Majorityrights Central > Category: War on Terror

Muammar Gaddafi and Aisha Gaddafi.

R2P, the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is the latest formulation which is used to rationalise just about any kind of arbitrary intervention without revealing the strategic and economic aims behind that intervention, lest those aims be subject to analysis or criticism in the international media.

Now that the situation in Libya has more or less settled into a repetitious cycle of instability of a predictably bad sort, it’s worth taking a retrospective look at the intervention, drawing together the various vectors which brought about this result.

Everyone likely remembers when Dick Cheney went on a sort of flamboyant tour talking down the Libyan intervention, because he thought it would result in disaster. The old Huguenot has many faults and has always been prone to over-extending his hand and overestimating the capabilities of the US military, but he is easy to understand because he actually is a true-believer in his own words, which means that he could at least be relied on to take the Global War on Terror seriously unlike many of his contemporaries. Cheney pointed out that even by R2P’s own logic, there was nothing to gain in terms of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ since Gaddafi had already given up his NBC weapons programme in 2003 and handed it all over to the United States.

Simultaneously, Libya had been an ally in the Global War on Terror and had collaborated repeatedly with the United Kingdom with intelligence sharing and even extraordinary rendition carried out against Islamist reactionaries of various stripes.

Cheney then invoked RAND RR637:

RAND Corporation, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists, 04 Jun 2014:

Research Questions

• What is the present status of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups?
• How has the broader Salafi-jihadist movement evolved over time, especially since 9/11?

This report examines the status and evolution of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups, a subject of intense debate in the West. Based on an analysis of thousands of primary source documents, the report concludes that there has been an increase in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups, fighters, and attacks over the past several years. The author uses this analysis to build a framework for addressing the varying levels of threat in different countries, from engagement in high-threat, low government capacity countries; to forward partnering in medium-threat, limited government capacity environments; to offshore balancing in countries with low levels of threat and sufficient government capacity to counter Salafi-jihadist groups.

Key Findings

The number of Salafi-jihadist groups and fighters increased after 2010, as well as the number of attacks perpetrated by al Qa’ida and its affiliates.

• Examples include groups operating in Tunisia, Algeria, Mali, Libya, Egypt (including the Sinai Peninsula), Lebanon, and Syria.
• These trends suggest that the United States needs to remain focused on countering the proliferation of Salafi-jihadist groups, which have started to resurge in North Africa and the Middle East, despite the temptations to shift attention and resources to the strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region and to significantly decrease counterterrorism budgets in an era of fiscal constraint.

The broader Salafi-jihadist movement has become more decentralized.

• Control is diffused among four tiers: (1) core al Qa’ida in Pakistan, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri; (2) formal affiliates that have sworn allegiance to core al Qa’ida, located in Syria, Somalia, Yemen, and North Africa; (3) a panoply of Salafi-jihadist groups that have not sworn allegiance to al Qa’ida but are committed to establishing an extremist Islamic emirate; and (4) inspired individuals and networks.

The threat posed by the diverse set of Salafi-jihadist groups varies widely.

• Some are locally focused and have shown little interest in attacking Western targets. Others, like al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, present an immediate threat to the U.S. homeland, along with inspired individuals like the Tsarnaev brothers — the perpetrators of the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. In addition, several Salafi-jihadist groups pose a medium-level threat because of their desire and ability to target U.S. citizens and facilities overseas, including U.S. embassies.

Recommendations

• The United States should establish a more adaptive counterterrorism strategy that involves a combination of engagement, forward partnering, and offshore balancing.
• The United States should consider a more aggressive strategy to target Salafi-jihadist groups in Syria, which in 2013 had more than half of Salafi-jihadists worldwide, either clandestinely or with regional and local allies.

Now, why would Dick Cheney be going around hawking this research in defiance of the US government in 2014? We know that it is not due to the usual partisan party-political reasons, because US party-political divisions are largely illusory anyway. The only explanation is that he seriously thought that the US was doing something that he didn’t think it was ‘supposed’ to be doing.

This means that there was a fundamental rift between Dick Cheney’s view of reality, a view of reality which had evolved between 2001 and 2007, and the new (or old, depending on how you look at it) reality that had asserted itself after 2011 as Hillary Clinton happened to be steering the ship of foreign policy as Secretary of State. This is not due to a difference in character of the individuals per se, but rather, a difference in the circumstances at the time, which Cheney had not caught up to because he was no longer in office and was not subject to the countervailing winds of lobbying (this includes not only positions taken by companies, but also positions taken by whole states, significantly, Israel and its ‘Clean Break’ programme going into effect in Libya) which reflect the change in economic necessity. Cheney is still living ‘in 2007’. The logic of capital was thus partially revealed through the nature of the ‘gap’ between Cheney’s—now out of office—and Clinton’s—then in office—understanding of the situation.

After 2001, there was the perception among the Americans—or at least, it appeared that such a perception existed—that the days of leveraging Salafist-jihadists as a tool of American foreign policy had ended, because the events of 11 September 2001 had shown them that a new enemy had emerged and that this enemy was the very same Salafist-jihadism that they had been patronising in one way or another through the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Some of the Americans seemed to actually be of that mind themselves, and so it may not have been a mere perception.

However, we live in a reality in which material economic factors have predominance over the idealist conceptions, and in cases where the two do not line up, the longer the timeline is extended, the more the economic factors come into predominance. As Friedrich Engels said:

Marx and Engels Correspondence, ‘Engels to Borgius’, 25 Jan 1894 (emphasis added):

Their efforts clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by necessity, which is supplemented by and appears under the forms of accident. The necessity which here asserts itself amidst all accident is again ultimately economic necessity. This is where the so-called great men come in for treatment. That such and such a man and precisely that man arises at that particular time in that given country is of course pure accident. But cut him out and there will be a demand for a substitute, and this substitute will be found, good or bad, but in the long run he will be found. That Napoleon, just that particular Corsican, should have been the military dictator whom the French Republic, exhausted by its own war, had rendered necessary, was an accident; but that, if a Napoleon had been lacking, another would have filled the place, is proved by the fact that the man has always been found as soon as he became necessary: Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc. While Marx discovered the materialist conception of history, Thierry, Mignet, Guizot, and all the English historians up to 1850 are the proof that it was being striven for, and the discovery of the same conception by Morgan proves that the time was ripe for it and that indeed it had to be discovered.

So with all the other accidents, and apparent accidents, of history.

The further the particular sphere which we are investigating is removed from the economic sphere and approaches that of pure abstract ideology, the more shall we find it exhibiting accidents in its development, the more will its curve run in a zig-zag. So also you will find that the axis of this curve will approach more and more nearly parallel to the axis of the curve of economic development the longer the period considered and the wider the field dealt with.

In Germany the greatest hindrance to correct understanding is the irresponsible neglect by literature of economic history. It is so hard, not only to disaccustom oneself of the ideas of history drilled into one at school, but still more to rake up the necessary material for doing so. Who, for instance, has read old G. von Gülich, whose dry collection of material nevertheless contains so much stuff for the clarification of innumerable political facts!

For the rest, the fine example which Marx has given in the Eighteenth Brumaire should already, I think, provide you fairly well with information on your questions, just because it is a practical example.

By quoting this, am I implying now that the United States and some of its allies have been drawn into finding it economically ‘necessary’ to support Salafist-jihadists? Yes, it seems that economics has reasserted itself.

Previously I had, with some degree of confidence, said this on the issue:

Kumiko Oumae / Majorityrights, ‘North Atlantic: You Have Spread Your Dreams Under Their Feet’, 11 Jul 2015 (emphasis added):

Islamists feel that their economic and social relevance is being sidelined by the dominance of international finance capital and the national bourgeoisie of countries in the developing world who have been activated by the unbinding of the circle of North Atlantic finance that took place after the 1970s. After the 1970s, capital flowed out of the North Atlantic area and into the developing zones in the periphery.

As a result of that movement of capital, social transformations took place, which Islamist reactionaries of different sorts interpreted as being a threat to their own dominance over the civic spaces - some of these being countries, some of them being zones within countries - in the Middle East and Central Asia.

However, this chaotic process, out of which a new order will emerge, is entirely necessary and is justified by the role that the actors in the North Atlantic are playing. I use the word ‘justified’ not in the petty-moralist sense of the term, but rather, in the scientific and economic sense of the term. The international financial system exhibits its justification for existing - its historical role - through the fact that it takes its surplus wealth and uses it to wend its way through every corner of the earth looking for new ways to engender the development of productive forces. This is a role that it will continue to be justified in taking on, until such time as it exhausts its progressive potential and is necessarily sublated and superseded by new social and economic systems, ones which would be established on socialist or syndicalist foundations. There is considerable evidence since 2008 that the system of international investment is already approaching its structural limits, and that various actors are attempting to explore those limits. And that after the development and interconnectivity of South East Asia is completed, ‘zero-profit capitalism’ could next emerge.

It’s clear now that the progressive potential of American and French capitalism is drawing to a close. Whereas previously the trajectory seemed to be that these states would find themselves locked into a zero-sum conflict over the fate of the Arc of Instability, the present interest of monopoly capital in maintaining their market share in the face of competition from elsewhere, is to enter into a ‘Holy Alliance’ of compromise and retrogression in which the United States and France begin to cooperate with their former ecclesiastical and feudal adversaries against a common threat of expropriation in the local sphere. They find themselves united in a common antipathy toward socialism, to shore up their global hegemonic position.

Bold statement, right? Do I have any proof at all to justify this view? Yes. See here:

U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779612 Date: 31 Dec 2015:

I don’t think that requires any particular comment. It practically speaks for itself.

However, could any of this have happened without tacit Russian consent? Let’s continue our retrospective:

The Jamestown Foundation, ‘Russia Placing Itself Above the Fray in Libya’, 29 Apr 2011 (emphasis added):

Russia made the US/NATO military intervention in Libya possible in the first place, by abstaining in the UN Security council vote on resolution 1973, rather than vetoing it. Russia’s March 27 abstention was a diplomatic masterstroke, poorly understood at that point by the Obama administration, which credited its “reset” for the Russian green light. As Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee, spelled it out: By abstaining, Russia has positioned itself to demand full observance of the resolution’s provisions by those who voted for it, and without sharing responsibility with those countries for the political consequences of their intervention (EDM, April 25).

As it turns out, the Western belligerents have undertaken this operation with insufficient forces; the US has withdrawn its most effective strike planes prematurely from action; and NATO — to which the US has largely devolved the operation — fights with one hand tied behind its back, unable to reinforce and escalate as long as Russia does not approve this via the UN Security Council, or by some tacit arrangement.

Arming the rebels is a poor option because it would simply prolong the conflict without a decisive outcome, absent of a massive US/NATO offensive. The top rebel commander, General Abdel Fattah Yunis, has rushed to Brussels, with a shopping list of weapons for insurgent forces that are yet to be trained. “We don’t mean light arms,” Yunis clarified for the press in Brussels. He wants Apache helicopters, anti-tank missiles, and torpedo boats for the rebel forces. “NATO has everything,” he judged (Interfax, April 28).

Russia will not necessarily or permanently veto a massive US/NATO offensive. Moscow will almost certainly negotiate its position, seeking trade-offs on issues of priority interest to Russia. For the time being, it can de facto tolerate an incremental escalation of offensive operations, insufficient for Western belligerents to win quickly, but sufficient to entangle them in yet another protracted conflict. If this scenario materializes, Moscow plans to emerge in some mediator’s role above the fray. And irrespective of the tempo of military operations, Russia is set to collect a windfall on European oil and gas markets, due to the halt in Libyan supplies for an indefinite period.

And:

The Jamestown Foundation, ‘Russia Unveils Political Objectives In Libya’, 21 Apr 2011 (emphasis added):

Based on statements by Medvedev, Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov, and other officials (“Moscow Positioning to Exploit Libya Stalemate,” EDM, April 21), Russian objectives at this stage in the Libya conflict can be summed up as follows:

1.  An early ceasefire in place, to be followed by mediated negotiations between Muammar Gaddafi’s government and the insurgents. Russia opposes regime change in Tripoli, but seems noncommittal on two key issues: Gaddafi’s personal departure from power and Libya’s territorial unity. With or without Gaddafi, an early ceasefire in place would result in dividing Libya de facto into eastern and western territories, pending an uncertain outcome of negotiations between Tripoli and Benghazi.

2.  Adherence to the UN Security Council’s existing mandate, which is limited to enforcement of a no-fly zone. Russia tolerates US/NATO air strikes in support of the outgunned insurgents, but opposes any ground operations, or arms supplies and training, to the same insurgents. Such prohibitions ensure the military superiority of pro-government forces, while the air strikes merely help the insurgents to fight defensively. Thus, Russian policy favors an inconclusive, open-ended civil conflict in Libya.

3.  No legitimate US/NATO actions without the UN Security Council’s, i.e. Russia’s, consent. Russia wants the Security Council to evaluate NATO’s compliance with the relevant resolutions on Libya. Such deference to the United Nations (instrumental in Moscow, ideological in the Obama administration) can open a way for Russia to affect NATO policy decisions through its role in the UN Security Council.

4. A halt on Libyan oil and gas supplies to the European continent. Russia gains from the unexpected interruption of those supplies and is interested in a prolonged halt. This has become, tacitly but indubitably, a Russian objective in the Libya crisis. Thanks to this conflict, Russia free-rides on higher prices for its oil and gas; it can increase its market share in Italy, Austria, Germany, and potentially other European countries; and gains more lobbying power for Russian energy projects that increase European dependence on Russian supplies.

Beyond the objectives linked directly with this conflict, Moscow has a broader interest in seeing the US and NATO tied down in wars of choice and other protracted confrontations. These increase Russia’s leeway for action in ex-Soviet [Central Asian] territories, Russia’s top priority. Moscow must welcome the disproportionate allocation of Western resources to expeditionary wars from shrinking defense budgets in NATO Europe, where lack of military investment stands in contrast with Russia’s ambitious military modernization program.

So, that’s that. My intent was not to rehash things that are already known, but rather, to draw a view of the conflict which may not be known to the average observer, particularly not observers taking the positions favourable to Russia that have become standard to “WN” and “the Alternative Right”. Positions which are of course completely at odds with the actual nature of the Russian Federation.

Part two will fill in some gaps on the role of Israel and Ethiopia in the Libyan conflict and its aftermath, as both countries made strategic gains as a result and were invested in the outcome. So stay tuned for that.

First debate - click image above or here.

Update - Second debate here:

Update - Third and final debate here:

  Hillard Clump

The conventions reveal a “Hillard Clump” as the candidates pursue the same fundamental paradigm shift in domestic and foreign relations - which is ultimately anti-White.

The Republican and Democratic conventions show a common paradigm behind both parties in terms of domestic and foreign agendas: both sides were superficial in presenting themselves as the nationalist champions, concerned to protect the economic interests of classes below Jewish and other oligarch interests. Their policies a) hearken back to older industrial methods - production methods by which America cannot compete and which are obsolete compared to the robotic methods a first world nation should pursue in self interest; and b) policies of tariffing, which will not only hurt the Asian economy, but raise the price of goods, and thereby offset wage increases domestically. Thus, the ostensible nationalism of Hillard Clump is not going to improve the economic prospects of underclass Americans. In fact, both sides are just pursuing policies which retain America’s liberal, de-White unionizing basis - the Republicans have revitalized their party by placating Whites with the hope that they may find their way through the proposition nation with dog whistles to “anti-PC”, etc.; hence, maintaining the party as good sport in the mutual foil game. By following suit, Whites are being roped-in to its racial mixing bowl; while the Democrats pursue their more flagrant pro-non-Whites agenda to make the “choice” seem more dramatic and important than ever - there isn’t a dramatic choice: It’s Hillard Clump.

Both sides are working for the same overall paradigmatic shift in foreign policy as well, configuring foreign relations to secure Jewish and oligarch interests. Hillard Clump are in favor of subduing Iran and its deal at the behest of Israel. Even more significantly, they are both shifting toward a policy of containment of Asia, and China in particular: Trump will present Israel’s Russian option against China and the rest of Asia, while Hillary will favor Saudi; but the primary outlook in either case is against Asian development - also against the rest of the third world development for those who care - however, the anti-Asian angle is significantly in Israel’s particular interests and NOT in White interests. That is because it will suppress Asian development in order to keep their ethnonational powers from growing, while Jewish and other oligarch interests keep comprador contacts (typically Muslim Imams) in place to exploit them. This policy of containing and suppressing Asia will not only hamper any projection and threat of Asian ethnonationalism against Jewish and oligarch exploitation, it will hamper Asian ethnostates from cooperating with European ethnonationalism against Jewish and oligarch power. At the same time Jewish and oligarch interests will continue to disrupt the projection of European/ White ethnonationalism through the ongoing promotion of race mixing civic nationalism in Europe and in America - in America, under the guise of “mutual economic class interest” (“protectionism” of America’s propositional underclasses); and in Europe, under the guise of needed labor and youthful diversity to break-up stayed nationalistic, racist, xenophobia. This foreign policy of Hillard Clump is thereby designed to head-off the possibility of European/ White ethnonational cooperation with Asian ethnonationalism because Jewish and other oligarch classes recognize that cooperation to be the greatest threat to their power and sources of power.

Examples of the common domestic/foreign paradigm shift from the conventions:

Republican: Ben Carson dog whistles a quote from The Book of Esther - “In such a time as this” (when war against Iran is called-for)

Democrat: Elijah Cummings expresses his true belief that the Democrats are opposed to oligarch interests, while he is forced to talk over the chants of fellow true believers, shouting, “stop the TPP.”

Washington Post: For three-full hours, they objected nearly every time a motion was brought up for a voice vote, calling instead for a roll call; they chanted against the TPP trade deal; they waved signs and banners.

Part two of Kumiko Oumae’s critical examination of Matt Parrott’s Christian traditionalism.

Subjects covered included: Global baptism, Christian universalism, homosexuality, Africa and the population question, Syria.

58 mins, 52.6 MB

Matt Parrott at NPI.

Summary: A two-part critical examination, conducted by Kumiko Oumae, of many areas of Matt Parrott’s Christian traditionalism, from Matt’s faith fundamentals as an Orthodox Christian traditionalist and nationalist - in that order - to Matt’s views on freemasonry, the relationship of Judaism to Christianity, the pagan past, how religion renews, global baptism, Christian universalism, homosexuality, Africa and the population question, and Syria.

Can I just say, from a personal perspective, that I thought the interview was a success, notwithstanding any hostilities which may have existed prior to it (and since). Kumiko was very well prepped and she did a great job of maintaining a high tempo of relevant and close questioning, to which Matt responded generously.

My thanks to you both.

This is part one: The fundamentals of Matt’s Orthodox Christian traditionalism examined, Freemasonry, Judaism and Christianity, the making of religions.

1 hr 22 mins, 75 MB.

I’ll cut up an article here:

MSN / New York Times, ‘Donald Trump Plays Down Role of U.S. in Global Crises’, 21 Jul 2016:

CLEVELAND — Donald J. Trump, on the eve of accepting the Republican nomination for president, said Wednesday that if he were elected, he would not pressure Turkey or other authoritarian allies about conducting purges of their political adversaries or cracking down on civil liberties. The United States, he said, has to “fix our own mess” before trying to alter the behavior of other nations.

Interesting!

[...] “This is not 40 years ago,” Mr. Trump said, rejecting comparisons of his approaches to law-and-order issues and global affairs to Richard Nixon’s. Reiterating his threat to pull back United States troops deployed around the world, he said, “We are spending a fortune on military in order to lose $800 billion,” citing what he called America’s trade losses. “That doesn’t sound very smart to me.”

Mr. Trump repeatedly defined American global interests almost purely in economic terms. Its roles as a peacekeeper, as a provider of a nuclear deterrent against adversaries like North Korea, as an advocate of human rights and as a guarantor of allies’ borders were each quickly reduced to questions of economic benefit to the United States.

This is really one of the most remarkable things about Trump. The most remarkable thing about him is that he says directly what other American leaders have cunningly masked all along. In that sense, Trump is not a fundamental change in America’s behaviour, he is more like America without the mask on, and with a different set of priorities.

Whereas previously, America was interested in encircling and enclosing Russia to prevent its expansion in the post-Soviet space, the elements of America that are now more interested in enclosing China are making Trump into their vehicle.

[...] Mr. Trump’s discussion of the crisis in Turkey was telling, because it unfolded at a moment in which he could plainly imagine himself in the White House, handling an uprising that could threaten a crucial ally in the Middle East. The United States has a major air base at Incirlik in Turkey, where it carries out attacks on the Islamic State and keeps a force of drones and about 50 nuclear weapons.

Mr. Trump had nothing but praise for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the country’s increasingly authoritarian but democratically elected leader. “I give great credit to him for being able to turn that around,” Mr. Trump said of the coup attempt on Friday night. “Some people say that it was staged, you know that,” he said. “I don’t think so.”

Trump is now Turkey. Erdogan is now America.

[...] Asked if Mr. Erdogan was exploiting the coup attempt to purge his political enemies, Mr. Trump did not call for the Turkish leader to observe the rule of law, or Western standards of justice. “When the world sees how bad the United States is and we start talking about civil liberties, I don’t think we are a very good messenger,” he said.

The Obama administration has refrained from any concrete measures to pressure Turkey, fearing for the stability of a crucial ally in a volatile region. But Secretary of State John F. Kerry has issued several statements urging Mr. Erdogan to follow the rule of law.

Donald Trump is in complete agreement with the Obama Administration on this issue. The only difference is a minor difference in rhetoric.

[...] Mr. Trump said he was convinced that he could persuade Mr. Erdogan to put more effort into fighting the Islamic State. But the Obama administration has run up, daily, against the reality that the Kurds — among the most effective forces the United States is supporting against the Islamic State — are being attacked by Turkey, which fears they will create a breakaway nation.

Asked how he would solve that problem, Mr. Trump paused, then said: “Meetings.”

Translation: He will do nothing.

[...] Ousting President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, he said, was a far lower priority than fighting the Islamic State — a conclusion the White House has also reached, but has not voiced publicly.

“Assad is a bad man,” Mr. Trump said. “He has done horrible things.” But the Islamic State, he said, poses a far greater threat to the United States.

Trump is actually lying here. Trump has previously said that he would deliberately allow ISIL to do maximum damage to the Syrian government, because that is in the American national interest, which he considers to be more important than coordinating with global stakeholders.

[...] He said he had consulted two former Republican secretaries of state, James A. Baker III and Henry Kissinger, saying he had gained “a lot of knowledge,” but did not describe any new ideas about national security that they had encouraged him to explore.

Donald Trump is reverse-Nixon, that’s all you need to know.

[...]

“To me, ‘America First’ is a brand-new, modern term,” he said. “I never related it to the past.”

He paused a moment when asked what it meant to him.

“We are going to take care of this country first,” he said, “before we worry about everyone else in the world.”

Well, there it is.

Abraham Anon

Kumiko was telling me about her disgust with Hillary and the YKW’s wars, citing an egregious collateral damage to schools and education: this will obstruct solutions to the root of social problems and exacerbate social problems from the root as the schools and formative educational years of vast demographics are being destroyed. She is enraged by the damage this will do to personal and social skills. She asks what can be done?

I suggest a new variant of the 12 step meetings. Why? Because when people have been that damaged and obstructed by an interpersonal problem - such as Islamic abuse - it will be primarily these people who have sufficient understanding; they will have sufficient concern; it will be a necessity for them to take the time and show patience; to articulate the difficulties in full significance of the impact to them and society; and to search for solutions.

People who have not gone through this will generally not have sufficient understanding of the difficulties of getting through it, even if they did have inclination and take time from their faster track to a good life to put up with the wild and frustrating expressions that result from traumatic experiences and pervasive abuse.

The “victims” themselves will carry most of the load - by “sharing their hope, strength and inspiration” indispensable coping skills will find their way among them. But that doesn’t mean that people coming from a background undergirded by normal philosophy and interpersonal relations shouldn’t interact with them; in fact, that is one of the first differences I would make from the 12 Step programs - to have intermittent interaction from people from healthy backgrounds so that they can model normalcy for them and share normal skills. To make sure that bad thinking doesn’t keep circulating and gets directed out before long.

So, there could be Visitors Meetings and Skilled Workshop Meetings to go along with the usual kinds of 12 Step meetings -

Speaker Meetings, in which one person tells the story of their struggle with the problem.

Step Meetings, in which one of the Steps is focused-on, with each person in the group having a chance to discuss their take and experience with that step.

The next change that I would propose is putting into question whether 12 should be the number of steps; of course it has pagan origin and has been hijacked by Abrahamism, but perhaps another number should be proposed to make the break more clear.

Of course the content of the steps should be significantly different as well. I will only sketch-in what they might look like. Suggestions from others are more than welcome.

One of the excellent features of the 12 step program idea is that one is not excluded for lacking skills or for not contributing dues. All that is required is a belief that you have a problem with the stated issue of the meeting group and that you comply with a few of its basic guidelines. There are no leaders. You agree to not expose the identity of those who go to meetings and to not gossip about them to people outside the group. You agree enough with the 12 steps (rather, we’ll go with 14 steps, why not?) to allow them to provide coherence; and, except for speaker meetings, you allow a chance for each person who wants to talk.

Ok. There are probably some things that I’m forgetting but that’s enough to start. Let me have a stab at how the steps might read:

The 14 Steps of Abraham-Anon

1. Came to understand that I had a problem with Abrahamism and that I could not handle it alone.

2. Came to identify positive attributes of my distinct race and my share in these positive attributes. Affirmed these daily to provide faith in mine and my people’s worth as opposed to the Abrahamic god.

3. Conducted a fearless and searching personal inventory in order to purge its memes which may harm myself, my people, and in order to make amends to anyone who I have harmed in the name of Abrahamism or because I was inappropriately directing my response to it.

4. Came to understand the truth of how harmful Abrahamism is.

5. Came to understand Abrahamism is not a necessary evil nor a relative cultural preference; there are other “gods” and better ways.

6. Came to understand that its practice and promotion must be rejected by our people.

7. Came to understand that its perpetrators can and must be punished - ranging from denunciation, to social ostracism, to denationalization, to severe personal punishment in some cases.

8. Came to believe in the priceless gift of serenity to be found in the faith that my race, my place within it, and our interests are being looked after by the best and greater part of my people; by myself included.

9. Came to believe not only in the reality of distinct kinds of people, but also their right to preserve their differences.

10. Came to believe in the DNA Nation and international ethno-nationalism (genetic and territorial bounds); as the means to such maintenance of distinct peoples; their quantities and qualities of genetic inventory; their habitats through national territorial delimitations; qualitative and quantitative foreign enclave delimitations.

11. Came to believe that the Abrahamic religion and the Abrahamic man is already an imperialist hybrid and therefore his fate and place is the subject of our discretion.

12. Came to believe that Abrahamism can and should be destroyed once and for all.

13. Came to believe facilitating that destruction to be our prerogative as the people who are willing and capable of respecting racial differences, their right to be preserved in ethno-states, among the DNA Nation; and knowing that there is no avoiding the issue of morals - that every society will have some things that are legitimate, some things prohibited and some things obligated - will seek moral orders based on the Silver Rule as opposed to The Golden Rule.

14. Came to understand that the homeostasis of our ethnostates are contingent upon having the decency and wisdom to respect an option for sacred and devotional enclaves for those preferring strict monogamy (e.g., they want to choose carefully enough, devote themselves to that important choice; and/or concentrate on their endeavors otherwise, not chasing around for partners); and that those wanting to protect more liberal personal prerogatives must assent to that sacrosanct option and to strict national borders of citizenship -  paradigmatic conservatism.

The Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of 11 September 2001 has now had the 28 pages relating to Saudi Arabia declassified.

This means that an area of this document that used to be completely covered in black bars, now is almost completely visible. The Saudis were strongly opposed to having this section declassified and made available, as was the executive branch of the US. However, contradictions between different factions in the US Congress has led to a situation where it has been declassified.

Predictably, the framing that the western media has given it, is to try to portray it as though there is nothing interesting in the document. Nothing could be further from the truth. Every paragraph is actually interesting.

Here is a small selection of what is inside, with highlights placed on it by me:

That is just a narrow selection of what is inside the document. I leave it to our readers to decide whether it looks interesting or not.

We should never forget that the attacks of 11 September 2001 were not just an attack against the United States, but rather an attack against the whole world. The centre of world finance, albeit flawed, had not exhausted its progressive potential, but it was attacked by the most regressive and most backward social forces. It is incumbent on us all to acknowledge where that attack came from and who supplied the ideological and logistical support which made it possible.

It should be clear that when the next memorial for the 11 September 2001 attacks is held, it should not be a time to make an oath of peace. Rather it should be a time to renew our intentions and recommit ourselves to permanent and neverending global war against all those who threaten to pull us asunder.

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