To the surprise of no one, Marine Le Pen has failed for the second time to make even a close-run thing of the second round of a French presidential election.  She won 41.4% of votes to her opponent’s 58.6%, on a turnout of 72% (against 74.6% in 2017).  The popular vote was 13,297,760 to 18,779,641.  The result does represent a long step forward from 2017, when Le Pen won only a third of the second-round ballot. 

On that calculation she cut the deficit very nearly in half (the easier half to persuade, of course).  The reality is a little worse than that.  Billed as an election for those one least dislikes, we now have definite proof that, allowing for a share of those who voted in 2017 but not this time, no more than four in ten French voters can be persuaded to support Le Pen.  Only 13% of non-nationalists (“nationalist” in this context meaning those who had voted a fortnight ago for Le Pen + Zemmour) felt able to switch to her.  And this after all the enormous efforts she has made to explain herself as something other than the Establishment media’s hate-object.  Even as the EU-neutral, Islam-accepting cat-lady of French politics she could not threaten a totally unloved sitting president.  It is another reminder for nationalists, were any reminder needed, how very difficult it is to break through in any systemically liberal polity.

One should also note that Le Pen did not always help herself during her campaign.  In the presidential debate last week she took the bad decision to focus on policy detail, which is Macron’s managerialist strength, not hers, and let him off the hook of his own unpopularity.  Obviously, she wanted to project competence.  But she projected his competence.  She also confused the voters by suddenly declaring that the lovable and by no means toxic cat-lady would ban the Muslim veil in public.  It didn’t need saying.  Mixed-messaging is never a good thing.  Then, too, she had bad luck in her timing with the war in Ukraine and her past approval of Vladimir Putin (basically tended for consenting to provide RN with banking facilities when no French bank would do so).  Finally, there was the very odd timing from Brussels of the launch of an investigation into fraud dating back before the last presidential election.  I don’t know how damaging that really was.  As an attempt to manipulate the election it could hardly have been more blatant.  Perhaps Brussels was more damaged by it than Le Pen.  Perhaps she actually gained votes just on the basis of the general disgust.  But all that said, these issues are petty and narrowly political.  It is difficult to believe that any of them could have made the difference for Macron.  His advantage was always secure.

Rather, the constant electoral problem for nationalism is that its grand cause is national and existential but the concerns of the majority of voters are stubbornly personal and economic; and here Le Pen really tried to break the mould.  She alighted on the rapidly rising cost of living at the beginning of her campaign, and pushed it throughout.  Many commentators praised her political shrewdness, acknowledging that any treasure trove of votes was going to be found on the left.  They obviously expected to see a pay-off for her at the polling station.  She obviously expected to see it.  But nothing very much was forthcoming.  One wonders whether something more than a me-too expression of solidarité with the policy-goals of the left and some communitarian empathie with those left behind by Macron is required.  In the absence of a complete economic vision will such offerings always be seen as opportunistic?  In the end, do voters look to nationalism for a bit of tax relief?

All this raises the vexing question of where French nationalism goes from here.  There will very likely need to be a self-critical assessment of the performance of Rassemblement National in the legislative elections scheduled for 12th and 19th June.  OK, Zemmour’s alternative Reconquête!, even with Marion Maréchal on board, may be unlikely to achieve much of an impact itself seat-wise.  But it could make the always problematic task of election difficult for RN candidates, and not just this June.  How can nationalism cut through if it is outflanked on the issue of Islam on the right by an essentially conservative party and out-flanked on economic issues on the left by an essentially Corbynist party?
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Personally, I suspect that, after his creditable performance in the first round of the presidential election, the old-left ideological warrior Jean-Luc Mélenchon and his party La France Insoumise (“France Unbowed”) will harvest much of the anti-Macron sentiment in June.  There is a strong possibility that the French, having elected the little man because they thought they had to, will delight in denying him the capacity to form a government in the legislature.  La France Insoumise is not a formal party, and is a classic vessel for temporary political protest.  It is a broad church of the narrow left consisting of supporters’ groups and small committees campaigning for “ecosocialism”.  One assumes that this oddity is for unhinged CO2 obsessives whose interest in the environment very oddly and abruptly curtails itself when the subject of population growth due to immigration pops up.  The égalité of Africans and Arabs is obviously much too pressing to allow ideological consistency to get in the way.

Accordingly, Mélenchon greeted Le Pen’s defeat (rather than Macron’s victory) with the words, “It’s very good news for the unity of our people,” which, naturally, demonstrates the customary pig-headed refusal to acknowledge who the French are and who they are not.  Over 7 million people - a fifth of the total vote - actually put a cross against Mélenchon’s name in the first round of the presidentials.  La France Incurable might have been more accurate.

As for Le Pen, she seems set on fighting on.  But what can she do that she has not already done to untie the gossamer bindings of her supposed toxicity?  Five years ago she was able to respond to other presidential candidate’s tough election-talk on immigration by saying, “Why vote for a fake when you can vote for the real thing.”  Now she has come to the point where her opponents can invert that and say the same of her centrism.  Of course, it’s true that ordinarily the centre is the ground an election winner must occupy.  It is where the most votes are.  It is where the most floating votes are. In addition, in France the traditional parties of power - the Gaullists and the Socialists - are dying.  The latter is effectively dead already.  The centre is eminently contestable.  But the gods of political change do not seem to be with Le Pen.  She sacrificed her authenticity to be their beneficiary.  It is difficult to see any real identity now, or much creative energy, in RN.  Perhaps Le Pen and her party have simply been around too long.  Perhaps RN will now fall victim to the same malaise as the Gaullists and the Socialists, and Marion will inherit the tricolour of Delacroix’ revolutionary Marianne.

Yesterday the UN General Council voted by the required two-thirds majority to exclude the Russian Federation from the UN Human Rights Council.  This morning the Kremlin’s reply landed at a train station in the Donbas - not one missile but two, and not a single-warhead but cluster munitions.  Initial reports say thirty people were killed on the spot, and a further hundred injured.  It is totally apparent from the personal items and clothing strewn about the place that this was not a military target.  The local mayor has stated that there were some 4,000 civilians at the station at the time.  The strikes were a perfectly clear statement to the effect that the Kremlin doesn’t give a damn about the safety and human rights of the people of the Donbas, never gave a damn about the safety and human rights of the people of the Donbas, and will break any and every moral boundary it pleases.  Even to make a bitchy political point.

One awaits the first Western nationalist to explain that if only the UN General Council hadn’t been so aggressive in pushing Putin to the limits, those refugees might still be alive.

Well, three days ago the Spectator carried a piece on the massacre in Bucha.  It referred to a remarkable article which had appeared in the state-owned, Russian-language news service RIA Novosti.  The Spectator article was written by one-time resident in Putin’s fiefdom Christopher Booth.  It set out the future of endless de-Nazification for Ukrainians in the Donbas and the south who cannot free themselves from Russian occupation and control.  Of the Novosti article it says:

It speaks in detail of how Russia might achieve the ‘denazification’ of Ukraine – the first stated aim of the invasion.

The piece comes just as the Kremlin would have us believe that the goals of the so-called ‘special military operation’ have been recalibrated, and perhaps all will end in some sort of queasy compromise in the east of the country. In case you have fallen for this idea, here’s a quote from the RIA Novosti article in question:

“Apart from the Ukrainian leadership, a substantial part of the population is also guilty of being passively Nazi, and facilitators of Nazism. They supported the Nazi regime and urged it forward… The further denazification of the population will require re-training through ideological repression and fierce censorship, not only in the political sphere but also in the sphere of culture and education.”

The author goes on to say: ‘History teaches us that Ukraine cannot exist as a nation state’. Note – this was written less than a week ago. He recommends further that Ukrainian school textbooks be confiscated; that the population should be compelled to denounce one another for the greater good; that memorials to Russian soldiers should be erected to commemorate the war against Ukrainian fascism; and that ‘anti-Nazi’ commissions should be established in what remains of the country for at least 25 years.

So, a Russian propagandist writing in a state-owned Russian publication, giving advice that cannot be at odds with Kremlin thinking, is seeking a “de-Nazification” that is not at all restricted to the Azov Battalions but is code for a population-wide cleansing of “guilt”.  This is precisely how the horrors of the Soviet Union proceeded.  It explains what a survivor of Bucha told the Western media, namely, that the Russian soldiers were demanding where “the Nazis” were and, in some cases, stripping villagers in search of incriminating tattoos.  Some of this behaviour has been ascribed to Chechens.  But it is also ordinary Russian soldiers ordinarily brutalising and murdering people of their own accord, because such behaviour is, if not ordered, more or less given licence from above.  Russian military operations have been that way in Chechnya and in Syria.

So we come to the matter of support among Western nationalists for Putin and the Russian military.  For years now I’ve been referring to the borderline personality types who populate our world.  These are people who are unable to “fit in” with the general Mind.  But they are perfectly able to withstand all the hatreds that are visited upon nationalism, rather like bacteria in hospitals that survive the action of chemical cleaners.  Our politics, therefore, is a natural home for these people.  On the Spectator thread there was an explanatory comment by someone named Venk (evidently not a nationalist himself) which I found relevant:

It puzzled me too until I realized that their hatred for western elites has twisted their worldview. They loathe our leadership class and they admire Putin because he’s a strong-man alternative to woke green-obsessed liberal western elites. Unfortunately, they lack common sense and moderation, so they adopt a “see no evil” approach.

If the western media says it; it must be a lie. If Putin’s propagandists say it; it must be true. If Putin’s forces do something obviously evil, it must be a western lie or a justified action given the circumstances. It’s a bit like the trait psychologists call splitting in people with Borderline Personality Disorder.

They remind me a little of the Cambridge Five, upper class communists who hated our system so much they sided with the enemy. They managed to convince themselves that the USSR was the solution to Western shortcomings, and they either ignored evidence to the contrary or explained it away as a necessary evil on the path to the greater good.

I don’t think it’s a phenomenon that can be attributed to the left or the right, but to certain personality types who can’t process complex realities or balance the good and bad in any scenario.

One would hope that the missile strikes on Kramatorsk train station might cause some of these folk to think again.  But for many, I think, the itch to attack “the West” and “the Jews” will be just too powerful, and they will go on, like the Russian propagandist who apparently wants the gulags back for the next twenty-five years, giving voice to the same certainties in fulfilment of the same emotional needs.

Our friend in the north responds to an article at the Guardian titled, Europe has rediscovered compassion for refugees - but only if they’re white.  It is written by a typical Global Boy.

Morgoth tells me that someone who viewed the video wiseacred to the effect that Salter’s thesis is falsified by the truth that people prefer a dog in their home to an African.  If proof were needed that Salterism itself has already dropped out of common use among nationalists, there it is.  Or maybe that person’s relationship to his pooch is just a bit different!

The purpose of this series of essays is to explore the function and effect of a politics of ethnicity, should it prove possible to bring one to the public life of this land.  Properly speaking, within the layout that is in creation at this site, such exploration has to follow on from the work on The Structure Project, ie, on ethnic nationalism’s principles, parts, and processes, and its episteme.  But that, too, is a new venture not much added to at this point.  So it is cheating a bit to categorise work today under the “The Politics Project”.  But we’re going to do it because, well, I want to!  All of the work on this project will be reflective and propositional in kind, and will concern itself principally with the metapolitics of our lived life.  It will not, therefore, venture on to the ground of political argument or activism as such.

1. STOLEN FIRE, TECHNOLOGICAL APOCALYPSE

“Sometimes his genius goes dark and sinks down into the bitter well of his heart. But mostly his apocalyptic star glitters wondrously” ― Friedrich Hölderlin, 1770-1843, the early-Romantic era German poet whose influence upon Heidegger was so strong. 

Some weeks ago Fróði Midjord and Morgoth livestreamed a wide-ranging discussion on many of the issues which presently concern nationalists.  There was much germane and thoughtful comment, as one would expect.  But one sentiment peaked my interest.  It concerned a sentence offered by Martin Heidegger to Der Spiegel on the occasion in 1966 of the last interview he ever gave.  Publishing the interview was held over at his request until after his death in 1976.  That sentence - “Only a god can still save us” - has, unsurprisingly, assumed the status of a final testimony.  Its resignation to the darkness, along with the temptation to the religious to take it as literally as possible, hacks away at the will, as does all defeatism, and runs in the face of the very spirit of creativity which has, in no small part, led us to our present pass.  I want to challenge that resignation, which I will do in the next instalment.  In this one, though, I will just set out my understanding of “the problem”.

At the outset, and for the clarification of any religious literalists who may read this, neither Fróði nor Morgoth (who, by the way, both agreed with Heidegger’s sentiment) are prone to such literalism.  Obviously, it is not the death of the gods which thinking nationalists abhor but the spiral of disconnection, nihilism and degradation which has come after.  A whole (it would seem) indispensable and vivifying life of the spirit, a whole world of connecting traditions and order, a way of thinking about self and kin, has been swept away, condemning us, so it is said, to a death spiral of our own.  Observations to that effect arrived in our culture within sixty years of the start of the Industrial Revolution, and seventy years before Nietzsche’s Zarathustra spoke on the matter.  For example, Mary Shelley’s 1818 gothic novel Frankenstein is subtitled The Modern Prometheus.

By 1966 the Western half of Heidegger’s Germany was in the full flowering of its Wirtschaftswunder, the post-war economic miracle.  Not only National Socialism’s deeds and dreams but the romantic soul of 18th and 19th century Germany had long since been bombed and burned and carried away in wheelbarrows to the outskirts by the women of the rubble.  What modernity threw up in its place was a Germany of growing civic pride in featureless economic utilitarianism.  In its reflexive, driven focus on a redemption by work and consumption it was as sickly and distancing from the essential as was the worst night-life of Weimar Berlin.  Something American and Jewish had eaten away at the things of the patriotic heart, and substituted the paper-thin public value of loyalty to the corporation.  Perhaps that is what happens in modernity to a people for whom the past is cut off, and may not be visited except with shame, even a patently manufactured shame.  Some miracle, anyway.

This, then, was Heidegger’s Germany at the time of his final pronouncement on the modern and, too, on his grand historiographical revolution, launched with such adventure four decades earlier.  One could be forgiven for thinking that it shows.  The full quote from which those famous words are taken actually reads:

Philosophy will not be able to bring about a direct change of the present state of the world. This is true not only of philosophy but of all merely human meditations and endeavours. Only a god can still save us. I think the only possibility of salvation left to us is to prepare readiness, through thinking and poetry, for the appearance of the god or for the absence of the god during the decline; so that we do not, simply put, die meaningless deaths, but that when we decline, we decline in the face of the absent god.

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The following exchange from a couple of days ago, on the thread to this unrelated PA article, is part of my effort to gesture in the direction of a renewal of our movement.  That effort began in earnest with the cross-posting of my “British Nationalism” piece, though I’ve been responding to “traditional nationalist” commentaries at PA for several months.  One of those with whom contest has occurred is B Hall, who writes at PA from a distributist and trad posture.  His sarcastic comment to an earlier remark from old-hand Michael Woodbridge (who was himself referring to the OP, not to me) set the conversation in motion.

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Apart from the hair.  And about a week.  And the use of military firepower.

Puteau, or possibly Trudin

Example 1

a) Autocrat commences upon a population control project on the pretext of public health measures.

b) Autocrat portrays protesters in dehumanising and deceitful terms.

c) Autocrat gives himself war powers.

d) Autocrat employs paramilitaries to crush protest, employs legal and financial terrorism against dissenters.

Example 2

a) Autocrat commences upon an empire building project on the pretext of supporting separatist fighters in neighbouring independent nation.

b) Autocrat portrays neighbouring nation as never really being separate from his own nation.

c) Autocrat obtains formal consent from the Federation Council for his military deployment.

d) Autocrat launches his military against neighbouring independent nation.

Western elites response to first autocrat: Delicate silence based on the fact that they, too, are trying to transition to a population control model.

Western elites response to second autocrat: Constantly ramping-up economic sanctions against Russia, supplying “defensive” weapons to Ukraine.

This latter is geopolitics, of course, and not merely a moral issue; so we mere members of the public don’t get to see much of the real picture until the historians get to work perhaps a decade or more later.  One would assume that the principal objective of the Western elites is to avoid entangelement in Ukraine while discouraging further Russian expansionism.  One would hope that there are no voices arguing in the private councils of power for conflict as a fast route to the Re-Set; though I wouldn’t rule out the possibility.

If that world is veiled to us, we can at least see what our fellow British nationalists are thinking.  Until now they have tended to support Putin because they think he is a defender of the Russian people against corrupt Western neoliberal and neo-Marxist values.  They tend to see Ukraine, on the other hand, as a nation created by a Jewish neocon revolution, now led by a Jew, and exploited by the West and by NATO as a vehicle for anti-Russian expansion (though Jewish support for Pravi Sektor, based on a shared hatred of Russia, throws them a bit).  Nationalists here probably won’t quibble too much if the Russian Army goes beyond the two areas in which separatists are fighting, say to the Dneiper or down the coast to establish a land route to the Russian-held Crimean Peninsula.  However, everything should change if the Russians push on to occupy the entirety of Ukraine, which seems inevitable.  Likewise, a future threat against Lithuania should cause nationalists to totally re-assess their thinking about the autocrat Putin.

Ultimately, human freedom and the democratic model (or some form of it, anyway) are not contrary to any of the nationalisms beyond the fascisms.  The more of both the better.  It is their scarcity, together with the absence of a genuinely independent and honest press, which constrains the political efforts of not just the nationalists but all the minor parties in the West.  We should be in no doubt which side to support in Ukraine.

And the autocrat Trudeau?  Well, his actions have revealed that the left all across the West isn’t remotely interested in the cause of the freedom and independence of the working man.  It is interested in its own pathological hatred for him because he’s just too white, and for that clarity we can thank the little Canadian autocrat.  Likewise, in one brief, ruthless act he has probably done more than anyone since Henry Morgenthau Jr. in 1944 to demonstrate the morality and ambitions of Power in the supposedly democratic West.  One would desire that he pays a steepling high political cost for it, and the woman Freeland with him.  But then the stress test on his minority government was passed with some ease, so he will probably continue serenely and untroubled in his labours on behalf of the folk in Davos.

This essay, which is long, is the second part of what will, in any case, be a fairly lengthy series wrapping up the Ontology Project and facing towards the problem off structure.  This essay is, then, a technical and preparatory exercise for what is to come, clearing the ground on which pure ontology and the basics, at least, of human difference may cohere in, and contribute to, a single, life-affording causal structure for Dasein.

FIVE CASES CONTRA HEIDEGGER

Why has Martin Heidegger’s 1927 opus Being and Time, arguably the most important book of philosophy of the 20th century, never fed into even an embryonic nationalist project to sideline the Nietzschean fiction and challenge the systemic dominance of liberalism?  Setting aside the endless, besmirching academic arguments about his years as a NSDAP member, and his brief and fraught rectorship at Freiburg, the answer most immediately to hand is that its quest is for the meaning of human being, not its nature.  Both are ontological quests, for sure.  But the former, addressed phenomenologically and without strongly-drawn lines, has proved a gift for thinkers concerned primarily with Being’s relation to World as the social environment, which all-too-easily shifts into the politicised study of the structure of society, language and semiotics, power and inequality.  These academics of inauthenticity would be horrified to find emerging from Heidegger’s thought a model of Man as a relational and agentive being, expressing what is most essential to him, commanding a politics of his shared natural interests.  But, of course, we would be highly delighted.

But to arrive even theoretically at such a definitively real Man on the basis of an account of Being is a really demanding intellectual undertaking.  Many would say impossible just on the basis that Being and the lived-life are categorically exclusive.  Heidegger’s forest of subtle and recondite formulations, which are oft-times run into one another with a cavalier freedom, do not advance the likelihood of success one whit, notwithstanding the fact that he was a Swabian identitarian and German nationalist himself.

In this long-delayed second part to this series (for any undue abstraction in which I hereby apologise) our search for agency will address Heidegger’s model critically and from the conviction that our reality is human being as bearer of Nature’s difference and specificity, and it isn’t intellectually undeliverable.  But there is no immediate way to it in Heidegger’s Dasein.  More clearly drawn parameters, strictly ontologically-derived, internally consistent, are necessary.

In this hunt for definition and consistency, then, I will confine myself to five examples of problem areas, and where possible suggest some re-working.  The objective is to demonstrate both the nature of the problem and that of the solution, and not to be exhaustive in any way; and out of that, as ever, to encourage the development of a complete and advantageous philosophy.

CASE 1: THE QUESTION OF CRISIS-DASEIN

As beings are biological and sociobiological and as their particular array of traits are inherited, so they are ethnically differentiated and specific.  The being of beings must, in its turn, and in its arrayal and deportment, carry some imprint of that specificity; not directly as a first-order effect of evolution, of course, but at the very least consequentially and receptively, like an ancient landscape, perhaps, weathered into uniqueness over the aeons.

Were this not the case then we would have to conclude that the being of a being is a neutral and unfeatured thereness, a profound and singular abstraction from the ontic, sans any hint of a constitution.  But we know perfectly well that the being of a tiger, say, is not that of a mollusc, and once one acknowledges the differential effect on being of different beings, then difference is unstoppable.  One’s enquiry must arrive at the principal specifics of difference, and with human being so we must come to ethnicity as a weathering effect on that ancient landscape.

Heidegger’s phenomenological interrogation of the meaning of being proceeds via the novel medium of a common base-entity or being-ness, Dasein.  Except through the presumption that authenticity will find its mark, he does not approach it from the proving direction of a constitution by imprimatur.  He is a putative light-shiner - he sets about determining “the basic content of Dasein’s existential constitution” with:

... those structures in which disclosedness constitutes itself: understanding, state-of-mind, falling, and discourse.

He analyses the temporality of each, pulling in anxiety and fear as “states of mind” which have the potential to disclose Dasein.  The direction of flow here is towards the shock and disaccommodation of some dread event, a personal disaster or, perhaps, natural disaster, which functions as “the exception”, knocking out the standard behavioural range of personhood, stripping everything back to the truth of a man.  On the surface it is not an unreasonable thesis.  Life conceivably can work like that although it is likely to be a very rare event indeed (which I will expand upon from Case 3 down); and given the power of absence and mechanicity in Man it is certainly not inevitable.  Everyone (excepting psychopaths, I suppose) has the full range of emotions.  Everyone reacts psychologically to disaster.  Some fight for every inch, some freeze, some submit and pray or don’t pray.  Who but the individual his or herself is to know what is from the very ground of that individual’s being and what from his or her personhood?  If it is only for the individual to know this, what is to save us from solipsism?  Then, even if it isn’t solipsistic, a reduction to the individual’s experience ineffably delivers us to a politics of prescribed universalism.  Nationalist philosophy could not issue from that.  Neither could it be systemic to the rest of human life, when there is no crisis in train.

In philosophy, as in politics, the universal tends to homogeny, and homogeny to distance from the lived reality, just as difference and specificity will tend to nearness to it.  An account of Man which does not adequately account for human difference and specificity will never produce a fit outcome.  The unfortunate people under its organising hand will be fated to live the lie of oneness.

Certainly, Heidegger did determine that Dasein has a constitution.  But the arraying of that, along with the conceptualisation of other significant elements in his schema, only encouraged co-option by the postmodern equalitarians.  Obviously, we, too, are looking to incorporate into our thinking that which is immediately useful and, where possible, to qualify whatever else has potential.  This essay is about the latter.

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This is an essay written for PA’s site.  It is a first attempt to shift British nationalism towards a genuine nationalism of ethnicity ...

In a word: ethnic.  In this primer I will set out a basic form of ethnic nationalism that British nationalists could create and promulgate so that we may yet make a philosophically and politically seriously assault on the citadel of Western elitism and political power, as these now operate in our home.  I will explain the great necessity but also the great difficulty of that task, and I will appeal to all nationalists to search their heart on the question, and to help in so much as they are able.

BASE ASSUMPTIONS

1. Our people are dying by the hand of our own political class and the corporate and banking interests which they serve.  It is, then, not a natural death, or an inevitable outcome of jet travel and the will of poor peoples around the world to improve their lives.  It is not a political mistake, or an act of stupendous negligence.  It is not a “pay-back” from history.  It is a political assassination, and the assassins know precisely what they are doing, and want to do it.  It is their chosen course for us.  It is a true genocide by Article 2 (c) of the 1948 Convention, for which they confidently expect not to have to answer.

The two principal methods the assassins employ are:

a) Endless, colonising and replacing migration of populations from elsewhere in the world.

b) Psychological warfare, also known as culture war, on the natural role and character of Man and Woman, and on our ethnic person.

But beneath these lies an array of deep-seated causalities acting upon us from the history of events and from the history of ideas, the sum of which presses us to the inevitable conclusion that “a serious assault on the citadel of Western elitism and political power” must mean a revolution on no mean scale.  A simple change to national politics alone will, in the longer term, be constrained and, finally, erased by the continuing effect of these foundational forces.  Many, and quite possibly all of them, have to be swept away, too.

The following chart of these forces, including those striving for control of the future of all humanity, supplies a relational form to them, be they historical or historiographical, or even futuristic!  I am still astonished, when I gaze at the totality of it, at just how much harm for our precious people there is in this world.  Heaven knows, there is room for some good.

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