests and antagonizes the interests of White/European peoples.

Pragmatism can be taken in other directions, in service of ethno-national interests. Bernstein acknowledges and approves of this facility as he quotes fellow tribesman Hilary Putnam:

In an article entitled “Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity” this is what [Hilary Putnam] writes:

“What I find attractive in the pragmatism is not a systematic theory of the usual sense at all. It’s a certain group of theses, which can indeed be argued differently by different philosophers, with different concerns from what became the philosophy of Pierce and above all James and Dewey.”

Excerpts, Richard J. Bernstein discussing the pragmatist philosophers, their distinguishing ideas and implications:

{1} Richard J. Bernstein, the 2013 Selzer Visiting Philosopher, gave a lecture on “The Pragmatic Turn” (he has a book by the same name) 13 February 2013 at Beloit College, Wisconsin, U.S.A. He argues that many philosophical themes from the past 150 years are derived from classical American pragmatists.

[...]

Pierce, James and Dewey.

Despite Dewey’s role as a leading progressive pragmatic thinker (who was in sharp disagreement, attacking Trotsky for his ideas about means and ends, upon Dewey’s death, pragmatism as kind of philosophical movement began to rapidly fade for the American academic departments. During the 1930’s and 40s, there was a growing influence of the emigre philosophers who had fled from Nazism. And many were associated with the Vienna Circle and with logical empiricists; and later there was a strong influence in the United States with the Oxford style of ordinary language analysis of philosophers in America. From the late 1930’s to the 1960’s there was in effect a quiet radical revolution in academic philosophy departments in The United States. And this is the period, in which one can begin to date the dominant the dominant linguistic analytic philosophy and indeed it is a time when the infamous, and I think it is infamous Anglo-American split in philosophy was becoming entrenched.

So what happened to pragmatism? The classical pragmatists were marginalized. They were viewed as fuzzy-minded thinkers who may have had their hearts in the right place, but they lacked the clarity, precision and analytic finesse to do serious philosophical work. Pragmatism seemed to be relegated to the dust bin of history. It’s still a sad commentary, I think, on American academic philosophy departments that one can get a PhD in philosophy today without ever having read a word of the classical pragmatists. But beginning in the 1970’s there were signs of a change. The beginning of a resurgence of pragmatism. And one of the key figures in helping to make pragmatism respectable was Richard Rorty. During the 1960’s and 1970’s Rorty had written some excellent articles at the cutting edge of analytic philosophy; and edited a famous anthology called, “The Linguistic Turn.” He was sufficiently popular among hard core analytic philosophers, that he was elected President of the Eastern division of the American philosophic association at a relatively young age. But when he published his famous, some would say infamous book, “Philosophy in the Mirror of Nature”, it caused something of a sensation.  He shocked many of his fellow philosophers when he wrote in his introduction, that “Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Dewey were the three most important philosophers of the twentieth century. Continental philosophers might agree about Heidegger; as Analytic philosophers might agree about Wittgenstein…. but virtually no one at that time would put Dewey in the same league, in the same category. From that time on, Dewey identified himself with the pragmatic tradition of Dewey and James; but his views of pragmatism was at that time and is to this day controversial.

Like James, Dewey wanted philosophers to stop dealing with the same worn out problems and he sought to foster a new spirit of creative experimentalism.

Another thinker of Rorty’s generation who contributed to an appreciation of pragmatism was Hilary Putnam. If ever there was someone who was originally identified as a hard core analytic philosopher, it was Hilary Putnam. He was a sophisticated philosopher, he is of physics and mathematics, and he was educated by the leading philosophers of logical empiricism, including Hans Reichenbach and Rudolph Kohlner. But gradually like Rorty, Putnam found that the confines of the analytic tradition were too narrow; and he too began to identify himself with the pragmatic tradition.. In an article entitled “Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity” this is what he writes:

“What I find attractive in the pragmatism is not a systematic theory of the usual sense at all. It’s a certain group of theses, which can indeed be argued differently by different philosophers, with different concerns from what became the philosophy of Pierce and above all James and Dewey.

Cursorily summarized, those are:

1) Anti-skepticism. Pragmatists hold that doubt requires justification just as much as belief.

2) Fallibilism. Pragmatists hold that there is never a metaphysical guarantee to be had by such and such a belief, that will never need revision; and then he puts in parentheses, that “one can be both fallibilistic and anti-skeptical is perhaps the unique insight of American pragmatism.

3) The thesis that there is no fundamental dichotomy between facts and values. and in a certain sense..

4) Practice is primary in philosophy.

[...]

Many of the divisions that were seen in philosophy for them [the pragmatists] did not exist. There were philosophers that inspired them, that were very different. Pierce claimed to know, and knowing Pierce’s capabilities I could believe it, although it sounds insane, that he knew Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason by heart. James always felt a closer affinity with the British empiricists, and he even dedicated Pragmatism to J.S. Mill. And Dewey, as I mentioned, really started as a Hegelian. Consequently, there’s a richness and diversity of philosophical orientations woven into classical pragmatism.

But lets turn to the ideas of these thinkers. Now I’m going to present a composite picture with some dominant themes. And I want to single out six interrelated themes; that I think are characteristic of these pragmatic thinkers. The first theme is anti-foundatonalism and the critique of Cartesianism. Descartes in his meditations, was searching for a solid foundation, for the edifice of knowledge. Something that is indubitable and incorrigible; a truth that can be known with certainty, and that can serve as the real basis or foundation for knowledge. Descartes is haunted by what I have called in some of my writings, “the Cartesian anxiety” - the grand either/or. Either, there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelope us with madness and intellectual and moral chaos. Now, there is a way of reading a good deal of philosophy from its beginning, to its present, and especially from Descartes to the present, as a search for a firm foundation. Whether we take the foundation to be the intellectual grasp of eternal forms, or the direct grasp of immediate empirical intuitions, or the cogito itself.

The appeal to such a basic, rock bottom foundation, cannot be underestimated. In our time, the failure to discover, quote, such a foundation, is said to lead straight right to a defeating relativism, that denies the very foundation of truth, objectivity and moral fealty; and I think unfortunately to a great extent, that still infects a great deal of popular consciousness. “If I don’t have something basically to believe in, then anything goes.”

Now the pragmatists, all of them, challenge this way of thinking, challenge this kind of grandeur, they seek to exorcise this Cartesian anxiety. they reject the ideal that there is an absolute grounding or foundation of our being. I think one of the best statements of the pragmatic alternative was succinctly stated by Wolfred Sellers, when he writes, “for empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is rational not because it has a foundation, but because it is a self correcting enterprise that can put any claim into jeopardy, although not all at once.” The alternative to the foundation metaphor is to think of inquiry as a self correcting enterprise; that has no fixed absolute beginning points and no absolute end.

This alternative paradigm, this alternative way of thinking, leads me to the second theme, that I think is characteristic of the pragmatic tradition, and that’s the theme of fallibilism. If inquiry is a self corrective activity, that can put any claim into jeopardy, then this means that all knowledge claims, indeed all validity claims are fallible, in the sense that we never can claim that we know anything with a type of certainty that cannot in principle be questioned. But there is a difference between indubitability and fallibility. Many of our beliefs are indubitable in the sense that we do not doubt them; and indeed may not even be aware that we have such beliefs. But what is indubitable today may turn out to be false tomorrow. Furthermore, fallibilism is not to be confused with epistemological skepticism. Hilary Putnam, who is one of the outstanding pragmatists of our time, and still alive, once wrote that the great contribution of the pragmatists is to show that fallibilism and anti-skepticism are compatible. Pierce, for example, never doubted that we can know a reality that is independent of ourselves. But he also argued, that we’re never in a position to claim that we know this with absolute certainty ...and I think we can illustrate what is meant by anti-foundationalism and fallibilism by an appeal to an understanding of scientific inquiry (or we could relate it to all kinds of inquiry). The validity of a given theory or explanatory hypothesis in any of the sciences is not dependent on showing that it rests on an absolute foundation, but rather that it is supported by the best empirical evidence and the best reasoning. Every serious scientist today knows, that our current theories and hypotheses will most likely be mollified or even abandoned in light of further inquiry and evidence. So strictly speaking what we take to be true today might turn out to be false. It would be hyperbolic to say that consequently, we don’t really have any knowledge because any knowledge claim that we make may turn out to be false… rather the pragmatic point is that all knowledge is fallible and all knowledge is corrigible - in principle it can be corrected.

[...]

The question arises, if we cannot know anything with absolute certainty, how to warrant and secure our knowledge claims? And answering this will bring me to our third theme, the importance of the community of inquirers and the sociality of our practices that shape us.

[...]

The community of inquirers and the socialty of practices. Here again I think Pierce was one of the first to emphasize the importance of the concept of the community of inquirers. For the ways in which we can test the validity of our claims, is by opening them to public criticism; again, using scientific inquiry as an example, and I only mean this as an example, we can say that no hypothesis, no theory, will be accepted as correct, simply because it is affirmed with absolute conviction. New hypotheses must be subject to relentless criticism by the relevant community of inquirers.  ..critical inquiry advances through the process of making bold conjectures and then subjecting them to rigorous testing and refutation. And the pragmatists go even farther, for they argue that we are quintessentially social beings in the sense that we are always being shaped, that does not mean completely determined, by the social practices in which we participate.

When I turn to the pragmatic conception of democracy, we will see that they reject the very common contrast between the individual and society. Individuality for them is not an ontological or epistemological given, it’s rather an achievement. And the quality of the individuality that we achieve is shaped and dependent upon the type of communities in which we live and thrive and the quality of the community, it’s life itself and quality is dependent upon our individual contributions. There’s a circular relation here, but not a vicious circularity; but rather a kind of creative circularity. And this leads me to the fourth theme that I want to emphasize.

Pluralism and Contingency. William James argues for a radical pluralism of perspectives. We human beings can never achieve a god’s eye perspective. In a pluralistic universe ..... but radical pluralism is not to be confused or identified with what might be called a self defeating relativism. It is an engaged, falliblilistic pluralism, such a pluralistic ethos as exhibited by James and others, places new responsibility on each of us, for it means taking our fallibility and our limited finitude seriously…

...and furthermore I think the pragmatists had a keen sense of urgency. There are and always will be surprises and conflicts in human life; and the pragmatists took contingency and change to be basic features not simply of human life but of the universe itself. We can never completely control or predict what will happen and consequently, their ideal, is to cultivate those habits virtues and dispositions that can prepare us for unexpected contingencies and conflicts.

Implicit in this view is a world that challenges a classical distinction between theory and practice.

__________

I provide a transcript of most all of this discussion between Robert Harrison and Thomas Sheehan about Heidegger’s Being and Time and Logic the Question of Truth. This is not meant as an endorsement of all of Harrison’s, Sheehan’s or even Heidegger’s positions. I have significant differences from them all. However, the discussion was clear and detailed enough to allow one (obviously myself included) to learn more clearly what Heidegger was saying, where one might agree and where one might differ; as well as where one might differ from these Heidegger scholars.

{2} Robert Harrison and guest Thomas Sheehan discuss Martin Heidegger and his famous work Being and Time. This is from an episode of Entitled Opinions, a podcast at Stanford University. Posted on Youtube, 14 January, 2017:

For more information, go to http://french-italian.stanford.edu/op...

Robert Harrison: The reason that I ask what it means to be at home in Ithaca is because Odyssyeus’s homecoming is not fully achieved once he returns; remember the visit to the underworld in book 11 of The Odyssey, there Odysseus had been told by the prophet Tyrresius, that once he make sit back to Ithaca that he must take off on yet another journey. With an oar on his shoulder he must travel to a saltless land where people know nothing of the sea; says Tyrresius, quote, “When another wayfarer on meeting you, shall say, that you have a winnowing fan on your stout shoulder then you must fix in the earth your shapely oar, and make goodly offers to Poseidon, and death will come to you far from the sea, a death so gentle that it will lay you low, when you are overcome with sleep, old age.” So just when you’d thought that you had returned, you have to take up your oar again, and leave. Only this time, your oar is no longer a means of locomotion, it no longer serves the practical purpose it was designed for; the oar now becomes a ritualistic object; that you place on your shoulder, carrying it into a place, where its instrumentality is misrecognized or misidetified. In that region of unlikeness, far from home, he must plant it in the earth, the ground of your mortality and thereby come to terms with your death. Only when Odysseus has undertaken this second journey into a foreign land, to make peace with his own dying, can he finally return to Ithaca and make himself at home there, for the first time.

...those who stay at home without undergoing this estrangement are not at home in their own homelands.” That Homer’s fable serves as the allegorical introduction to our show today deals with Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time; this is a book that in the ponderous prose of German high philosophy, analyzes the kind of being that belongs to Odysseus, in so far as he is resourceful, insofar as he is mortal, insofar as he is human. It is a book that probes the underlying strangeness of the familiar, and penetrates the ground in which Odysseus plants his oar, which, by the time he reaches that destination, is neither an oar nor a winnowing fan, but a marker of our being unto death in the mode of anticipatory resolve. Being and time is a book that undertakes that second journey, dislodging the oar from its familiar context and following its hero, who goes by the name of Dasein, into that uncanny region where human existence is revealed in its fundamental determinations.

With my guest today we will probe and try to put into relief those fundamental determinations of Dasein’s mode of being as Heidegger understands them, and to share with you, our reasons for believing that Being and Time, is one of he most important events of western philosophy.

My guest today is Professor Thomas Sheehan, professor in the department of religious studies at Stanford, and the author several books as well as a host of articles on Martin Heidegger - most recently, he has translated into English, Martin Heidegger’s 1925-26 lectures on truth, entitled Logic the Question of Truth. This book is central to Heidegger’s overall project of reinterpreting western thought in terms of time and truth.

Tom, welcome to the program.

Thomas Sheehan (5:07): Logic the Theory of Truth is a first draft of parts of Being and Time. Its a difficult book, especially in its last third, where he deals with Kant, but a very rewarding one. I would say it’s divided into three sections. One is Heidegger’s very close reading of psychologism and his critique of that.

Robert Harrison: What is psychologism?

Thomas Sheehan: psychologism is the reduction of all the rules of logic to just the working of the mind, so that if we could anthropologically study what the mind is doing when it thinks we would have all the laws of logic so that they are no longer universal, they are no longer free of human reasoning, they are simply dependent upon reasoning itself.

And then in its second part, a very fruitful part, I think, you have an analysis of logos - that’s the word that underlies logic, the question of truth; an analysis of logos as the human being’s a-priori need to make sense of things. Logos is not language, it is not binding things together - it’s making sense, as Heidegger makes clear. And also in that second part, his best analysis of meaning, by reference that is say alethea itself, by reference to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, book theta chapter 10. So, we’ve got psychologism, we’ve got logos and alethia; and then thirdly, and stunningly good, I think is his best statement of what he means by time.

And he defines time as the need to make things meaningfully present, so he focuses on the present moment of time. Anyway, he does this by a close and I must say difficult analysis of Kantian schematism, which turned out to be the first draft of his 1929 book on Kant.

And in the whole book, he anticipates what he would later say, namely that time is only a stand in for alethia, incorrectly translated as truth.

So its an important text, it underlies a certain shift that’s taking place in the profession these days, I would call it a paradigm shift that’s settling in among the younger scholars, among the best graduate students as well among some of us oldies, the paradigm shift consisting-in and its clear from part two of this book that Heidegger interprets Being as meaning bedoitzonkite - so meaning, significance etc, is what he means by being; which is no surprise because being is always the meaningful presence of something to one, in the practical or theoretical order. So, the emphasis on being as meaning is I think crucial to the text.

Robert Harrison (8:35): When he takes on psychologism, I presume he’s taking-up Husserl’s own polemic against psycholgism, and the critique of psychologism in Heidegger’s phenomenology was crucial ...how do you understand Heidegger’s relation to Husserlian phenomenology in Being and Time now?

Thomas Sheehan:  Yeah, that’s a big and very important topic. And I think that part of the shift of emphasis these days has been the rediscovery of phenomenology as the very basis of Heidegger’s work, Being and Time and all the rest. He said, in 1969 shortly before he died, that his work was phenomenological through and through - both phenomenological and hermeneutic; so perhaps we have to say something about both of those.

In the early 70’s, about five years before he died, I had the opportunity to meet with Heidegger in his home in Frieberg for a long conversation one afternoon in April of 1971. And, the topic that we mostly discussed, we discussed was phenomenology and Aristotle; phenomenology, comma, and Aristotle, two separate topics, but it was phenomenology that he put his emphasis on; and he made it utterly clear to me, I was just a young PhD at the time, that there is no understanding Heidegger without understanding phenomenology.

..and he walked me through some of the sections of (Husserl’s) The Logical Investigation and central and categorical intuition. ..Husserl’s main opus, the first volume of which was Husserl’s critique of psychologism as you mention, and he emphasized that phenomenology is not about things out there, stuff that is, phenomenology is about the meaning of things, in our world of use and practical orientation, the significance of things. It’s precisely meaning that changes things out there to phenomenon ..say things that meaningfully appear to us and that we can engage with. So, as he made clear to me, phenomenology is exclusively about meaning, sense, significance.. and “presence-to-you” in a meaningful way. So he was never about things out there now as they are real and so on, he was always about their interface, their correlation with human being. And human being’s correlation with meaning. So, phenomenology is the search for the last word on meaning.

But Heidegger, as you know, always uses the word “being”, except in his later years, he sort of came out and said, and I quote: “I no longer use the word being gladly, I no longer like to use the word being” would be the way to translate it; he said in his later writings that being was only a preliminary word. He said that basically, “being” was to be surpassed to the phenomenological correlation which he called [German word, phonetically: eraigniz] in his own interpretation .... so I would say that being is just another way of saying meaning.

Robert Harrison (12:04): Can I take issue with that? The heavy emphasis that you put on the word meaning ..by privileging that one word, you gave a number of other possible words, interface, correlation and you said the way things appear to you…the sense that they have. When we use the word meaning there are connotations to that, that there’s something humanly dependent on meaningfulness and that the meaningfulness can reach an order of having a larger meaning to life, for example. Why not just stick, for the moment, when we’re talking about phenomenology, with the fact that things appear to us, in ways that are accessible. That can be in the realm of visibility, it can be in the realm of intelligibility, it can be in the realm of practicality, practical use, any number of modes; and I think that the word meaning doesn’t encompass the full array of possibilities of how things are given over to us as phenomenon.

Thomas Sheehan: Well, except that Heidegger insisted in Being and Time on the word [Geman word, phonetically: bedoitzonkite] which means “meaningfulness.” The first name for being in Heidegger’s work is “world” - the meaning giving context, as he calls it. So, he did not shy-away from discussing being in terms of meaning, presence-to, accessibility as you say, but he does use the word bedoitzonkite, bedoitund all through his analysis of “world”, in Being and Time.  ...and he makes it clear that the central, how shall we say, determination of human being, dasein, is being in the world, being in meaning in bedoitzonkite.

Robert Harrison: Is “world” reduce-able to the word “meaning”?

Thomas Sheehan: Yes, I mean he actually defines world as, the structure of world as bedoitzonkite, what goes on inside of world is bedoitund.

As he says, when things are discovered along with human being, that is to say when they’ve been understood, we say they have meaning.

So, really what he’s saying is that the human being is a hermeneut - that’s not an add-on to some sort of plain old existence. Our existence is the obligation, the need the thrownness into making sense of things ...in fact, the first meaning of the word of Alethea is meaning, its not truth, as Heidegger points out; so if we’re embedded in hermeneutics and he is using the word bedoitzonkite, I think that we can actually retrieve from this plain old word being, we can retrieve the urgency that Heidegger feels are in your face - he says at on point in his first course after the war, the Great War, in February of 1919, he asks his students, what is it that you first encounter in your lived world? Is it things, is it objects, is it being? No, he says, its meaningful, that’s what’s in your face…all over the place, it’s coming at you. So, we don’t want to lose him to traditional ontology which just talks about the inner substance of things - no, we want to have him on this side of phenomenology as he himself insisted ...and one way of constantly recognizing that is being in your face. Being is meaning.

Robert Harrison: Well, ok, we’re not going to resolve that only because of the connotations of the word meaning. It’s associated for me very much with Analytic philosophy, with its analysis of meaning making in propositions; and that the meaning-making activity is one that is very cerebral; it seems to be related back to subjectivity. The great excitement of Being and Time was that it was such a sort of existentialist, sort of treatise; and he didn’t call it “being and meaning”, he called it Being and Time.

And time is something which, would you agree to be the kind of ground of meaning, as you’re referring to it; and if so, there’s a way in which being temporal includes all sorts of things that don’t enter into the usual connotation of the word meaning - namely thrownness into the world and being ahead of one’s self and self transcendence; and being unto death and all these great existential categories that seem to take us away from this otherwise cerebral activity of making sense of everything.

Thomas Sheehan: Maybe we should start by asking why he even called his main work Being and Time. And that’s where the 1925-26 course, Logic the Theory of Truth comes in, because the whole last third of it is an analysis of the schematism, is an effort to give a statement on what he means by “time”.

And it’s clear, throughout Heidegger’s work, that the source of his meditations on temporality are not Aristotle, it’s not the time of the cosmos, its not the spread of moments across a certain arc; rather, his focus in understanding time is Augustin and Plotinus. In other words, time is a characteristic of human existence.

So, it takes it out of the cosmos and puts it into the realm of human existence. Time occurs only with the human being, Aristotle, Augustin and Plotinus would agree to that.

And time, he says, he says this in 1949, he says this in the Logic book that I translated, time is only a preliminary way of saying alethia - openness; unclosedness; disclosure; which is something that is the primary determinant of human being. It’s the existential which determines human being, which is that we are constantly embedded in the meaning making process; which is not a subject’s sort of casting of meaning over things; it’s rather an interplay, a correlation between meaning and hu/man/s. So, his motto in Being and Time is, “without Being, no Dasein”, but what he’s really talking about is the interface of human being and meaning. Without Dasein, there is no place for meaning to occur.

This is clear throughout the text; that what time, temporality means, is being present to things not passively, just receiving them, but actively making sense of them. That’s not simply painting in a certain color. Because we are always already involved-with, familiar-with, engaged with meaning as such.

Robert Harrison (19:54): Being and Time is in two parts. In the first part there’s a distinction between Dasein in its inauthentic modes of being and then in the second division, the authentic mode of being of dasein. And I presume that meaning-making pertains to both modes [Thomas Sheehan: “sure”]. But lets um, if I can ask you the fundamental meaning of some terms that he uses in pat one especially; because he says that dasein, and there are three particular modes of dasein - facticity, existentiality and fallenness. ..can you briefly go through what these three determinations of dasein amount to? Starting with facticity.

Thomas Sheehan: Right. He gives different names to the triads. One would be thrownness; projectedness; and being meaningfully present-to. So what if we take facticity in the sense of one’s thrownness? As you and your audience knows, his way of denominating the determinations of human being; the a-priori determinations, is to call them existential characteristics, or existentials, just like that. And the most basic existential of them all is dasein’s “thrownness.” All the others derive from it; even dasein’s alethic function of making sense of things. So the basic existential characteristic is called thrownness (eventually it would called facticity); but thrownness into what? He says thownness into the world, the world of the bedoitzankeik, the world of making sense ....and what he means from the very first page of being and time is that you have to be yourself; the question becomes what is this self? This self is hermeutical; this self is intrinsically sense making, so, I have to be a hermeneuse; I have to make sense of things; is the first characteristic of human being.

Being yourself in that thrownness entails as first requirement, making sense ....you must be a hermeneut.

Thomas Harrison: So thrownness is being thrown into a world, without my having chosen to be in the world; and I’m thrown as also projected beyond myself, as that the dimension of existentiality? you are thrown in so far as you are thrown with a past, but also, you are out ahead of yourself and reaching out into a future [Sheehan: into a future, sure], and then you are also present among other people as well as things and you are kind of fallen-in; and among things in a way that you might be making sense of them but in a fallen mode by just using them instrumentally, ah. How does this projection relate to thrownness?

Robert Sheehan: Right. The human being is divided against itself, or is disjunctive in its relation to itself; it’s not all self contained, it’s not closed-in upon itself, like the Aristotelian god who thinks of nothing but itself; the self thinking thought as we sometimes translate it; so, what we’re thrown into rather is our openness. I sometimes like to put the two terms together, throwness and projection, facticity and existentiality, put them together as “thrown-openness” - openness referring to one’s alethic function of making sense of things; but openness really means the opposite of the Greek, closure, so it’s a sign of finitude; fragility of, the need to strive, into the future ect. and the disjunction that we are thrown into is that we cannot take things immediately, and understand what their meaning is; their significance, their being, if you want to use that term.  Rather we always have to take them in terms of something else; it’s a discursive, a step by step kind of knowledge, unlike the knowledge of god when god just opens his eyes (if you want to put it that way) and understands exactly what the thing is; no, we have to labor after the concept in Hegel’s sense; we have to work in order to put together this in terms of that; and the that is the dimension of meaning of a particular object.

So that disjunction at the core of human sense-making is what will eventually be called temporality, human openness as such.

But when we’re thrown into projectedness, we’re thrown into the need to reach ahead as it were and into the meaning of something in order to understand it for what it is.

Robert Harrison: Tom, can I ask about fallenness? Because we’ve been talking about dasein in its authentic mode, but Heidegger makes it clear time and again that for the most part dasein exists inauthentically. In a state of fallenness. What does he mean by that?

Thomas Sheehan: If I can take one step back because you refer to being with, other people, things, ourselves even. It’s always important to remember that the issue of being-with is not simply a physical coming up against, but rather a relationship of meaningfulness; in relation to things, to people, to myself, etc. Heidegger bifurcates being-with things meaningfully into two forms, into two modes, we might say - one is inauthentic and one is authentic; and the principle difference between that is whether or not one relates to things in terms of one’s full human nature; or if one instead treats other things and other people as just “out there”, to be kind of bumped-up against; that would be an inauthentic way, because one’s not reflecting upon or bringing to bear one’s whole human nature - finite, mortal, and all of that (actually, the Greek word authentikos means to be the one who commits the murder, believe it or not, the one who is responsible for the murder.).

So, to be responsible for one’s whole human nature, is to be authentic, that is to say to have accepted oneself; as thrown, as disjunctive, as finite, as going to die; so, inauthentic is all the opposite of that.

Robert Harrison: I used to be much more fascinated by the authenticity side of the two because I thought that’s where it all happened. Now I have to say that the analysis of inauthenticity interests me a lot more than his analysis of authenticity, because to begin with we are authentic only in privileged moments [Sheehan: right], we have these moments that break us out of the continuum, but for the most part, out home, where we live, where we are in Ithaca [the Odyssey] as it were, is in the inauthenic world. Now I said in my allegorical introduction, I said that if Odysseus is going to make himself at home in the world he’s going to have to estrange himself in the familiar; and he’s going to have to undertake this journey into the strange land and his oar will no longer be this instrument that he uses in an everyday functionality mode, but it becomes a marker for his own death and mortality, so its a thing of authenticity but after that he can go back to Ithaca. and actually make himself at home in a kind of world that is now not just the place that he’s from, but he’s taken full possession, he’s repossessed that world of his.

Thomas Sheehan (30:19): The experience of being estranged from oneself and the piercing through is called dread. He has a small section on it in Being and Time and a longer, more discursiveness treatment two years later in What is Metaphysics? Phenomenology, besides being bout meaning is always about first person experience. 

So it puts the burden on oneself. So he walks us through this phenomenological experience of having your whole world fall apart. The whole world, filled with its meaning for us, that we are familiar with, suddenly collapses. Then you realize that you are so much a hermeneut, a maker of sense, but so finitely a maker of sense.

It’s an anticipation of death, dread is, because there is an anticipation of making sense - and that is to be dead. So, in the experience of dread you move right to that frontier between nothingness, absurdity, your own death and making sense. And Heidegger says, the experience is not one that pulls you into your death and encourages you to commit suicide, to fall into nothingness. He actually says that the experience of dread of that thin line that separates you from nothingness throws you back into the sense making world, now with the awareness that there is no ground under your feet, that you are doing this alone, that’s what he also means by the call of consciousness, that I am dreadfully alone, in the midst of all this, do I have the courage to accept that in an act of decision or resolve? To accept that that’s what meaning is all of meaning is about, that I am bound into a correlation that will finally just disappear when I die.

Robert Harrison (33:38): Well again one could say that the risk one takes by emphasizing so heavily on the world meaning is that it creates a difficulty to understand this moment of awakening, through the experience of angst or dread, where I realize that all my meaning-making activity is fundamentally meaningless, or absurd in that meaninglessness is the ground for the possibility of meaning; and therefore being has to be more than meaning; it has to mean my being at that edge of my finititude, where everything slips into a kind of nothingness and I realize that I am the nullity of all my projects and meaning making is a highly circumscribed activity and it does not exhaust the potentiality of my being.

Thomas Sheehan: Well, I would disagree and I’m only trying to explain, not convince why some of us see this a different way; Heidegger says, in the 1925-26 course, that human beings are embedded in meaning, there is no exit from that, making sense of one’s life, that’s what it means by being, having to be ..it doesn’t mean just having to tick tock tick tock your way through life, it means actually to, is there any meaning in my life…and its true what you say that the real source of all meaning making is absurdity, its death, we’re constantly pushing back that moment, or its pushing us back into sense, and that’s our experience but that moment of dread, like the moment of conscience, the call of conscience, the moment of dread is experiencing yourself right at the point of death. I don’t like the phrase being toward death as if we’re going down a road, and someday the road will end. No, it’s about right here and now at your death and that death is the realm of absurdity, because there will be no more sense to your life, there will be no more life.

But I don’t see as you do, this hermeneutical side as an add-on to existence. It is rather the definition of existing. It’s what makes human beings different. A human being is the animal that has logos - possessed by logos which is making sense.

Robert Harrison: Can I ask…you’re bringing up angst, and the role that angst plays in authenticity; angst he describes as an emotion or a mood, and one of the original contributions, as I see it, of Being and Time, in the history of philosophy, is that Heidegger actually proposes what we might call a philosophy of moods, or he redeems, retrieves things like state of mind and mood and the emotional life, as legitimate grounds for philosophical sense making. So, that, uh, now, I can go along with you that moods are always meaningful, but there is something in the fact of moods, which seems to escape the ordinary understanding of meaning as something we can reduce to conceptualization; so, what do you make of Heidegger’s redemption of mood as a philosophical opening.

Thomas Sheehan: Right, both earlier and just now, you seem to look upon meaning as what you say what analytic philosophers deal with or as you put it now, meaning reduce-able to conceptuality, well that’s not exactly what Heidegger means by meaning; by meaning he means, making your way, being on a way, a path, where things open up and give you a world that you can live in; be familiar with, rather than anything like a conceptuality; he doesn’t mean that at all by meaning, because he’s not talking about it as we might say, in an ontic sense, of the mind that is generated by your brain as it were. No, for him it is a way of being, its a way of being on your way, opening up a territory of meaning.

But back to mood, mood is for him a [German word] which means a resonance; it’s like two tuning forks; you hit one the other will start to resonate with it; so it’s a famiarity with meaning where both of them are resonating, both are on the same terms, as it were; I would call that correlation between these two resonating somethings; I would call that what Heidegger calls [German word], its the correlation whereby man needs meaning, and can’t exist without it, that would be the first part of Being and Time; and the unpublished part being meaning needs man. Meaning appears only with Dasein in various configurations. So that this resonance between the two, he even uses a German word that says that, the word means to go back and forth, resonate back and forth - that’s the core of thrownness into meaning; that we cannot separate ourselves from that buzz as it were, which gives us our meaning, our being and makes meaning able to appear. If you consider if I may, with the question of being: I once asked a friend of mine, who was holding a position similar to yours; I asked him, “when meteorite hits, and we’re all dead, will there still be being?” And he answered, “Of course there will be, there will be the moon, the sky, the earth itself, we won’t be there but there will be things in existence.”

Robert Harrison: I would say “no” though.

Thomas Sheehan: I would say “no”, of ours we would say no. Because being is only in correlation with human being, so now we’ve moved entirely away from the tradition of being as being out there. Rather its the importance of this thing to me, what being is. I use the phrase, in your face, I can’t escape that relationality. And mood is the primary way in which we feel the significance of this.

When I raise a cup of water to my lips to drink some water, I don’t even have to conceptualize anything. I simply know how to do it. And that would be the primary insantiation of [German word], namely that I am in resonance with that world of meaning. So that’s what I’m thrown into, I’m thrown into a mood which is a relationship to a whole world of meaning giving relationships that surround me. And that’s going to be gone, will be no being when there is no dasein. There will be no meaning when there is no dasein.

Robert Harrison: In fact, Heidegger says in Being and Time that the laws of Newton were not true prior to Newton’s discovery of them. They did not in a certain sense have their being. It’s only in their uncovering that they come into play.

Do you think that Dasein’s temporal constitution that makes it always ahead of itself and gives it a certain anticipatory access to its own death which means more than demise but means a certain kind of nullity that is always operative in being and time…that this is what discloses for the first time the intelligible world that gives us access to things.

Thomas Sheehan: Yes, I do, I think you said that very well. And in Being and Time as you now, there’s a step by step as it were reduction to the basis of everything - so you have being in the world in the first part of being and time, that gets defined as concern for meaning; from being in the world to Care as it is sometimes translated, to temporality, ultimately as the meaning of Care and of being in the world. So that temporality, that anticipation of death is the core of meaning,it is the ultimate source of meaning one might say.

[Perhaps interaction is a better place to look for source].

[...]

The call of conscience says to you in Germnan [word] - it’s usually translated as “guilty”, but another way of translating that word is “responsible for.” You’re responsible for your nothingness, you are in the driver’s seat when you confront this experience - what are you going to do with it? You can run from it, ignore it, you can say no, I’m not up for that, or you can embrace it, understand it and say, even if only momentary experiences as you point out, authentic experiences, when we lift our face out of the mud and realize what we are, even if only in renewable moments, that is the basis on which I am going to live my life. That would be the act of what he calls resolve. By anticipating one’s death, by understanding, one’s mortality, death is death, after which there is nada. But to anticipate it is to really feel, resonating with the mortality, the finitude of what you are. Now, Heidegger of course stops there. We won’t go into a discussion of how he learned to apply this or didn’t apply it in his own decisions ect.

But at least he sets up that model for being and human being on the basis of which everything else can be built. That’s why he calls it a fundamental ontology. It would be the basis for an ethics or an aesthetics, or anything, after that.

Robert Harrison: So we have a cluster of terms, angst, the call of conscience and guilt and they are all intimately interrelated; angst is something that has an awakening, it awakens me to the fact that there’s not a stable foundation, there’s not a positive foundation to existence; if I heed the call of conscience, its whence is also the wither, Heidegger says. It’s coming to me from where I will be going; mainly this finitude that I am; and it awakens me also to my guilt, in the German sense of debt, not just sinfulness. The sense that I owe something, I have an obligation; and do you believe that dasein can ever discharge that debt? or is the most we can do when we resolve authentically who we are that we can just acknowledge that this is a debt that is undischargable in full awareness?

Thomas Sheehan: Right, and I would say a responsibility that even when you choose not to notice, and not to live with, is nonetheless, your responsibility. To choose to not be responsible is to still be responsible, to still be in debt, as you put it.

Robert Harrison: and Tom, can I ask just a follow-up question, because the interesting thing there in Being and Time is after he’s talked about anticipatory resolve, he goes away from the individualistic emphasis of dasein and he starts speaking about how dasein is also an heir to a tradition; and that through the moment of authenticity you can authentically retrieve possibilities in your heritage and renew them or recast them, re-appropriate them in an authentic mode; and then you become not just a temporal being, but you become an authentically historical agent. And you belong not only to yourself, but now you belong also to your tribe, your community, your nation, your species and so forth.

That is a very important move, I think, toward the end of Being and Time. That perhaps could have been further developed but was not.

Thomas Sheehan: Right, some of course would accuse him of developing it in a nefarious direction; saying that the community is Germany and all of that; the way that that retrieval takes place that you’re describing, where one goes into one’s corporate past, one’s individual past, it all depends on what you’re retrieving, and brings it into something explosive, useful, uh, futural, is by, as he says, passing it under the eyes of death - a dramatic phrase; going into the teeth of death, another way that he says it. In other words, take all of those possibilities that are yours upon your shoulders and choose among them, which you want to live with in the light of your mortality; passing it under the eyes of death as it were.

[we can now see this reification of meaning coming singularly from the angst of one’s individual death can lead to a superficial existence]

...and there’s lots of things in our past that we would prefer to just let go, and rightly so. But, if we’re able to take possibilities and renew them in a finite, mortal way, that would give one a sense of one’s historicness, one’s connection with a past and one’s ability to renew that in a future that is a mortal, finite future.

Robert Harrison (48:37): But you would agree that there are no ethical prescriptions possible, even when one embraces resolutely your own mortality, it does not provide standards, for making choices that are right rather than wrong; which is troubling to a lot of moral philosophers, when they look to Heidegger and say, well, on the one hand he’s suggesting that there is a way of making authentic decisions, in an authentic mode, but he will not tell us what kinds of things would be right and wrong to choose. It’s up to you to choose.

Thomas Sheehan: Right. I think that, uh, that failure to provide any kind of standards, that would, as it were, channel the passionate authenticity that he calls one to; he, in section 74, where he says, “give up shirking your duty, give up being lazy”, you know, he has three or four categories there, but the fact that he couldn’t work out some sort of ethics, even at a meta-level, is probably the fault of the ..the weakness of his philosophy, insofar as it cannot take the next step, it cannot even begin to take the next step and it put up no bulwark for him, himself, in is choices in the future. So, I do think that really with Heidegger that you do need a complement, some people would say a Levinosian complement, but I would look to more ah, Enlightenment complements to that, a sense of equality of people and so on rather.

Robert Harrison (50:14): But do you believe like some people believe that if a philosopher can make the kinds of mistakes that Heidegger made after writing Being and Time that that goes a long way in neutralizing the validity of the philosophy itself? I mean its really quite astonishing that someone who could author Being and Time, one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century, one of the greatest philosophers in the western tradition, would have such a colossal failure of judgment; when it came to historical events as he was embroiled.

[I actually do not find this so singularly surprising; we have experience of people who compartmentalize their operations of thought and concern, neglecting some terribly at times.]

Thomas Sheehan (50:53): Right. I remember the first day I arrived in Friebourg, in an attempt to visit with Heidegger, I had to wait for another year, I had a letter of introduction but he was ill. I met a former professor of mine who lived in Friebourg and he said to me, I will have nothing to do with someone who has been a Nazi. I figured wow, that is the first time I’ve been confronted with that, because the American story put forth by Hannah Arendt was just a passing mistake, a kind of adventure on his part. It is utterly astonishing to me that he could write such a brilliant text, calling one to responsibility, and then find himself not only in the political order, but as we now know through the letters to his wife, in his own personal life to be a man who was entirely irresponsible vis a vis other people. Not to mention his sense of German nationalism and what that led to. On the other hand we do have this text that was written prior to his work, we have plenty of texts written after his sympathy for Nazism waned in the later 30’s. But we do, as Emmanuel Faye has pointed out in his very flawed book, “Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism Into Philosophy,” ..a very flawed text, we do have, he has discovered texts that show Heidegger to have basically been a minion, sort of the useful idiot of Hitler and Nazism and its just absolutely shocking. And he even later tried to locate it - in 1936 he says my whole notion of historicity is what led me in this direction. Well, Herbert Marcuse read Being and Time and said, “on the contrary, it leads in the direction of sociality, and a community of authentic human beings.” 

So, the doctors are divided but we still have the paradox of a brilliant set of texts and a flawed man.

Robert Harrison: Do you think a lot of his subsequent thinking, his so-called later thinking, is a re-thinking of the role that responsibility plays and what philosophy’s role is in assuming responsibility - for example, The Letter on Humanism, which he writes right after the war, it’s all about the relationship between thought and action; and he’s making very clear there that he thinks that thought is responsible to itself only as a form of thinking, not as something that can translate into action as we understand it politically and socially; and there we get a very different sort of - not a contrite Heidegger per se, but a chastened one, who now has despaired of philosophy’s relevance to the larger world.

Thomas Sheehan (53:38): I find his repentance if we can even call it that, because he was very chary about putting forth any apologies at all, but in his private correspondence with Jaspers, for example, he points out that he was utterly devastated by his own guilt of this thing, he was so ashamed, as he puts it. But, I must say that in the later writings, I don’t find him coming to grips with his Nazi period at all; rather he comes to grips, and meaningfully so, with something like the spread of fallenness throughout civilization and culture in the form of technology and so on. But personally, I don’t feel that he ever stepped-up and took responsibility for the thirties.

Robert Harrison: Yeah, well, I agree with that and at the same time the twentieth century did tell us something about philosophy’s fecklessness, even when it becomes ethical philosophy or prescriptive philosophy, this fecklessness to really intervene in a decisive way into the course of history; and perhaps there is something there about Heidegger’s realization that thinking has to take care of itself and hope that in mysterious ways the relationship between thinking and action will work itself out, in ways that we cannot even suspect being operative, but its not going to be an immediate sort of connection.

Thomas Sheehan: Going back to phenomenology, there is the failure of phenomenology in Heidegger I would think - phenomenology is about first person experience, taking things concretely, and Heidegger got more and more abstract; as he moved back into the Greeks, etc. and favored writing about poetry - it was sort of like uh, retreat from not the abstract, but the concreteness that phenomenology wants to be about.

Robert Harrison: Yeah, that’s why I like to go back to the early stuff and the phenomenoloy.

Thomas Sheehan: Yeah, that’s really alive there, as Hannah Arendt says, that thought came alive again.

Robert Harrison: Passionate thinking indeed.


Experiments in integrating and advancing upon Heidegger with pragmatism and social hermeneutics:

As I said, the discussion was clear, thorough and honest enough to lay bare Sheehan’s errors, Harrison’s errors (which seem to be lesser) and even Heidegger’s.

Both Sheehan and Harrison agree with the “it doesn’t make a noise” doesn’t have being for us, anyway, regarding whether a falling tree in the woods makes a noise if there is nobody there to hear it. Presumably Heidegger thought similarly.

This may be sheer practicality, but I agree, but I believe it is a philosophical decision which is highly practical, as it places humans at the center of the relative, social perspective - our use and well being because if we’re not there, or who cares?

A inference that they do not make, however, is that this is is a social perspective; we care about some people more than others; and some we don’t like at all - who cares if they hear the tree falling.

All three seem to be locked into the phenomenologial perspective of Husserl, (he was a ((())), don’t know if that matters much, but…) in a failure of the phenomenological perspective, its first person experience and concreteness indeed - reification of the individual’s anxiety in confrontation of death, that finitude as the sole source of meaning, of being, dasein (whatever is supposed to make us distinctly human); as opposed to its source being, I might propose, in interaction in the ongoing social classification and its hermeneutic…

Now Harrison begins to invoke attention to Heidegger’s somewhat modest attention to responsibility to our people, history and future..

..while Sheehan is appalling in his putting aside of this concern. It goes to show just how superficial, not deep at all, a philosophy based on the idea that anxiety about one’s own individual death is the source of being. I can see superficiality and lack of empathy ranging through all manner of sociopaths in this philosophy, from cleptocrats, to those who destroy our environment, to those who destroy our genome, the assertions of many a self righteous mudshark in this philosophy; and, at the same time, a pandering to self righteous assertions on the part of this philosophy.

Nevertheless, he has something very right where he says that “hermeneutics is not a mere add-on” .... indeed it is our first obligation as beings, to begin, at least, to make sense. As he says…

  ...when things are discovered along with human being, that is to say when they’ve been understood, we say they have meaning.

So, really what he’s saying is that the human being is a hermeneut - that’s not an add-on to some sort of plain old existence. Our existence is the obligation, the need the thrownness into making sense of things ...in fact, the first meaning of the word of Alethea is meaning, its not truth, as Heidegger points out; so if we’re embedded in hermeneutics and he is using the word [German word], I think that we can actually retrieve from this plain old word being, we can retrieve the urgency that Heidegger feels are in your face - he says at on point in his first course after the war, the Great War, in February of 1919, he asks his students, what is it that you first encounter in your lived world? Is it things, is it objects, is it being? No, he says, its meaningful, that’s what’s in your face…all over the place, it’s coming at you. So, we don’t want to lose him to traditional ontology which just talks about the inner substance of things - no, we want to have him on this side of phenomenology as he himself insisted ...and one way of constantly recognizing that is being in your face.

I don’t care to exaggerate meaning if Sheehan is exaggerating Heidegger’s meaning (he claims that when he talked to Heidegger that Heidegger assured him that was correct- he was a “phenomenologist to the end.” ... but I am definitely prepared to believe that a hermeneutic feature is one among other features that is integral to our human being, and that it feeds rather, not only, or even primarily off-of our ownmost death, but through interaction and the history of our peoples; more, its authenticity is confronted, I agree, immediately in the practical world - it is in our face - what is in our face is anti racism and that is what we need to make sense of:

Anti-racism is Cartesian, it is predjudice, it is not innocent, it is hurting and it is killing people.

I have begun to discuss how pragmatic participation of the ethnonationalist community and hermeneutics lived in their interests can begin to solve our problems…

Hermeneutics has wonderful possibilities to manage rigor and imagination, in ready connection to emergence and in confrontation with fallenness and facticity, to make sense of it, on the one hand; and on the other hand to liberate one from mere facticity, to neither get stuck in the absent mindedness of the arbitrary or to be stuck in reification, such as in the anxiety of our individual death; but to connect with the significance of our history and the systemic human ecology of our people; its dramatic journeys, ensconced in the general sense of security of our emergence already accomplished and its increasing bliss.



Comments:


1

Posted by Pragmatics of Coherence and Truth on Wed, 12 Jul 2017 00:02 | #

Hasok Chang gives a lecture on Coherence and Truth. This is his second talk in a series titled Pragmatist Realism: Philosophy, History and Science at The University of Tartu.


2

Posted by Ordinary Languge Philosophy on Wed, 12 Jul 2017 02:42 | #

Ordinary Language Philosophy

Posted on Youtube 11 June 2017:

Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss Ordinary Language Philosophy, a school of thought which emerged in Oxford in the years following World War II. With its roots in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ordinary Language Philosophy is concerned with the meanings of words as used in everyday speech. Its adherents believed that many philosophical problems were created by the misuse of words, and that if such ‘ordinary language’ were correctly analysed, such problems would disappear. Philosophers associated with the school include some of the most distinguished British thinkers of the twentieth century, such as Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin.

The guests are Stephen Mulhall (Professor of Philosophy at New College, Oxford), Ray Monk (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southampton), and Julia Tanney (Reader in Philosophy of Mind at the University of Kent). The producer was Thomas Morris.

This is an episode of BBC Radio 4’s program In Our Time: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006qykl


3

Posted by Epicureanism on Wed, 12 Jul 2017 07:16 | #

Epicureanism

20 Jan 2017

Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss Epicureanism in this BBC episode of In Our Time. Epicureanism is the system of philosophy based on the teachings of Epicurus and founded in Athens in the fourth century BC. Epicurus outlined a comprehensive philosophical system based on the idea that everything in the Universe is constructed from two phenomena: atoms and void. At the centre of his philosophy is the idea that the goal of human life is pleasure, by which he meant not luxury but the avoidance of pain. His followers cast off fear of death, and were suspicious of religious superstition, marriage and politics, but placed great emphasis on friendship. Epicureanism became influential in the Roman world, particularly through Lucretius’s great poem De Rerum Natura, which was rediscovered and widely admired in the Renaissance.

The guests include Angie Hobbs, David Sedley and James Warren.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01qf083


4

Posted by Parmenides on Wed, 12 Jul 2017 11:01 | #

Parmenides

“All that really exists, is being


                 


5

Posted by Heraclitus on Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:24 | #

  Heraclitus

 


6

Posted by Guessedworker on Wed, 12 Jul 2017 20:55 | #

Is it not an arbitrary and inappropriate decision by Jaegwin Kim to select the Mind-Body Problem as a test model for emergentism?  It’s not remotely relevant.  There’s no intellectual justification that I can see beyond ignorance or laziness why the mind should be understood in the amorphous Cartesian sense, rather than as a pluralised action of certain regions of the brain.  Further, the will – such as it is (again, not Cartesian) - is likewise not at all an obstacle to the emergent explanation, as I hope I have already demonstrated via my multi-speed, tripartite model and my model of the transitory nature of consciousness.  In the matter of human decision we really cannot rely on Descartes to assess, say, Darwin.

To be clear ...

Evolutionarily speaking, the cognitive action of the brain (ie, Mind) is not somehow standing alongside the organism causally, available for Cartesian comparison.  It is itself an emergent property, catalysed not from the organism as such but its relation to the world without, which is one of unknown and imminent but deadly threat as well as of life-sustaining opportunities.  The resultant evolutionary process has a specific energy and direction of travel determined by the survivalist event of catalysis, which itself already implies component relation - actually a functional relation.  So all this should be pretty obvious.  Function really does follow form, as the dreaded architect of postmoderism liked to put it.  But it also determines it!

If I missing something here I don’t know what it is.


7

Posted by DanielS on Wed, 12 Jul 2017 22:18 | #

Posted by Guessedworker on Thu, 13 Jul 2017 02:55 | #

Is it not an arbitrary and inappropriate decision by Jaegwin Kim to select the Mind-Body Problem as a test model for emergentism? It’s not remotely relevant.

My understanding is that one of the central concerns of emergentism is the rejection of this distinction - inasmuch as that is true, it’s a good thing from both of our perspectives - and how those grappling with emergentism deal with it would be relevant indeed; even where their efforts are mistaken.

Saying it is not remotely relevant reminds me of Bowery trying to say that John Locke’s notion of civil rights and the American Constitution are not relevant to the matter of dealing with race.

There’s no intellectual justification that I can see beyond ignorance or laziness why the mind should be understood in the amorphous Cartesian sense, rather than as a pluralised action of certain regions of the brain.

Perhaps “THE” mind is not understood in an amorphous, Cartesian sense with that focus provisionally. But actually, Cartesianism can apply on the empirical side as well.

Nobody should say that you should not propose these close readings; though it is valid to say that they may not be looked upon as the only location of “mind”, nor most helpful in locating “mindfulness” and its vital use.

If you want to examine brain function then you’d probably be on steadier ground if you talked in terms of brain function and neural activity as opposed to “THE” mind.

Further, the will – such as it is (again, not Cartesian) - is likewise not at all an obstacle to the emergent explanation, as I hope I have already demonstrated via my multi-speed, tripartite model and my model of the transitory nature of consciousness.  In the matter of human decision we really cannot rely on Descartes to assess, say, Darwin.

To be clear ...

We can look at Descartes to assess where errors he made might be introduced and misapplied in Darwinian analysis - not only to humans, but of course centrally in our concern.

Evolutionarily speaking, the cognitive action of the brain (ie, Mind)

The brain is the “mind” ?

Evolutionarily speaking, the cognitive action of the brain (ie, Mind) is not somehow standing alongside the organism causally, available for Cartesian comparison.

With a historical, sequential perspective on what is called “mind” one can compare Cartesian models to newer efforts to map “the mind.”.

It is itself an emergent property, catalysed not from the organism as such but its relation to the world without, which is one of unknown and imminent but deadly threat as well as of life-sustaining opportunities.

It’s good that you are taking it into interaction and relationship.

The resultant evolutionary process has a specific energy and direction of travel determined by the survivalist event of catalysis, which itself already implies component relation - actually a functional relation.

Well ok, we can agree that in our basic, animal nature (which is) that there is a specific energy largely in the direction of survival… but then, when it comes to human being, we might ask whether it is in aversion to pain and misery? Injustice? A violation of our ancestors? “Nature rarely works within lethal variables.”  - it’s a great critique of Heidegger. For humans, some anyway, there can be fates worse than death.

So all this should be pretty obvious.

It may seem obvious to you. But be implored to remain faithful to a first principle of emergentism - which is anti-reductionism.

Function really does follow form, as the dreaded architect of postmoderism liked to put it.  But it also determines it!

I hope that you are going after post modern architecture, and that this is not another attempt to try to deny that the positive aspects of modernity are embraced; nor to diminish the negative significance of modernity and the need to move beyond it in a coherent, knowing way with post modernity proper.

If I missing something here I don’t know what it is.

You are missing a great deal where you might not move beyond efforts to try to show-up the academics, not let them have anything, criticizing and denying only (applying skepticism) and do not encourage, partake and cultivate what is of clear, important utility.

I put the Jaegwin Kim quote basically for your sake, to connect with concerns of emergentism, it is hardly a major point to the post.

I was reluctant to put that there, as I was to even talk about Heidegger. Lets move to a focus on what we can deploy in our interests rather than singularly in resentment toward them (academics and academically devised tools), their abuse and misapplications.


8

Posted by DanielS on Thu, 13 Jul 2017 03:46 | #

Adding to post:

And again there is academia’s (particularly Gadamer’s/Derrida’s ) crucially abused (as Cartesian) notion of “marginality”  - where in “marginality” is taken to be those who are from without the classification and/or antagonistic to it, as opposed what would be the ethno-nationalist concept of marginality - i.e., those remaining just within the classification despite pressure, but well disposed to its reconstruction; and having the additional existential benefit of “knowing where the shoe pinches.”

“Those who are marginalized” in this sense, does not necessarily mean those who are falling behind, but can also mean those who are outstanding, though they would be ostracized as they are not understood and appreciated as being out in front; and well intending.

We would be bringing to bear correctiveness from the “rich and diverse perspectives of our ethnonational community.”

As such, marginals would contribute to a homeostatic function of the ethnonational system, against incursions and crass exclusion of sufficient basic function and of outlier advance.


...


Adding the (important bit about Augustinian/Manichean Devils):

This Abrahamic attack is well cast in terms of Manichean as opposed to Augustinian devils. Judaism and Islamics were coming from a place in evolution to compete more against other tribes for resource - thus, how to trick them (Manichaen devils) became a central skill.

Whereas for Northern Europeans in particular, but all Europeans, the issue of survival was more a competition against nature - thus a skill set more evolved to handle Augustinian, viz. natural devils, where human agency to avoid solution is not so central a concern.

By all evidence, Christianity is a Jewish trick, prescribing universalism and self destructive altruism to us, taking advantage of our evolved European nature in predilection to attend to Augustinian devils - as I have said, our predilection to attend to Augustinian devils is not necessarily bad, as we will ultimately be up against Augustinian devils to solve; however, we must not be naive simply because we’d rather not be bothered with the pettiness, the trivial mindednesss of Manicheans.

Anti-racism is Cartesian, it is prejudice, it is not innocent, it is hurting and it is killing people.


9

Posted by Guessedworker on Thu, 13 Jul 2017 17:30 | #

Emergentism, as an attempt to explain the life-process, has mushroomed into a substantial and varied discipline in its own right, with people devoting their entire intellectual life to particular interpretations of it.  I am not at all sure that it can all be falsified by saying it has to resolve Descartes’ dualism while, of course, using his own model.  That is very obviously a rigged test which misses the elephant in the corner of the emergentist room, which is really order.  Actually, I am amazed that this Korean guy can get away with formulating “the problem” in Cartesian terms and then telling the world that emergentism can’t solve it.  It’s reminiscent of the Intelligent Design advocates’ dismissal of evolutionary theory, whereby the answer they are going to arrive at is already there in the terms in which they propose the question, but only because the question skips over falsifiability.

In short, the flaw with the Mind-Body Problem is that its dualistic model is not actually a model of anything, and certainly not of the human mind.  It is just a presumption for a dichotomy which declares - surprise surprise - for dichotomy.

As regards what Mind actually is, well, it is the functioning of the human brain in its cognitive aspect (the brain also has a regulatory aspect as well as a reproductive aspect).  It can be modelled basically but quite straightforwardly just using its functional machinery.  The neurological detail is not required.  It is only necessary that the emerging model does not offend against that at any point, or it, too, ceases to have verity.  The model is, therefore, not neurological itself, nor is it psychological.  It is interpretative of the human experience and propositional and, therefore, essentially philosophical in character and in application to various philosophical issues, of which the human will is probably the one on which it most directly bears.

More generally, emergentism proves its relevance not because it resolves a false dichotomy but because it establishes the historical form of the life-process in all its manifestations, which necessarily include processes of change.  It acknowledges functional order, energy and direction where Descartes saw only stasis and division.  His dichotomy dissolves, and we are left with a new general rule.  The great questions for nationalists, as would-be change-agents, remain as they always were.  But now it becomes possible to trust in the inherent direction of process, if it is not made subject to shocks and diversions from without of the kind we have come to expect only too well.


10

Posted by DanielS on Sat, 15 Jul 2017 09:01 | #

Posted by Guessedworker on Thu, 13 Jul 2017 17:30 | #
Emergentism, as an attempt to explain the life-process,

If one is attempting to deal empathetically with emergentism, then the use of the article “the” here is problematic from the onset as one of emergentism’s central concerns is anti-reductionism.

has mushroomed into a substantial and varied discipline in its own right, with people devoting their entire intellectual life to particular interpretations of it.

Yeah.

I am not at all sure that it can all be falsified by saying it has to resolve Descartes’ dualism while, of course, using his own model.

Well, maybe Jaegwon Kim’s was trying to falsify all of emergentism by placing it within Descartes model, but obviously that’s not what I’m after.

That is very obviously a rigged test which misses the elephant in the corner of the room, which is really order.

Maybe Jaegwon Kim was trying to “rig the test”, but I was trying to present common grounds of concern for anti-Cartesianism and anti-reductionism as well as common concern for emergentism itself.

Speaking of traps, I was reluctant to go into tangential examples of emergentism and Heidegger, anticipating that despite my basic concern to connect to common ground, that given your autobiography in reacton to social academic concerns that you would rather take it as grounds to compete through particulars of those langauge games, and as such divert from the significance of the post.

Speaking of traps, I’m sorry that I fell into one by putting that example there, as you liable to take it as pseudo occasion to try to trivialize the post and the central matter of Cartesianism and divert rather into a discussion of your mind stuff.

Actually, I am amazed that this Korean guy can get away with formulating “the problem” in Cartesian terms and then telling the world that emergentism can’t solve it.  It’s reminiscent of the Intelligent Design advocates’ dismissal of evolutionary theory, whereby the answer they are going to arrive at is already there in the terms in which they propose the question, but only because the question skips over falsifiability.

Well, maybe human life can be reduced to falsifiable propositions.

In short, the flaw with the Mind-Body Problem is that its dualistic model is not actually a model of anything, and certainly not of the human mind.  It is just a presumption for a dichotomy which declares - surprise surprise - for dichotomy.

“In short the”

You are oversimplifying the issue with Cartesianism by means of this example, I suspect because you want to minimize the post and its signficance as it threatens your mind project - a project stemming from your reacton and the opposite day game that you intransigently play as a restult, against (what you’ve known of) socially concerned academic input.

As regards what Mind actually is, well, it is the functioning of the human brain in its cognitive aspect (the brain also has a regulatory aspect as well as a reproductive aspect).

Well, that’s how you are defining “mind.”

It can be modelled basically but quite straightforwardly just using its functional machinery.

Really?

The neurological detail is not required.  It is only necessary that the emerging model does not offend against that at any point, or it, too, ceases to have verity.  The model is, therefore, not neurological itself, nor is it psychological.  It is interpretative of the human experience and propositional and, therefore, essentially philosophical in character and in application to various philosophical issues, of which the human will is probably the one on which it most directly bears.

Well, at least we are moving away from a preoccupation with psychology and into human experience and its philosophical, existential circumstance instead.

More generally, emergentism proves its relevance not because it resolves a false dichotomy but because it establishes the historical form of the life-process in all its manifestations, which necessarily include processes of change.  It acknowledges functional order, energy and direction where Descartes saw only stasis and division. His dichotomy dissolves, and we are left with a new general rule. The great questions for nationalists, as would-be change-agents, remain as they always were.  But now it becomes possible to trust in the inherent direction of process, if it is not made subject to shocks and diversions from without of the kind we have come to expect only too well.

Though we might do well to tell a story of perfection as such to gird our direction against the vicissitudes of fortune and outward antagonism…

We cannot presume that it is an eternally emergent direction to maintain the form of the nation; and that it will not be subject to shocks as a part of its inherent course; for example, shocks that may be caused by base female inclination to incite genetic competition, especially if you are talking on such a “naturalistic” level; nevertheless, with respect as mature ethnonational agents, emergentism can be kept on ethnonational course with sound biological and historical basis, through means of accountability and correctability to our interests as such.

 


11

Posted by DanielS on Sun, 16 Jul 2017 11:08 | #

With anti-Cartesianism, we’re precluding the “that’s just the way it is” according to nature argument ... a void of accountability that the YJKW and Right Wing contingent can mess with to no end—- a nature argument so fundamental to liberalism and so destructive to us.


12

Posted by DanielS on Mon, 17 Jul 2017 03:12 | #

Actually, a better ant-Cartesian, anti-anti racist mantra would read:

“Anti-racism is anti-broad classification of peoples for the purpose of discriminatory accountability. This prohibition of discriminatory classification is Cartesian, it is prejudice, it is not innocent, it is hurting and it is killing people.”

That’s a safer mantra because anti-anti-racism is less likely to be misunderstood as such, in a supremacist or other needlessly aggressive, exploitative, destructive senses.


13

Posted by DanielS on Fri, 21 Jul 2017 02:12 | #

This paragraph wasn’t written as well as it should have been before. It is significantly improved now, as such:

In fact, participation in our fallibilistic correction can include contributions as deep, abiding and scientific as any - i.e., you can, in theory, question anything, even the most verified scientific law; though sane people, in vast percentage may consider you insane, dishonest, at best engaged in some speculative inquiry that will require you to compile verifiable information for you to bring to bear once you’ve completed your rather impractical inquiry; but the skeptic is not owed a privileged position of non-accountability for the initiation of inquiry over that which the community holds fast, that which shows no practical need to change for the rather impractical inquiry; this holds true for many requirements of ethnonationalism -

3) The great contribution of the pragmatists is to show that fallibilism and anti-skepticism are compatible:



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Heraclitus commented in entry 'Pragmatism as ethnonationalism's tool against radical skepticism' on Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:24. (View)

Parmenides commented in entry 'Pragmatism as ethnonationalism's tool against radical skepticism' on Wed, 12 Jul 2017 11:01. (View)

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