Majorityrights Central > Category: Liberalism

Regarding your people’s history and future, the (((choice))) you get with U.S. politics is no choice.

The White Left has NOT issued its first, or any fatwa, as Nick Cohen asserts, but what The SPLC has done is tantamount to aiding and abetting one.

One may argue that Nick Cohen is as confused as his audience about the terms “left” and “liberal”, but it is not likely that someone with the name Cohen and entrusted to a prominent writing position at The Spectator is trying to be careful about clearly describing a platform to serve the full class of White interests - i.e., a White Left, not to be confused with liberalism, a confusion of terms promoted by his fellow tribesmen, and by which they’ve been able to confuse the public for decades now.

In fact, he does indulge in a new twist. Whether he fancies himself as being descriptive of White liberals (in his view, Jews, such as Mark Potok of the SPLC, would be included as White) or he has some idea of the power of our burgeoning White Left platform, and therefore seeks to confuse it pre-emptively, he is attributing to the term “White left” logics of meaning and action which do not follow from our platform of White Left Nationalism - The White Class.

Indeed, I had discussed the case of Maajid Nawaz with Kumiko, who had explained to me the irony of The SPLC placing this man on their “hate list.”

While I am against making the distinction between “radical and moderate” Islam, as I recognize all of Islam to be harboring and wielding our destruction, whether most active in a present episode or not, I would not go so far as to put at risk to a fatwa a man who has, in fact, come to denounce the more violent and destructive expressions of Islam and is trying to encourage other Muslims to take advantage of more healthy, moderate and liberal life possibilities.

Kumiko showed me this video of a speaking engagement of Nawaz’s, where he describes his project. She and I agree that Nawaz is a bit off in his recommendations - we would ultimately prefer a full denunciation of Islam in favor of Left Nationalism for his people, but also agree that such sudden prescription is both unrealistic and would be even more dangerous to him; as would our taking his side, in defense of him against the SPLC. Kumiko figured that we would not help him, that we would contextualize him in a way that exposes him more to Muslim violence by associating him with platforms (such as this) of White advocacy; while making an association here would also expose him to further Jewish vitriol, such as The SPLC placing him on their “hate list.”

Nevertheless, we think, “of all the Muslims to put on their hate list!” ?

The last straw for me though, making it a bad option to keep silent, was this Cohen guy trying to say that “The White Left” has issued a “fatwa” on Maajid Nawaz, when in fact it is The SPLC that is putting him at that risk, with a clear signal to more radical Muslims - “have a go at him, we wash our hands of defending him in his attempt to moderate Islam.”

Now then, for a look at the article which attempts to blame something which Cohen calls “the white left” for this.

The Spectator, “The white left has issued its first fatwa”, by Nick Cohen, 31 Oct 2016:

Maajid Nawaz

[Cohen]: I have never advised anyone to use the English libel laws. I spent years helping the campaign to reform them, and am proud of the liberalisation I and many, many others helped bring. I have to admit, though, our achievement was modest.

...and hypocritical, as now you misappropriate the term and in fact libel what would be a proper articulation of The White Left, if the term were disentangled from decades of Jewish journalese confusing “left and liberal;” and understood properly by contrast - by the public, and somehow by copyright law.

Ibid: Libel in England remains sinister in intent – the defendant has to prove he or she was telling the truth – and oppressive in practice. Parliament and the asinine Leveson inquiry into the press failed to tackle the horrendous costs, and kept libel as the preserve of the rich and the reckless. You can risk spending £1 million before a case comes to court. Despite reform, libel courts remain the place oligarchs and charlatans go to suppress the truth.

Well, I will not initiate a case against the sinister intent of Jewish media, even though I believe it is their sinister intent to prevent White (as in not Jewish) people from organizing, unionizing in their exclusive defense - a defense of those Whites who are relatively innocent, who are not right wing supremacists, but are rather characteristically cooperative, non-coercive separatists: White Left ethnonationalists -  that there is by contrast an antagonism, a persistent, sinister intent on the part of (((media, academia and other niches))) to confuse the term “left” with “liberal” when it applies to Whites and a would-be “White Left” in order to keep them from defending themselves against the genocide that is being launched against them by Jewish and neo-liberal interests: by means of open immigration of exploding non-White populations, “anti-racism” (i.e., prohibition of White discrimination on the basis of racial and ethnic groups, even in national interest), ubiquitous promotion of race-mixing, endless propaganda of Whites as evil, advancing non-White interests with and against the concept of “White privilege” applied across the board, to all Whites, as something to be “legally corrected” ...their right to abstain from forced contract and imposition undone - a feudal differentiation of laws which disadvantage White organized defense; compelling their mere servitude, their ultimate extinction enforced at the behest the YKW and neo-liberal PTB.

Not only would Cohen libel the term, “White Left,” saying “it has issued a fatwa” but he’s libeled The White Left also by associating it with neo-liberalism and the SPLC in its nefarious irresponsibility to put further at risk a man who is risking his safety to try to encourage more reasonable ways for Muslims.

The White Left is issuing no such fatwa against this man, and rather believes that his heart is in the right place, even if still a bit misguided.

Ibid: Last night, however, I found myself advising the anti-fascist campaigner Maajid Nawaz to sue in the London courts.  I even gave him the names of lawyers who would be happy to help. The attack he is facing is so grotesque, ferocious remedies seem the only response.

It is not “fascism” that he is campaigning against inasmuch as he is articulate - it is the right-wing feudalism of Islam and its (terroristic, if need be) imposition of imam compradores, radical shock troops and the feudal Muslim way of life against what would have been Left ethnoationlaist nations; if not for the destructive imposition as aided and abetted by neo-liberals.

Ibid: Nawaz’s enemy is not the usual user of the libel law: a Putin front-man or multinational. It is an organization that ought to share Nawaz’s values, but because of the crisis in left-wing values does the dirty work of the misogynists, the racists, the homophobes, the censors, and the murderers it was founded to oppose. It does it with a straight face because, as I am sure you will have guessed, the fascism in question is not white but Islamic. And once that subject is raised all notions of universal human rights, and indeed basic moral and intellectual decency, are drowned in a sea of bad faith.

Lets clarify what is really going on here, Nawaz’s enemies are right wingers, Jews (such as the SPLC) and neo-liberals who seek Islamic compradores and shock troops to disrupt Left ethnonationalsm.

Ibid: Nawaz is from Essex. He has fought and been beaten up by white British neo-Nazis. He fell in with Hizb ut-Tahrir while he was young. When he ended up in a torture chamber in an Egyptian jail, he abandoned Islamism for liberalism. Since then, he and his Quilliam Foundation have struggled against both the white far right and the Islamist far right. They have defended liberal Muslims and, indeed, all of us from lethal blasphemy taboos and the threat of terrorism. They respect freedom of speech, including the freedom of their enemies to speak. (When they asked me to introduce their report on online extremism, I was pleased to see them warning the state against the folly of trying to ban extremism rather than argue against it.) Quilliam and Nawaz support women’s rights and gay rights. They believe that there is no respectable reason why men and women with brown skins should not enjoy the same rights as men and women with white skins. They think they should try to stop young Muslims joining Islamic State, not just for the sake of the Yazidis they will take into sex slavery, or the civilians they will tyrannise and kill, but for the sake of the young Muslims themselves.

And now you would try to say that we, “The White Left,” are issuing a “fatwa” against a man who is trying to do this good work? Who is libelous here? Not The White Left: we issue no such fatwa. On the contrary, we commend his good intention.

READ MORE...

Muammar Gaddafi and Aisha Gaddafi.

R2P, the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is the latest formulation which is used to rationalise just about any kind of arbitrary intervention without revealing the strategic and economic aims behind that intervention, lest those aims be subject to analysis or criticism in the international media.

Now that the situation in Libya has more or less settled into a repetitious cycle of instability of a predictably bad sort, it’s worth taking a retrospective look at the intervention, drawing together the various vectors which brought about this result.

Everyone likely remembers when Dick Cheney went on a sort of flamboyant tour talking down the Libyan intervention, because he thought it would result in disaster. The old Huguenot has many faults and has always been prone to over-extending his hand and overestimating the capabilities of the US military, but he is easy to understand because he actually is a true-believer in his own words, which means that he could at least be relied on to take the Global War on Terror seriously unlike many of his contemporaries. Cheney pointed out that even by R2P’s own logic, there was nothing to gain in terms of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ since Gaddafi had already given up his NBC weapons programme in 2003 and handed it all over to the United States.

Simultaneously, Libya had been an ally in the Global War on Terror and had collaborated repeatedly with the United Kingdom with intelligence sharing and even extraordinary rendition carried out against Islamist reactionaries of various stripes.

Cheney then invoked RAND RR637:

RAND Corporation, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists, 04 Jun 2014:

Research Questions

• What is the present status of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups?
• How has the broader Salafi-jihadist movement evolved over time, especially since 9/11?

This report examines the status and evolution of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups, a subject of intense debate in the West. Based on an analysis of thousands of primary source documents, the report concludes that there has been an increase in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups, fighters, and attacks over the past several years. The author uses this analysis to build a framework for addressing the varying levels of threat in different countries, from engagement in high-threat, low government capacity countries; to forward partnering in medium-threat, limited government capacity environments; to offshore balancing in countries with low levels of threat and sufficient government capacity to counter Salafi-jihadist groups.

Key Findings

The number of Salafi-jihadist groups and fighters increased after 2010, as well as the number of attacks perpetrated by al Qa’ida and its affiliates.

• Examples include groups operating in Tunisia, Algeria, Mali, Libya, Egypt (including the Sinai Peninsula), Lebanon, and Syria.
• These trends suggest that the United States needs to remain focused on countering the proliferation of Salafi-jihadist groups, which have started to resurge in North Africa and the Middle East, despite the temptations to shift attention and resources to the strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region and to significantly decrease counterterrorism budgets in an era of fiscal constraint.

The broader Salafi-jihadist movement has become more decentralized.

• Control is diffused among four tiers: (1) core al Qa’ida in Pakistan, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri; (2) formal affiliates that have sworn allegiance to core al Qa’ida, located in Syria, Somalia, Yemen, and North Africa; (3) a panoply of Salafi-jihadist groups that have not sworn allegiance to al Qa’ida but are committed to establishing an extremist Islamic emirate; and (4) inspired individuals and networks.

The threat posed by the diverse set of Salafi-jihadist groups varies widely.

• Some are locally focused and have shown little interest in attacking Western targets. Others, like al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, present an immediate threat to the U.S. homeland, along with inspired individuals like the Tsarnaev brothers — the perpetrators of the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. In addition, several Salafi-jihadist groups pose a medium-level threat because of their desire and ability to target U.S. citizens and facilities overseas, including U.S. embassies.

Recommendations

• The United States should establish a more adaptive counterterrorism strategy that involves a combination of engagement, forward partnering, and offshore balancing.
• The United States should consider a more aggressive strategy to target Salafi-jihadist groups in Syria, which in 2013 had more than half of Salafi-jihadists worldwide, either clandestinely or with regional and local allies.

Now, why would Dick Cheney be going around hawking this research in defiance of the US government in 2014? We know that it is not due to the usual partisan party-political reasons, because US party-political divisions are largely illusory anyway. The only explanation is that he seriously thought that the US was doing something that he didn’t think it was ‘supposed’ to be doing.

This means that there was a fundamental rift between Dick Cheney’s view of reality, a view of reality which had evolved between 2001 and 2007, and the new (or old, depending on how you look at it) reality that had asserted itself after 2011 as Hillary Clinton happened to be steering the ship of foreign policy as Secretary of State. This is not due to a difference in character of the individuals per se, but rather, a difference in the circumstances at the time, which Cheney had not caught up to because he was no longer in office and was not subject to the countervailing winds of lobbying (this includes not only positions taken by companies, but also positions taken by whole states, significantly, Israel and its ‘Clean Break’ programme going into effect in Libya) which reflect the change in economic necessity. Cheney is still living ‘in 2007’. The logic of capital was thus partially revealed through the nature of the ‘gap’ between Cheney’s—now out of office—and Clinton’s—then in office—understanding of the situation.

After 2001, there was the perception among the Americans—or at least, it appeared that such a perception existed—that the days of leveraging Salafist-jihadists as a tool of American foreign policy had ended, because the events of 11 September 2001 had shown them that a new enemy had emerged and that this enemy was the very same Salafist-jihadism that they had been patronising in one way or another through the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Some of the Americans seemed to actually be of that mind themselves, and so it may not have been a mere perception.

However, we live in a reality in which material economic factors have predominance over the idealist conceptions, and in cases where the two do not line up, the longer the timeline is extended, the more the economic factors come into predominance. As Friedrich Engels said:

Marx and Engels Correspondence, ‘Engels to Borgius’, 25 Jan 1894 (emphasis added):

Their efforts clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by necessity, which is supplemented by and appears under the forms of accident. The necessity which here asserts itself amidst all accident is again ultimately economic necessity. This is where the so-called great men come in for treatment. That such and such a man and precisely that man arises at that particular time in that given country is of course pure accident. But cut him out and there will be a demand for a substitute, and this substitute will be found, good or bad, but in the long run he will be found. That Napoleon, just that particular Corsican, should have been the military dictator whom the French Republic, exhausted by its own war, had rendered necessary, was an accident; but that, if a Napoleon had been lacking, another would have filled the place, is proved by the fact that the man has always been found as soon as he became necessary: Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc. While Marx discovered the materialist conception of history, Thierry, Mignet, Guizot, and all the English historians up to 1850 are the proof that it was being striven for, and the discovery of the same conception by Morgan proves that the time was ripe for it and that indeed it had to be discovered.

So with all the other accidents, and apparent accidents, of history.

The further the particular sphere which we are investigating is removed from the economic sphere and approaches that of pure abstract ideology, the more shall we find it exhibiting accidents in its development, the more will its curve run in a zig-zag. So also you will find that the axis of this curve will approach more and more nearly parallel to the axis of the curve of economic development the longer the period considered and the wider the field dealt with.

In Germany the greatest hindrance to correct understanding is the irresponsible neglect by literature of economic history. It is so hard, not only to disaccustom oneself of the ideas of history drilled into one at school, but still more to rake up the necessary material for doing so. Who, for instance, has read old G. von Gülich, whose dry collection of material nevertheless contains so much stuff for the clarification of innumerable political facts!

For the rest, the fine example which Marx has given in the Eighteenth Brumaire should already, I think, provide you fairly well with information on your questions, just because it is a practical example.

By quoting this, am I implying now that the United States and some of its allies have been drawn into finding it economically ‘necessary’ to support Salafist-jihadists? Yes, it seems that economics has reasserted itself.

Previously I had, with some degree of confidence, said this on the issue:

Kumiko Oumae / Majorityrights, ‘North Atlantic: You Have Spread Your Dreams Under Their Feet’, 11 Jul 2015 (emphasis added):

Islamists feel that their economic and social relevance is being sidelined by the dominance of international finance capital and the national bourgeoisie of countries in the developing world who have been activated by the unbinding of the circle of North Atlantic finance that took place after the 1970s. After the 1970s, capital flowed out of the North Atlantic area and into the developing zones in the periphery.

As a result of that movement of capital, social transformations took place, which Islamist reactionaries of different sorts interpreted as being a threat to their own dominance over the civic spaces - some of these being countries, some of them being zones within countries - in the Middle East and Central Asia.

However, this chaotic process, out of which a new order will emerge, is entirely necessary and is justified by the role that the actors in the North Atlantic are playing. I use the word ‘justified’ not in the petty-moralist sense of the term, but rather, in the scientific and economic sense of the term. The international financial system exhibits its justification for existing - its historical role - through the fact that it takes its surplus wealth and uses it to wend its way through every corner of the earth looking for new ways to engender the development of productive forces. This is a role that it will continue to be justified in taking on, until such time as it exhausts its progressive potential and is necessarily sublated and superseded by new social and economic systems, ones which would be established on socialist or syndicalist foundations. There is considerable evidence since 2008 that the system of international investment is already approaching its structural limits, and that various actors are attempting to explore those limits. And that after the development and interconnectivity of South East Asia is completed, ‘zero-profit capitalism’ could next emerge.

It’s clear now that the progressive potential of American and French capitalism is drawing to a close. Whereas previously the trajectory seemed to be that these states would find themselves locked into a zero-sum conflict over the fate of the Arc of Instability, the present interest of monopoly capital in maintaining their market share in the face of competition from elsewhere, is to enter into a ‘Holy Alliance’ of compromise and retrogression in which the United States and France begin to cooperate with their former ecclesiastical and feudal adversaries against a common threat of expropriation in the local sphere. They find themselves united in a common antipathy toward socialism, to shore up their global hegemonic position.

Bold statement, right? Do I have any proof at all to justify this view? Yes. See here:

U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779612 Date: 31 Dec 2015:

I don’t think that requires any particular comment. It practically speaks for itself.

However, could any of this have happened without tacit Russian consent? Let’s continue our retrospective:

The Jamestown Foundation, ‘Russia Placing Itself Above the Fray in Libya’, 29 Apr 2011 (emphasis added):

Russia made the US/NATO military intervention in Libya possible in the first place, by abstaining in the UN Security council vote on resolution 1973, rather than vetoing it. Russia’s March 27 abstention was a diplomatic masterstroke, poorly understood at that point by the Obama administration, which credited its “reset” for the Russian green light. As Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee, spelled it out: By abstaining, Russia has positioned itself to demand full observance of the resolution’s provisions by those who voted for it, and without sharing responsibility with those countries for the political consequences of their intervention (EDM, April 25).

As it turns out, the Western belligerents have undertaken this operation with insufficient forces; the US has withdrawn its most effective strike planes prematurely from action; and NATO — to which the US has largely devolved the operation — fights with one hand tied behind its back, unable to reinforce and escalate as long as Russia does not approve this via the UN Security Council, or by some tacit arrangement.

Arming the rebels is a poor option because it would simply prolong the conflict without a decisive outcome, absent of a massive US/NATO offensive. The top rebel commander, General Abdel Fattah Yunis, has rushed to Brussels, with a shopping list of weapons for insurgent forces that are yet to be trained. “We don’t mean light arms,” Yunis clarified for the press in Brussels. He wants Apache helicopters, anti-tank missiles, and torpedo boats for the rebel forces. “NATO has everything,” he judged (Interfax, April 28).

Russia will not necessarily or permanently veto a massive US/NATO offensive. Moscow will almost certainly negotiate its position, seeking trade-offs on issues of priority interest to Russia. For the time being, it can de facto tolerate an incremental escalation of offensive operations, insufficient for Western belligerents to win quickly, but sufficient to entangle them in yet another protracted conflict. If this scenario materializes, Moscow plans to emerge in some mediator’s role above the fray. And irrespective of the tempo of military operations, Russia is set to collect a windfall on European oil and gas markets, due to the halt in Libyan supplies for an indefinite period.

And:

The Jamestown Foundation, ‘Russia Unveils Political Objectives In Libya’, 21 Apr 2011 (emphasis added):

Based on statements by Medvedev, Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov, and other officials (“Moscow Positioning to Exploit Libya Stalemate,” EDM, April 21), Russian objectives at this stage in the Libya conflict can be summed up as follows:

1.  An early ceasefire in place, to be followed by mediated negotiations between Muammar Gaddafi’s government and the insurgents. Russia opposes regime change in Tripoli, but seems noncommittal on two key issues: Gaddafi’s personal departure from power and Libya’s territorial unity. With or without Gaddafi, an early ceasefire in place would result in dividing Libya de facto into eastern and western territories, pending an uncertain outcome of negotiations between Tripoli and Benghazi.

2.  Adherence to the UN Security Council’s existing mandate, which is limited to enforcement of a no-fly zone. Russia tolerates US/NATO air strikes in support of the outgunned insurgents, but opposes any ground operations, or arms supplies and training, to the same insurgents. Such prohibitions ensure the military superiority of pro-government forces, while the air strikes merely help the insurgents to fight defensively. Thus, Russian policy favors an inconclusive, open-ended civil conflict in Libya.

3.  No legitimate US/NATO actions without the UN Security Council’s, i.e. Russia’s, consent. Russia wants the Security Council to evaluate NATO’s compliance with the relevant resolutions on Libya. Such deference to the United Nations (instrumental in Moscow, ideological in the Obama administration) can open a way for Russia to affect NATO policy decisions through its role in the UN Security Council.

4. A halt on Libyan oil and gas supplies to the European continent. Russia gains from the unexpected interruption of those supplies and is interested in a prolonged halt. This has become, tacitly but indubitably, a Russian objective in the Libya crisis. Thanks to this conflict, Russia free-rides on higher prices for its oil and gas; it can increase its market share in Italy, Austria, Germany, and potentially other European countries; and gains more lobbying power for Russian energy projects that increase European dependence on Russian supplies.

Beyond the objectives linked directly with this conflict, Moscow has a broader interest in seeing the US and NATO tied down in wars of choice and other protracted confrontations. These increase Russia’s leeway for action in ex-Soviet [Central Asian] territories, Russia’s top priority. Moscow must welcome the disproportionate allocation of Western resources to expeditionary wars from shrinking defense budgets in NATO Europe, where lack of military investment stands in contrast with Russia’s ambitious military modernization program.

So, that’s that. My intent was not to rehash things that are already known, but rather, to draw a view of the conflict which may not be known to the average observer, particularly not observers taking the positions favourable to Russia that have become standard to “WN” and “the Alternative Right”. Positions which are of course completely at odds with the actual nature of the Russian Federation.

Part two will fill in some gaps on the role of Israel and Ethiopia in the Libyan conflict and its aftermath, as both countries made strategic gains as a result and were invested in the outcome. So stay tuned for that.

The application of what are called human rights by what, these days, is adjudged to be the human rights industry is roundly and rightly deprecated by nationalists.  This isn’t news.  But it is not only us.  It’s fair to say that the white man in the street tends to much the same view.  By natural instinct alone he understands that none of the silvered words of the great panjandrums, those politico-corporate whores and criminals who wallow in their own faux-virtue at the UN and all the international conferences, and in the TV studios … none of their gracious, corrupt schtick is meant to benefit him.  He is not one of their designated victims.  He knows elitism when he sees it, and it isn’t deference he feels toward it.  Ask him about the Human Rights Act (or, if you like, dress it up as the European Convention on Human Rights) and he will tell you about some Pakistani hate preacher or African multiple rapist who says and does what he wants but, somehow, never gets deported.  Ask him about the human rights lawyers who work the courts and win these verdicts, and he’ll narrow his eyes and tell you he’d like to ship the lot of them off to Somalia for a little life-education.  It is the stubborn, abiding dissent of the sturdy yeoman, and it comes straight out of who he is, defiant and unabashed.

He’s probably far from alone, too.  I imagine that even in these neo-Marxised times there are plenty of perfectly liberal-minded lawyers operating in other, less rarified areas of the legal system who also have some mixed feelings on the subject.  They might say of their HR colleagues, “Good luck to them if there’s money in it”.  But classically liberal-minded lawyers and judges will care about the integrity and political neutrality of the law.  The judiciary, after all, is its custodian and interpreter.  Judges, if they have not grown political themselves, should tend to discomfort with any politicisation of the justice system.  The overt campaigning fervour for social justice which typifies HR progressives ... indeed, the whole idea of an intrusive hyper-egalitarian, internationalist political bandwagon really ought to offend against their professional principles.

That said, this essay is not one about signs of light in the darkness.  This essay is about the fundamentals of the life which our history has vouchsafed us, and which has brought us to the pass in which we now labour.  It is about a history of serial anti-identitarian developments, of which human rights and the universalism which underpins them are but a sign and a sadness.  My apologies for the length.  I hope it will prove interesting and informative.

Rights, but how human?

For our part, we nationalists are bound to ask how, in practise, that seminally Christian ideal of an overriding and overarching love of one’s fellow man, and compassion for his suffering, degenerated into an instrument of global political activism undertaken for the purpose of solidising and advancing a new technocratic elite whose priestly function is to stand over the world and make moral distinctions between “the rich north” and “the poor south”, or “privileged whites” and “oppressed non-whites”, or “narrow-minded, xenophobic racists” and “suffering refugees”, etcetera.  The answer, of course, is that love has absolutely nothing to do with it.  Indeed, these men and women who affect to love everyone love no one but themselves.  Their self-interested political activism is the inevitable precondition for regulating and maintaining a panoply of positive rights which are, without exception, contingent upon other values and sensibilities about what is just and fair.  Even the perfectly understandable claim in Article 3 of the 1948 UN Declaration, that “everyone has the right to life”, is not actually natural in kind (something I will come to later).  It, like the other twenty-eight articles, is grounded in Western presumptions and preoccupations, and interpretations which are quotidian, fluid and highly susceptible to political fashion.  Consider Article 22, which states:

READ MORE...

First debate - click image above or here.

Update - Second debate here:

Update - Third and final debate here:

    Fail: on this one, your erudition yields an F-

In minute 2:18 - 2:21:18 of a discussion with TRS, Greg Johnson proposes to do away with the idea that John Locke’s notion of civil individual rights is a key fundament of U.S. politics and suggests that it is only portrayed as such by Jewish interests.

First and foremost, Greg is ignoring the fact that it is in the group interests of Whites to criticize this notion for basically the same reasons that Jews have - especially for its bias against their capacity for group discrimination.

Johnson argues that Calvinism and Republicanism, in the latter case in particular, by way of reading Montesquieu, were exponentially more important to the founders. Maybe they were, but that doesn’t translate to what became important in the life of ordinary everyday Americans for over 100 years.

Are people concerned with The Republic? Well, of course not very much in any practical sense. You can set aside the bit about Montesquieu being more influential by a factor of a hundred. This is a case of an erudite man pulling rank to the detriment not only of the truth, but of important utility.

The second matter is of Calvinism and its inherent means to exclude Jews. The separation of Church and State is integral to The U.S. Constitution, so any such notion of this being more relevant than Lockeatine rights in the every day lives of Americans - or even for those who set the agendas - is way off the mark. Again, it displays a wish for some of that unused erudition to come in handy in a place where it does not really help.

To look at Locke’s notion of individual rights as set against and problematizing group organization is the best way to critique the foundations of America in terms of what has left racial defense susceptible. This is what makes racial defense extremely difficult, because it de-legitimizes group organization.

Given individual rights as the characteristic and definitive law of the land, when people raise concerns about how borders and boundaries are to be maintained, i.e., when people do try to tarry with these strictures, at best they tend to render crazy propositions (disingenuous or naive) that not only will the markets take care of themselves by the magic hand, but boundaries and borders around groups will be taken care of by the magic hand as well. In a word, Locke’s empirical objectivism is a force of liberalism that is available for easy exploitation - by Jewish interests, liberals and other later day objectivists, be they Austrian School or other form of objectivist.

Nobody around here is saying that Jewish interests would not have taken advantage of The Constitution’s empirical basis. Nobody should be naive enough, however, to believe that just because Jews reject it for its troubling of group organization and discrimination, that we should not problematize it on that basis as well, in order to discriminate on behalf of ourselves.

Greg is being that naive and asking us to be that naive when he tries to pull rank and suggest that Montesquieu is more influential by a factor of a hundred. Well, maybe he was to the founders. But ask Americans, including politicians, what matters to them when push comes to shove - for the past hundred years or so, what matters to them? Montesquieu, Calvin or their Lockeatine rights?

Part two of Kumiko Oumae’s critical examination of Matt Parrott’s Christian traditionalism.

Subjects covered included: Global baptism, Christian universalism, homosexuality, Africa and the population question, Syria.

58 mins, 52.6 MB

Matt Parrott at NPI.

Summary: A two-part critical examination, conducted by Kumiko Oumae, of many areas of Matt Parrott’s Christian traditionalism, from Matt’s faith fundamentals as an Orthodox Christian traditionalist and nationalist - in that order - to Matt’s views on freemasonry, the relationship of Judaism to Christianity, the pagan past, how religion renews, global baptism, Christian universalism, homosexuality, Africa and the population question, and Syria.

Can I just say, from a personal perspective, that I thought the interview was a success, notwithstanding any hostilities which may have existed prior to it (and since). Kumiko was very well prepped and she did a great job of maintaining a high tempo of relevant and close questioning, to which Matt responded generously.

My thanks to you both.

This is part one: The fundamentals of Matt’s Orthodox Christian traditionalism examined, Freemasonry, Judaism and Christianity, the making of religions.

1 hr 22 mins, 75 MB.